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In almost all countries in the world, the public sector consists of multiple levels.
The highest level is the national level and is usually represented by the central
government or federal government. Sub-national levels of the government may range
from states, provinces, or regions that come directly below the national level, to
counties, municipalities or cities at the local level. The government in a country
may decide to devolve part of its responsibilities to these sub-national levels of
the government. An important reason to do so is the believe that sub-national
governments, because of their closer proximity to citizens, are better informed and
more responsive to the specific wishes of these citizens. This advantage in preference
matching and responsiveness is hoped to enable sub-national governments to find
better and more effective ways to fulfill the wishes of the constituencies than their
national counterparts (cf. Oates, 1999).
The degree to which governments devolve their responsibilities to sub-national
levels of the government differs across countries. Figure 1.1 shows the share of sub-
national government expenditures in total government expenditures, a widely used
measure of the government’s vertical structure, for several countries over the pe-
riod 1972–1981 and the period 2001–2007. Some countries such as Cyprus, Greece,
Morocco, and Iran are highly centralized, and almost all expenditures in these coun-
tries take place at the national level. Other countries such as Canada, Denmark,
and Switzerland, where around half of all government expenditures take place at the
sub-national government level, are highly decentralized. The degree of decentraliza-
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Notes: Data are from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 2010.
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Introduction and Summary
tion not only differs across countries but also changes over time within countries.
Argentina, Belgium, Chile, and Spain all became more decentralized, while Norway
and Peru became more centralized.
The first part of this thesis looks whether differences in countries’ vertical struc-
ture of the government are associated with differences in certain outcomes. More
specifically, we look at the outcomes of fiscal decentralization since the measures of
the government’s vertical structure we use are based on expenditure and revenue
data of the government. Studies that look at the outcomes of fiscal decentralization
focus primarily on its possible economic efficieny improvements as a result of better
preference matching and responsiveness of more decentralized governments. Other
possible outcomes, such as the provision of public goods, governance, and the sat-
isfaction with or amount of trust in the government receive far less attention or no
attention at all. Chapter 2 empirically analyzes the relationship of fiscal decentral-
ization and one of these alternative outcomes, namely the amount of trust citizens
have in their government.
Although formal, or even informal, theories on the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and trust in government are absent, we argue that the responsive-
ness advantages of more decentralized fiscal systems translate into a higher degree
of citizens’ trust in their government. We use repeated cross-section survey data of
individuals to measure trust in government. This structure allows us to deal with
some of the methodological concerns, such as a possible omitted variable bias, that
may plague the relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government.
We find that more decentralized fiscal systems are beneficial for trust in government.
Since higher levels of trust may be beneficial for political and economic reasons (cf.
Keele, 2007; Knack and Keefer, 1997), we argue that these trust benefits should
be taken into account when making an assessment of the pros and cons of fiscal
decentralization.
In Chapter 3, we take a closer look at the relationship between fiscal decentraliza-
tion and economic growth. Despite the considerable attention it has received in the
literature, there is no consensus on the possible economic efficieny improvements of
more decentralized fiscal systems. Of more than fifteen studies considered, there are
3
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almost as many studies that find a positive, a negative, or no relationship. Differ-
ences in the number or type of countries, the time period of the analysis, estimation
methods, empirical specifications, and data used make it hard to pin down an ex-
planation for these results. More importantly, only a few of these studies deal with
possible reverse causality problems, which is a concern regardless of any differences
these studies may have. Another concern is the accuracy with which conventional
government revenue and expenditure based measures of fiscal decentralization re-
flect the autonomy of sub-national governments. This concern has led to the use
of alternative measures of fiscal decentralization, although a consensus of what the
effect of doing so is compared to the use of conventional measures is absent. We
address both concerns in this chapter.
We deal with possible reverse causality problems by introducing instrumental
variables based on the origin of the legal system, the federal system, country size,
and geographical distance. We argue that countries that are similar in these aspects
share a similar process of fiscal decentralization. These instrumental variables are
preferred over the ones used in the literature so far. Compared to standard internal
instruments, such as the lag of fiscal decentralization itself, they do not lead to a
loss of observations, and they are stronger instrumental variables than conventional
external instruments. Using a sample of 56 countries over the period 1990–2007, we
find evidence that fiscal decentralization is beneficial for economic growth. The use
of alternative measures for fiscal decentralization that capture the autonomy of sub-
national governments better than the conventional ones may change this outcome.
However, this result seems more likely to be caused by the accompanied changes in
the sample rather than the use of the alternative fiscal decentralization measures
themselves.
The second part of this thesis leaves the notion that governments can devolve part
of their responsibilities to lower government levels. Rather, it treats governments as
single-level entities that have to deal with certain challenges. The challenge discussed
in this part of the thesis can best be described as a fiscal dilemma. More specifically,
governments face the challenge to develop fiscal systems, or set fiscal policies, such
that they result in sufficient revenues to deal with long-run budget challenges and
4
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Figure 1.2: Growth of GDP per worker and Debt-to-GDP ratio
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promote economic growth at the same time. These objectives are a challenge since
taxes used by the government to raise these revenues harm economic activity, deter
investments, and likely lead to lower economic growth.
Although governments always face this fiscal dilemma, it seems especially rele-
vant in the last few years. Figure 1.2 shows the average annual growth rate of gross
domestic product (GDP) per worker and the government debt-to-GDP ratio over
the last 15 years for several countries, where the time period is divided in two parts,
1998–2007 and 2008–2012. For most of the countries, the average growth rate of
GDP per worker in these last five years is considerably lower than it was a decade
before that. For example, Finland went from an average annual growth rate of over
2 percent to a growth rate of almost minus 1 percent. At the same time, the average
debt-to-GDP ratio became larger in these last couple of years for most of the coun-
tries. Hence, in the recent years where economic activity came to a standstill or even
declined, the long-run budget challenges of the government became even harder.
Lowering tax rates to deal with this fiscal dilemma seems a very counterintuitive
measure. However, one may believe that the stimulating effects that these lower
taxes have on economic activity partly, or even more than completely, offset the
initial loss in tax revenues. This notion is best illustrated by the Laffer curve (Laffer,
1979), which describes an inverted u-shaped relationship between the level of a tax
rate and the amount of revenues it can raise. The possibility that tax cuts can fully
pay for themselves is very unlikely. The levels of tax rates or behavioral elasticities
necessary for such a situation to occur would be too large to be justified empirically
(e.g., Fullerton, 1982). A lot of these studies used static partial equilibrium models,
ignoring general equilibrium effects and long-run implications of fiscal policies. This
leaves the question whether a tax cut can partly, or completely, pay for itself over
time open.
Ireland (1994) is one of the first to show that it is possible for tax cuts to pay for
themselves when the stimulating effects of these tax cuts in the long run are taken
into account. However, this finding is not undisputed. Other studies show that
such a dynamic Laffer curve, or dynamic Laffer effect, is not possible or depends
on the value of behavioral elasticities, in this case the intertemporal elasticity of
6
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substitution. Chapter 4 looks at these conflicting results. Using a simple dynamic
general equilibrium framework, we decompose the dynamic Laffer effect in three
basic effects, namely the direct budget effect, the growth rate effect, and the discount
rate effect. This decomposition enables us to reconcile the different results found
in the literature. The necessary assumption for a dynamic Laffer effect to occur is
not related to the value of the behavioral elasticities, but it is the assumption that
governments should commit to a path of expenditures that is growing at a lower rate
than the economy itself. Under this assumption, resources are being freed up in the
future that are used to make up the initial loss in revenues caused by the tax cuts.
If this condition is satisfied, fiscal instruments with lower initial tax bases, such as
the tax rate on capital income, are more likely to lead to a dynamic Laffer effect.
Studies that look at the impact of fiscal policies on the long-run budget balance of
the government and the economy are referred to as ‘scoring exercises’. These scoring
exercises are a useful tool to look at the above described fiscal dilemma. Chapter
5 performs such a scoring exercise. In contrast to related studies, which mainly
use neo-classical models where the growth rate is taken as given (e.g. Mankiw and
Weinzierl, 2006), we use a model where economic growth is the result of intentional
research and development by firms. Such a framework is especially interesting since
it usually features monopolistic distortions and some form of externalities, lending
itself to study active government policies. Of course, studying fiscal policies of
the government only makes sense if government activities are properly taken into
account. We address this issue by looking at a wide array of fiscal instruments such
as tax incentives with respect to research effort, tax rates on capital income, labor
income and consumption, and government expenditures. Moreover, the model covers
almost all government expenditures and revenues that are listed in the national
accounts.
From the scoring analyses we perform, it follows that allowing for more generous
tax incentives with respect to research effort is the least costly way, in terms of the
impact on the government budget, to stimulate economic activity. This policy is on
average almost three times as cost effective as lowering the tax rate on capital in-
come, which is the next best policy. We never obtain a dynamic Laffer effect for the
7
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fiscal policies considered. This last finding can be explained by the relatively large
deterioration of the government budget balance in the short run compared to the
resulting efficiency gains of these policies in the long run. Also, when non-distorting
financing options are unavailable, more generous tax incentives with respect to re-
search effort can best be financed by cutting government expenditures and raising
the tax rate on consumption. Finally, the model we develop has closed form so-
lutions in equilibrium, features tractable transitional dynamics, and comes with a
graphical apparatus that provides a clear insight in the mechanisms that are at work
after a change in a fiscal instrument. This makes it suitable to also study questions
other than dynamic scoring exercises.
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In Government We Trust: The Role of
Fiscal Decentralization1
2.1. Introduction
During the last decades, many developed and developing countries have devolved
parts of their fiscal policy-making authority to sub-national levels of government.
This process of fiscal decentralization has been promoted by changes in the geopolit-
ical landscape—such as the enlargement of the European Union and the breakup of
the former Soviet Union—dissatisfaction with the role of the central government in
policy setting, and the policy advice of the World Bank (Tanzi, 1995). International
policy institutions like the World Bank emphasize the improvements in allocative
efficiency resulting from more decentralized fiscal systems. The general notion is
that sub-national governments are better at delivering public goods that match lo-
cal preferences or providing a given level of public goods at lower cost or both (cf.
Oates, 1972, 1999).
Various empirical studies have measured the potential effects of fiscal decentral-
ization on allocative efficiency. In particular, a lot of attention has been paid to the
question whether fiscal decentralization can boost economic growth. So far, the em-
pirical evidence on the fiscal decentralization and economic growth nexus is mixed.2
1This chapter is based on Ligthart and Van Oudheusden (2011).
2Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Zhang and Zou (1998) find evidence of a negative relationship
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, whereas Thiessen (2003) and Iimi (2005) show
that fiscal decentralization enhances economic growth. Others do not find a significant relationship
(Woller and Phillips, 1998; Thornton, 2007).
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The strong focus on the dynamics of allocative efficiency implies that other possible
favorable effects of fiscal decentralization, such as lower corruption, a more effective
provision of public goods, and improved governance, have received less attention.3
More important, some political-economy aspects of fiscal decentralization, such as
the effect on trust in government—defined as the ‘judgment of the citizenry that the
system and the political incumbents are responsive, and will do what is right even
in the absence of constant scrutiny’ (Miller and Listhaug, 1990, p. 358)—and po-
litical institutions, have not received any attention at all. This chapter investigates
whether fiscal decentralization promotes trust in government. To our knowledge, we
are the first to analyze this relationship in a systematic way.
Why is it interesting to look at trust in government? From a political science per-
spective, trust in government is important for political leadership and governance.
More specifically, a larger degree of trust in government makes it easier to commit
resources that are needed for collective action or to obtain citizens’ compliance with
policy without coercion (Keele, 2007). Moreover, from an economic perspective,
more trust in government may indirectly contribute to improved economic perfor-
mance. Knack and Keefer (1997) show that a higher level of trust in government is
associated with a higher level of ‘social capital,’ which Putnam (2000, p. 19) defines
as ‘connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity
and trustworthiness that arise from them.’ A larger stock of social capital, in turn,
induces a higher rate of economic growth.4 These governance and macroeconomic
benefits make it particularly interesting to understand what factors contribute to
trust in government.
This chapter is related to studies analyzing the determinants of trust defined
more generally, which can be either trust in persons or institutions.5 Brehm and
Rahn (1997), Alesina and Ferrara (2002), Keele (2007), and Gustavsson and Jor-
dahl (2008) study the determinants of trust using data for a single country. Except
3Exceptions are Treisman (2000) and Fisman and Gatti (2002), who study empirically the
effect of fiscal decentralization on corruption, and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007), who study
its effect on governance and public goods provision.
4Not only Knack and Keefer (1997), but also Rodrik (1999) and Zak and Knack (2001) find
that economic growth rises with social capital.
5The definitions of trust in persons—also referred to as interpersonal trust—differ in the litera-
ture on trust, but generally refers to citizens’ confidence in each other as members of a community.
10
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for Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008), who use Swedish data, all studies pertain to the
United States. Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) employ data for
several countries to explain cross-country differences in trust. None of these studies,
however, investigate the effect of fiscal decentralization on trust. This chapter is
also somewhat related to papers studying aggregate determinants of individual out-
comes.6 Of these studies, the one that comes closest to ours is that of Bjornskov et al.
(2008), who analyze the effect of fiscal decentralization on subjective well-being.
We use an ordered response model to analyze the effects of fiscal decentralization
on several measures of trust in government defined in a broad sense (i.e., the gov-
ernment, civil services, parliament, and political parties). These measures of trust
in government—which are obtained from the World Values Survey—pertain to up
to 35,259 individuals from 13 countries over the period 1994–2007. We take into
account a wide array of determinants of trust at both the individual and aggregate
level. Because we use data from multiple surveys over time for a given country (i.e.,
a repeated cross section, where the respondents differ by survey), we can control
for country characteristics that are correlated with fiscal decentralization. On the
methodological side, we thereby extend Mishler and Rose (2001) and Bjornskov et al.
(2008), who do not control for this unobserved country heterogeneity.
Controlling for various macroeconomic determinants, individual determinants,
and unobserved country characteristics, we find that fiscal decentralization increases
trust in government. More specifically, a one standard deviation increase in fiscal
decentralization causes on average half a standard deviation increase in trust in
government, which is defined as the share of the population that indicates to trust the
government.7 The beneficial effect of fiscal decentralization on trust in government
is neither limited to nor necessarily large for relatively decentralized countries; that
is, the effect on trust in government can be relatively small for countries with a
highly decentralized fiscal system (e.g., Australia and Germany).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents some
6See the Mishler and Rose (2001), Di Tella et al. (2003), and Bjornskov et al. (2008).
7The effect is based on the average effect of fiscal decentralization on the measures of trust
in government as described above. The population share that trusts the government is based on
respondents that indicate to have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in these institutions; see
Section 2.2 for more details.
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theoretical considerations and discusses the data on trust in government and fiscal
decentralization. Section 2.3 sets out the methodology employed in estimating the
effect of fiscal decentralization on trust in government. Section 2.4 presents the
results, performs robustness checks, and addresses endogeneity concerns. Section
2.5 concludes the paper.
2.2. Trust in Government and Fiscal Decentralization
This section sheds light on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust
in government. We first present some theoretical considerations. Subsequently, we
provide a descriptive analysis of this relationship.
2.2.1. Theoretical Considerations
The formal literature on the non-economic benefits of fiscal decentralization is sparse.
Theories describing the link between fiscal decentralization and trust in government
are absent. However, existing theories on the economic benefits of fiscal federalism
are a good starting point in discussing the potential relationship between trust in
government and fiscal decentralization. One of the basic arguments in favor of
fiscal decentralization is provided by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972, 1999), who
claim that fiscal decentralization improves allocative efficiency. They reason that
sub-national governments have more information than national governments about
local preferences, reflecting their proximity to households. Accordingly, sub-national
governments are better at matching the provision of public goods to local preferences
than national governments. We hypothesize that improved preference matching may
not only translate into higher efficiency but also into more trust in government.
The above line of reasoning can also be extended to several other arguments in
support of fiscal decentralization such as Oates’s (1999) ‘laboratory federalism’ or
the competition argument of Brennan and Buchanan (1980). Oates (1999, p. 1132)
argues that ‘in a setting of imperfect information with learning-by-doing, there
are potential gains from experimentation with a variety of policies for addressing
social and economic problems’ and that the conditions to do so may be better
12
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when sub-national governments have fiscal policy-making authority. In other words,
fiscal decentralization creates an environment that may foster more effective public
policies. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that fiscal decentralization increases
jurisdictional competition, which constrains the total size of the public sector.
Again, this may not only lead to more efficient public service delivery but also to
higher trust in government.8 Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis. A larger degree of fiscal decentralization promotes trust in government.
Besides the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on trust in government, there
could also be an indirect effect. For example, fiscal decentralization may increase
the quality of the government, which in turn could increase trust in government.
However, the fiscal decentralization literature provides little to no guidance on the
transmission channels. Because we are interested in the direct effect, we will control
for potential indirect channels in our empirical analysis.
2.2.2. Data on Trust in Government and Fiscal Decentralization
The measures of trust in government are obtained from the World Values Survey of
the World Values Survey Association (2009). Our data are taken from three waves of
interviews of this survey, which cover up to 35,259 individuals over the period 1994–
2007. More specifically, we use data from the 1994–1999, 1999–2004, and 2005–2007
wave. Given that we do not have countries in our sample with interviews in 1999,
we use data over the period 1994–1998 for the 1994–1999 wave, so we have three
non-overlapping time periods; that is, 1994–1998, 1999–2004, and 2005–2007.
Although the World Values Survey dataset we use consists of 80 countries for
which data on our dependent variables are available, we consider two samples of 10
and 13 countries, respectively, that only partially overlap. Because of data limita-
tions implied by our choice of covariates, we had to drop a large number of countries
and observations. The majority of observations and countries drops due to the lim-
8Fiscal decentralization may also give rise to costs. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point to the
possibility of soft budget constraints at the local level, causing excessive debt accumulation.
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ited availability of fiscal decentralization data (38 countries).9 We have also removed
six countries with missing determinants at the individual level and 19 countries with
missing data on the remaining aggregate level determinants. We include only coun-
tries with at least two waves of surveys and matching fiscal decentralization data
so that we can control for country-specific fixed effects; see Section 2.3.1. The final
samples consist of selected OECD members, Eastern European and Latin American
countries. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix show the trimming procedure and
distribution of the interviews over the countries and waves for the two samples we
consider, respectively.
To capture trust in government, we study several governmental institutions. This
approach accommodates differences in the degree to which survey respondents may
experience or have knowledge about these institutions. For instance, survey respon-
dents may have a better grasp of the operations and performance of civil services
rather than the government because they had direct dealings with civil servants
in their town hall. In view of this approach, we employ four measures of trust in
government: (i) confidence in government; (ii) confidence in civil services; (iii) con-
fidence in parliament; and (iv) confidence in political parties. All four measures are
answers to the following question: ‘I am going to name a number of organizations.
For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them?’ Survey
respondents had to indicate their level of confidence on the following scale: ‘a great
deal of confidence,’ ‘quite a lot of confidence,’ ‘not very much confidence,’ or ‘none
at all.’
We follow Alesina and Ferrara (2002) in defining confidence in organizations as
trust in institutions. Moreover, since our selected organizations have in common that
they all cover a dimension of government, we define confidence in those organizations
as measures of trust in government. A somewhat similar approach is taken by Knack
and Keefer (1997), who define confidence in government in a broad sense by taking
an average of confidence in education, the legal system, the police, and the civil
service rather than looking at these institutions individually. Mishler and Rose
9Table B.3 of Ligthart and Van Oudheusden (2012b) shows the availability of fiscal decentral-
ization data by country.
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(2001) define political trust by taking the average of trust in parliament, the prime
minister or president, courts, police, political parties, and the military.10 Compared
to these studies, we employ more narrowly defined concepts of government and
do not average over government-related institutions. Indeed, Table 2.1 shows that
our different measures of trust in government are not very strongly correlated; the
correlation coefficients range from 0.45 to 0.68 and are significant at the 1 percent
level.
Table 2.1: Correlation Coefficients of Government Trust Measures
Civil Services Parliament Political Parties
Government 0.47*** 0.68*** 0.55***
Civil Services 0.55*** 0.45***
Parliament 0.64***
Notes: Based on the large sample of 13 countries; see Table A.2. ***, **, *
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
In line with most of the fiscal federalism literature, we measure fiscal decentral-
ization as the share of sub-national government expenditures in general government
expenditures. The data are taken from the 2010 edition of the IMF’s Government
Finance Statistics (GFS). Based on the IMF’s GFS Manual (2001), sub-national
expenditures are defined as expenditures on both the state and local government
level, where the state level refers to the largest geopolitical entity within a country
and the local level describes the smallest governmental units.11 General govern-
ment expenditures encompass public expenditures on the central, state, and local
government level.12 This measure of fiscal decentralization has been criticized by
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) and Thornton (2007) for not accurately rep-
resenting the degree to which sub-national governments have policy autonomy. The
10Brehm and Rahn (1997) and Alesina and Ferrara (2002) investigate confidence in the executive
branch of the federal government.
11Some countries (e.g., the United States and Spain) have more than one level of government
between the central level and the local level. In such cases, the GFS Manual groups the intermediate
levels of government together with the level they are most closely associated with.
12Some studies use the share of sub-national revenue in general government revenues as an
alternative measure (i.e., Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007). Typically, the revenue-based and
expenditure-based decentralization measures are highly correlated. Ligthart and Van Oudheusden
(2012b) show in Table B.7 that the main results of this paper can also be found using revenue-based
measures.
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OECD (1999) has developed an alternative measure of fiscal decentralization, which
takes into account various categories of tax autonomy of sub-national governments.
However, the OECD indicator is not available for the samples we are considering
and, therefore, we resort to the standard indicator used in the literature. We average
the fiscal decentralization data over the years corresponding to the three specified
time periods since fiscal decentralization data are not always available for the years
in which the interviews took place. Average decentralization ratios during 1994–2007
vary between 0.13 for Chile and 0.59 for Canada.
Figure 2.1: Confidence Shares and Fiscal Decentralization





















































0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Fiscal Decentralization





















































0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Fiscal Decentralization
Notes: Based on the large sample of 13 countries and three time periods; see Table A.2. The
horizontal axis measures the degree of fiscal decentralization and the vertical axis represents
the confidence share, which is defined as the percentage of survey respondents of a country




Figure 2.1 displays the unconditional relationships between the four measures of
trust in government and fiscal decentralization. To facilitate a graphical presenta-
tion, we use an aggregate measure of trust in government, the so-called confidence
share, which is defined as the percentage of survey respondents of a country in a
given wave that indicated to have either ‘a great deal of confidence’ or ‘quite a lot of
confidence’ (cf. Knack and Keefer, 1997). Panels (a)–(d) of Figure 2.1 show that the
confidence share is increasing in the degree of fiscal decentralization, although it rises
to a different extent for each measure. For instance, the unconditional relationship
is much stronger for confidence in civil services than for confidence in government.
2.3. Empirical Methodology
This section sets out an ordered response model for trust in government, presents
both individual-level and aggregate-level determinants, and discusses econometric
issues.
2.3.1. The Ordered Response Model
Our dependent variable in the analysis is a measure of trust in government described
in Section 2.2. Because the dependent variable is categorical and ordered, we use
an ordered response model. To capture the repeated cross-sectional nature of our
data—where households are different in each cross-section—we index individuals by
i(t), where i(t) = 1, . . . , I and t = 1, . . . , T . More specifically, we estimate the following
ordered logit model for individual i(t) residing in country j = 1, . . . , J at time t:
yi(t)jt = k if µk−1 < y∗i(t)jt ≤ µk for k = 1, . . . ,K, (2.1)
where k represents an index for the number of categories (where K = 4), µk is the




′zi(t)jt + ηj + φt + εi(t)jt, (2.2)
13The category yi(t)jt = 4 corresponds to the answer ‘a great deal of confidence,’ yi(t)jt = 3 to
‘quite a lot of confidence,’ yi(t)jt = 2 to ‘not very much confidence,’ and yi(t)jt = 1 to ‘none at all.’
The categories k = 1 and k = K = 4 (i.e., the extreme categories) are open-ended intervals with
µ0 → −∞ and µK →∞. See Long (1997) for further details on the ordered logit model.
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where xjt is a vector of variables at the aggregate level (Section 2.3.2.1), including
our measure of fiscal decentralization, zi(t)jt is a vector of variables at the individual
level (Section 2.3.2.2), and β and γ are vectors of parameters. The parameters
ηj and φt are country-specific fixed effects and wave fixed effects, respectively, and
εi(t)jt is a logistically distributed error term with mean zero and variance π2/3. We
include country dummies to control for unobserved country-specific fixed effects
such as culture. The potential effects of other time-invariant or highly persistent
determinants (e.g., ethnic fractionalization, democracy, and political autonomy) are
picked up by the country dummies as well. Wave dummies are employed to control
for shocks common to all countries. Because the analysis includes covariates defined
at the aggregate level while our dependent variable is measured at the individual
level, the regression disturbances may be correlated. To ensure the disturbances
are robust to dependency across individuals, we cluster the standard errors at the
country-wave level (cf. Moulton, 1990).
The probability of individual i(t) of country j choosing category k conditional on
xjt and zi(t)jt is given by
Prob(yi(t)jt = k|xjt, zi(t)jt) = F (µk − β′xjt − γ′zi(t)jt − ηj − φt)
− F (µk−1 − β′xjt − γ′zi(t)jt − ηj − φt),
where F (·) denotes the logistic cumulative density function of εi(t)jt. The correspond-










yi(t)jt ln Prob(yi(t)jt = k|θ,x, z), (2.3)
where θ ≡ [β γ ηj φt µ]′ is a row vector with parameters, and µ is the vector of
cut-points. For identification purposes, we set the constant to zero. Maximizing
(2.3) gives the estimates of the coefficient vectors β and γ, the fixed effects ηj and
φt, and the cut-points µk.
2.3.2. Determinants of Trust in Government
We now discuss the determinants of trust in government at both the aggregate and
individual level. Table A.3 in the Appendix presents descriptive statistics. We draw
18
Empirical Methodology
on the literatures on trust in institutions in determining the expected sign of the
determinants. Since there are only a few papers that deal with the determinants of
trust in institutions, we also look at papers dealing with the determinants of trust
in persons. Although Alesina and Ferrara (2002) find that these two forms of trust
are not necessarily correlated, there is evidence that trust in persons is affected in
the same way as trust in institutions (cf. Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Mishler and Rose,
2001).
2.3.2.1. Determinants at the Aggregate Level
Besides our variable of interest, the matrix xjt contains controls at the aggregate
level, which are measures of government quality, government size, income inequal-
ity, and both the level and volatility of the growth rate. Government quality is
measured by the government effectiveness indicator, which is taken from the World
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (2008). The government effectiveness in-
dicator captures the quality of public services, the capacity of the civil service and its
independence from political pressures, and the quality of policy formulation. The
indicator generally ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, where positive values reflect a better
institutional quality. The empirical analysis of Zak and Knack (2001) reveals a pos-
itive relationship between interpersonal trust and the quality of institutions related
to contract enforcement and corruption. Mishler and Rose (2001) find that both in-
terpersonal trust and trust in institutions decrease with corruption. Although these
studies do not investigate government quality, our measure of government quality
is highly correlated with measures of institutional quality related to corruption.
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between government quality and trust
in government.
We also control for the size of government in estimating the effect of fiscal de-
centralization on trust in government. Government size is measured by the share
of general government final consumption expenditures in Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), which is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(2010). To our knowledge, the relationship between government size and trust in
institutions has not been analyzed directly. However, Brehm and Rahn (1997) find
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that trust in institutions increases with life satisfaction and Bjornskov et al. (2008)
show that life satisfaction decreases with government size. In view of this, we expect
a negative relationship between government size and trust in government.
Income inequality is included to control for the effect of the income distribution
on trust in government. We measure income inequality by the Gini coefficient,
which is constructed using data taken from the World Income Inequality Database
(2008) of the World Institute for Development Economics Research.14 The analysis
of Alesina and Ferrara (2002) shows that the Gini coefficient is not related to trust
in institutions. However, Brehm and Rahn (1997), Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak
and Knack (2001), and Alesina and Ferrara (2002) do find a negative effect of the
Gini coefficient on interpersonal trust. The analysis of Gustavsson and Jordahl
(2008) does not find support for this relationship, but presents evidence of a negative
relationship with other measures of income inequality. Hence, we expect a non-
positive relationship between the Gini coefficient and trust in government.
We include the level and the volatility of the growth rate of real GDP per capita
to control for the effects of each country’s macroeconomic performance on trust in
government. We use the growth rate of real GDP per capita rather than its level
given the possible problems of regressing untrended trust measures on likely trended
variables such as the GDP per capita; see Di Tella et al. (2003).15 The growth rate is
defined as the growth rate of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (measured
in 2005 international dollars). The volatility of the growth rate is measured by the
standard deviation of the growth rate calculated based on the three specified time
periods. Mishler and Rose (2001) find that trust in institutions increases with the
GDP growth rate. However, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001)
do not find a relationship between the level of GDP per capita and trust, where
Knack and Keefer (1997) look at trust in institutions and Zak and Knack (2001) at
interpersonal trust. Therefore, we expect a non-negative relationship between the
14The database provides Gini coefficients based on different categories of income definition, type
of income adjustment, area coverage, and data quality ratings. In addition, per category there are
multiple measures per country per year. To construct one Gini coefficient per country per year, we
applied the following preference ranking: consumption-based measures are preferred over income-
based measures, national estimates are preferred over urban and rural estimates, and high-quality
data are preferred over low-quality data.




growth rate of real GDP per capita and trust in government. The literature has not
studied the effect of the volatility of the growth rate on trust yet. In view of the
negatively sloped frontier between the growth rate and volatility of the growth rate
(cf. Ramey and Ramey, 1995), the above relationship is likely to be negative.
2.3.2.2. Determinants at the Individual Level
The matrix zi(t)jt contains a set of explanatory variables at the individual level—all
are taken from the World Values Survey—which are measures of interpersonal trust,
gender, age, education, income, social class, and the importance of politics in life.
We are interested in estimating the effect of fiscal decentralization on government
confidence above and beyond the effect of interpersonal trust. This means that
interpersonal trust corrects for the respondent’s general level of trust, therefore
controlling for any personal bias in the subjective dependent variable. Interpersonal
trust takes the value one if survey respondents indicated that ‘most people can be
trusted’ and zero otherwise. Knack and Keefer (1997) find a positive relationship
between interpersonal trust and trust in institutions based on data at the aggregate
level. Using data at the individual level, the analysis of Brehm and Rahn (1997)
yields a similar result. Alesina and Ferrara (2002) analyze the correlation between
interpersonal trust and trust in several institutions employing data at the individual
level. They find that interpersonal trust is positively related to trust for some
government-related institutions, but these correlation coefficients are rather small.16
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between interpersonal trust and trust
in government.
Gender takes the value one if the survey respondent is male and zero otherwise.
Age and education are both represented by three categories: for age these are 15–24,
25–34, and 35–44, and for education these are lower, middle, and upper. Income is
represented by 10 categories, where category one corresponds to the lowest and 10
to the highest income level. Note that income levels denote the income deciles of the
survey respondents’ countries. Mishler and Rose (2001) find that both interpersonal
16For example, interpersonal trust has the strongest relationship with confidence in the executive
branch of the federal government but the corresponding correlation coefficient is only 0.06 (Alesina
and Ferrara, 2002, p. 216).
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trust and trust in institutions increase with age, but are not related to gender,
education, or income. The studies by Alesina and Ferrara (2002) and Gustavsson
and Jordahl (2008) find that interpersonal trust increases with income and education.
In contrast, Alesina and Ferrara (2002) show that interpersonal trust is lower for
women than for men and is increasing in age, while Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008)
reveal that interpersonal trust is not related to gender or age. Hence, we expect
that trust in government is either not related to gender or higher for men and is
non-negatively related to age, education, and income.
Social class is represented by five categories: upper, upper middle, lower middle,
working, and lower class. The four categories representing the importance of pol-
itics in life are based on survey respondents’ answers, which vary from ‘not at all
important’ to ‘very important.’ To our knowledge, the literature does not provide a
hypothesized sign for these covariates, but we expect them to be positively related
with trust in government.
Finally, as a robustness check, we include a dummy measuring whether an indi-
vidual is unemployed to control for economic performance effects at the individual
level. Brehm and Rahn (1997), Mishler and Rose (2001), and Gustavsson and Jor-
dahl (2008) point out that interpersonal trust is lower for individuals that are unem-
ployed. Mishler and Rose (2001) find the same relationship for trust in institutions
rather than interpersonal trust. We expect trust in government to be negatively
related to individual unemployment.
2.3.3. Endogeneity
One concern is the potential reverse causality of fiscal decentralization and trust in
government. Citizens’ trust in government may affect politician’s reelection proba-
bilities. Politicians in turn shape the political decision process on the appropriate
degree of fiscal decentralization. In Tanzi’s (1995) view, however, the devolution of
fiscal policy-making authority is unrelated to trust in government. In view of these
conflicting lines of reasoning, it is worthwhile to investigate the fiscal decentralization
and trust in government nexus further.
One could test for the potential endogeneity of fiscal decentralization by using
an instrumental variables (IV) approach. However, in the context of an ordered
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logit model, this is not a straightforward procedure given that our left-hand side
variable consists of four categories. Furthermore, traditional instruments for fiscal
decentralization such as the origin of a country’s legal system (Fisman and Gatti,
2002) and country size (Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007) are time invariant and
thus drop out in an analysis with country fixed effects. Therefore, we do not resort
to an IV approach. Instead, we follow Di Tella et al. (2003)—who also study the
effect of aggregate variables on outcomes at the individual level—by lagging our
variable of interest by one time period to deal with the problem of reverse causality.
More precisely, we lag fiscal decentralization by taking the average degree of fiscal
decentralization of the three years preceding the wave in which the interviews took
place. Since those data are not available for all countries, there is a reduction in
sample size. To alleviate the loss of observations, we use the large sample rather
than the small sample and look at both current and lagged fiscal decentralization.
As a second approach, Di Tella et al. (2003) include the lags of all variables at the
aggregate level and use the contemporaneous values of variables at the individual
level that are truly exogenous (e.g., age and gender).
2.4. Estimation Results
Section 2.4.1 discusses the benchmark estimation results and Section 2.4.2 performs
robustness checks and deals with endogeneity issues.
2.4.1. Benchmark Analyses
2.4.1.1. Effects of Determinants at the Aggregate Level
Panel (a) of Table 2.2 presents the ordered logit estimation results for determinants
at the aggregate level using the small sample of 22,794 individuals. In all regressions,
we include wave dummies, country dummies, and the determinants at the individual
level, except for the employment status, as discussed in Section 2.3.2.2. Column (1)
of Table 2.2 regresses confidence in government on fiscal decentralization. Columns
(2), (3), and (4) add the quality and size of the government, income inequality, and
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macroeconomic performance indicators, respectively.
In all cases, fiscal decentralization enters with a positive and significant coeffi-
cient. Because of the nonlinear nature of the model, the estimated coefficients do
not represent marginal effects. Section 2.4.1.3 discusses the interpretation of the size
of the effect of fiscal decentralization on trust in government. In line with expecta-
tions, both government size and income inequality feature a negative and significant
coefficient. The 2005–2007 wave coefficient is negative and significant, except for
the case where we include all covariates at the aggregate level. The coefficients of
government quality, the macroeconomic performance indicators, and the 1999–2004
wave are not significant.
In columns (5)–(8) of the table, we estimate the same set of specifications for
confidence in civil services. The results are very similar to the previous results.
Fiscal decentralization is positively related to confidence in civil services and both
government size and income inequality enter with a negative and significant effect.
The coefficients of the macroeconomic performance indicators and the 1999–2004
wave are again not significant. In contrast to confidence in government, the coeffi-
cient of government quality is now positive and significant and the 2005–2007 wave
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Columns (9)–(12) present estimation results for confidence in parliament. Fis-
cal decentralization again enters with a positive and significant coefficient. The
coefficient of government quality is never significant. Government size enters with
a negative coefficient, but is only significant at the 10 percent level for the case in
which we include all covariates at the aggregate level. Coefficients of income inequal-
ity, the macroeconomic performance indicators, and the 1999–2004 and 2005–2007
waves are similar in sign and significance as the coefficients in the case of confidence
in civil services.
Columns (13)–(16) show that in all cases fiscal decentralization is positively re-
lated with confidence in political parties. The coefficients of government size, income
inequality, and the 2005–2007 wave are always negative and significant. Government
quality has a positive coefficient for the case in which we include all covariates at
the aggregate level, but it is only significant at the 10 percent level. The remain-
ing coefficients differ from the corresponding coefficients of the other measures of
trust in government. More specifically, the 1999–2004 wave features a positive and
significant coefficient, except for the case where we include all determinants at the
aggregate level, and the macroeconomic performance indicators both show a negative
and significant coefficient.
The overall picture suggests a positive and significant relationship of fiscal de-
centralization with trust in government. This relationship is robust to the inclusion
of various control variables at the aggregate level. For those aggregate-level controls,
the evidence is in line with the findings in the trust literature. Government quality is
non-negatively related to trust in government and both government size and income
inequality are negatively related. We do not find evidence of a systematic relation-
ship between economic performance indicators at the aggregate level and trust in
government. Although not shown here, the individual country dummies are jointly
significant and we cannot reject the hypothesis that they should not be included in
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2.4.1.2. Effects of Determinants at the Individual Level
Panel (b) of Table 2.2 focuses on the determinants at the individual level. To
conserve on space, we restrict our attention to the estimation results corresponding
to columns (4), (8), (12), and (16) of panel (a) of Table 2.2, where we include
all determinants at the aggregate level. For all measures of trust in government,
interpersonal trust enters with a positive and significant coefficient. The coefficient
of gender is only significant for confidence in civil services and confidence in political
parties, where it is negative and the base category is female. Coefficients of the
15–24 and 25–34 age categories are negative and significant, coefficients of the lower
and middle education levels are positive and significant, and the base categories are
age 35–44 and higher education.17
17Exceptions are the coefficients of middle education for confidence in civil services and age
15–24 for confidence in political parties, which are not significant.
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Panel (b): Individual level
Government Civil Services Parliament Political Parties
(4) (8) (12) (16)
Interpersonal trust 0.391*** 0.338*** 0.405*** 0.302***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Male -0.014 -0.066*** 0.014 -0.051*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 15–24 -0.290*** -0.171*** -0.187*** -0.059
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Age 25–34 -0.194*** -0.144*** -0.166*** -0.095**
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Education is lower 0.336*** 0.151* 0.236*** 0.267***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Education is middle 0.132** 0.025 0.118** 0.146***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Income level 1 -0.285** -0.171** -0.189* -0.060
(0.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09)
Income level 2 -0.240* -0.071 -0.148 0.058
(0.13) (0.08) (0.13) (0.09)
Income level 3 -0.233** -0.058 -0.137 -0.025
(0.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.10)
Income level 4 -0.183* -0.049 -0.119 0.022
(0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
Social class is upper 0.187 0.195 0.147 0.004
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.19)
Social class is upper middle 0.409*** 0.266*** 0.362*** 0.259**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)
Social class is lower middle 0.272*** 0.209*** 0.201** 0.125
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Social class is working 0.166** 0.128** 0.079 0.055
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Politics is very important 0.577*** 0.453*** 0.688*** 1.154***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
Politics is rather important 0.676*** 0.479*** 0.740*** 1.021***
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Politics is not very important 0.490*** 0.346*** 0.508*** 0.665***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Aggregate covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,794 22,794 22,794 22,794
McFadden’s pseudo R2 0.0470 0.0642 0.0689 0.0562
Notes: The dependent variable is one of the four measures of trust in government, that is, confidence in government, civil services,
parliament or political parties. All equations include covariates at the aggregate level [panel (a) of Table 2, columns (4), (8), (12),
and (16), respectively]. The equations are estimated by ordered logit. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent
level, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients and are clustered at the country-wave level.
Base categories are female for gender, age 35–44, higher education, income level 10, social class is lower, and politics is not at all
important in life. Coefficients of income levels 5 to 9 are never significant for any measure of trust in government and are not
reported to conserve on space.
The estimation results for income level categories differ across the measures of
trust in government, although all measures have in common that the coefficients of
income levels 5 to 9 are not significant. Coefficients of income level categories are
never significant for confidence in political parties. For the other measures of trust
Chapter 2: In Government We Trust: The Role of Fiscal Decentralization
in government, income level 1 has a negative and significant coefficient. Coefficients
of income levels 2 to 4 are only significant for confidence in government and are
negative. In all cases, income level 10 is the base category. Social class categories
always enter with a positive coefficient for all measures of trust in government,
where the base category is lower social class. However, these coefficients are never
significant for the upper social class and always significant for the upper-middle
social class. The significance of the coefficients of the other social class categories
varies across the measures of trust in government. The categories measuring the
importance of politics in life always show up with a positive and significant coefficient
for all measures of trust in government, where the base category is that politics is
not at all important in life.
In sum, the estimated coefficients of the determinants at the individual level are in
line with the related literature, except for gender and education. Both interpersonal
trust and income are positively related with trust in government, whereas gender
and education have a negative relationship where a positive one is expected. The
negative effect of education on trust in government may be explained by the inclusion
of social class as a control variable, which is positively related to trust in government
and positively associated with education.
2.4.1.3. Marginal Effects of Fiscal Decentralization
Because we use an ordered logit model, the sign of the estimated coefficients does not
always correspond to the qualitative effect of fiscal decentralization on the reported
confidence categories. More specifically, only the effects for the top and bottom
categories are known; that is, a positive coefficient means that an increase in the
fiscal decentralization ratio makes it more likely to have ‘a great deal of confidence’
and less likely to have ‘none at all.’ To determine the effects of fiscal decentralization
on the intermediate categories of reported confidence, we calculate marginal effects,
which are defined as the change in predicted probabilities of the categories of reported
confidence for a one percentage point increase in the fiscal decentralization ratio.
Table 2.3 presents marginal effects at the mean, which we calculate based on the




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 2: In Government We Trust: The Role of Fiscal Decentralization
All marginal effects are significant and imply that a one percentage point increase
in the degree of fiscal decentralization increases the confidence share on average by
four-fifths of a percentage point. This effect is calculated by adding the marginal
effects of the top two categories of confidence together for all measures of trust in
government and subsequently taking the average. Moreover, it implies that a one
standard deviation increase in fiscal decentralization increases trust in government
with approximately half a standard deviation.18
The point estimate is the largest for confidence in government. These findings
are confirmed when using a regular logit analysis on the confidence share directly—
where the dependent variable takes the value one if the respondent indicates to have
either ‘a great deal of confidence’ or ‘quite a lot of confidence’ and zero otherwise—
although the estimated effect is somewhat larger; see Table 2.3.
In nonlinear models, average behavior of individuals differs from the behavior
of the average individual, yielding a difference between average marginal effects
and marginal effects at the mean. By taking the average of the predicted proba-
bilities across individuals in the sample, we derive average marginal effects rather
than marginal effects at the mean. To facilitate a comparison of the results across
countries, we calculate the average marginal effect for each country.
The results for an increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization by 5 percent-
age points are given in panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.2, where the stacked bars
are the changes in the average predicted probabilities for the respective confidence
categories, which are represented by different shading patterns. The horizontal axis
ranks countries in ascending order by either their confidence share or fiscal decen-
tralization ratio.
The average marginal effects are the strongest for those countries with a large
confidence share. When ranked by the degree of fiscal decentralization, we do not
see a clear relationship. For example, Germany has a relatively high average fiscal
decentralization ratio (39 percent) compared to Bulgaria (15 percent) or Georgia
18The standard deviation of fiscal decentralization is 0.09. A one standard deviation increase
would lead to an increase in the confidence share of approximately 0.07(= 0.09 × 4/5). Since the
average standard deviation of the confidence share for the several measures is 0.15, the 0.07 change
corresponds to roughly half a standard deviation. This effect has to be interpret with some caution
since it is based on average measures and ignores the non-linearity of the model.
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Figure 2.2: Average Marginal Effects: Civil Services
Benchmark Model
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a great deal quite a lot
not very much none at all
Robustness Check
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a great deal quite a lot
not very much none at all
Notes: The table presents average marginal effect which are defined as changes in the average
predicted probabilities of the respective confidence categories for a 5 percentage points increase
in fiscal decentralization. We focus on civil services because it has the largest number of
significant variables. Panels (a) and (c) rank countries in ascending order by confidence share
and panels (b) and (d) by the degree of fiscal decentralization. The average marginal effects
in the panels (a) and (b) are calculated on basis of the estimation results corresponding to
column (8) of Table 2.2. Those in panels (c) and (d) are calculated on basis of the estimation
results corresponding to column (8) of Table B.5 of Ligthart and Van Oudheusden (2012b).
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(20 percent), but has either a lower or the same average marginal effect on trust
in government. However, these results do not imply that the overall effect of fiscal
decentralization on trust is not representative for a given country. Rather, they
suggest that the beneficial effect of fiscal decentralization on trust in government is
neither limited to nor necessarily large for relatively decentralized countries.
2.4.2. Robustness Analyses
Next, we discuss several robustness checks. The corresponding estimation results
can be found in Tables B.5 to B.8 in the Web Appendix to the chapter; see Ligthart
and Van Oudheusden (2012b). As a first robustness check, we control for additional
economic performance indicators at the individual level by including the individual’s
unemployment status to the set of covariates (cf. Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Mishler
and Rose, 2001; Gustavsson and Jordahl, 2008). At the same time, we broaden
the country coverage in the sample from 10 to 13—and thus work with the large
sample—at the expense of losing income inequality as a control variable at the ag-
gregate level (Table B.5).19 The results are very similar to the benchmark outcomes.
Fiscal decentralization always enters with a positive and significant coefficient. The
only exception is for confidence in government, where the coefficient does not enter
significantly once we control for the economic performance indicators at both the
aggregate and individual level. The coefficients of government quality and govern-
ment size are always positive and negative, respectively, but are only significant for
confidence in civil services. These findings correspond to those of the benchmark out-
come for government quality but deviate from the benchmark for government size.
Thus, the negative relationship between government size and trust in government is
only robust for confidence in civil services. As in panel (a) of Table 2.2, we do not
find evidence of a systematic relationship between economic performance and trust
in government, although some of the corresponding coefficients enter significantly.
Moreover, the coefficient of individual unemployment is never significant.
To check the robustness of the average marginal effects, we calculate them us-
19The inclusion of unemployment at the individual level reduces the number of countries in the
sample. To have at least as many countries as in our benchmark analysis, we drop inequality as a
covariate. The large sample is also used for other robustness checks.
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ing the estimation results for the large sample.20 Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 2.2
show results similar to those in the benchmark case, which suggest that the size of
the beneficial effect of fiscal decentralization on trust in government is not neces-
sarily larger for more centralized countries. For example, Bulgaria and Chile have
a relatively low average degree of fiscal decentralization compared to Australia and
Germany, but have rather similar marginal effects. Finally, we find that, on aver-
age, the quantitative effect is smaller when looking at the point estimates. A one
percentage point increase in fiscal decentralization now causes roughly a two-thirds
of a percentage point increase in the confidence share.
As a second robustness check, we increase the sample size so that it includes
36 countries. However, this procedure comes at a cost since we only can take up
fiscal decentralization as a variable at the aggregate level and cannot include country
dummies in our specifications (Table B.6). The results are broadly consistent across
the different samples; the pooled sample of 36 countries, the large sample, and
the small sample. Fiscal decentralization enters with a positive coefficient and is
significant in most of the cases. The exceptions are for confidence in government
and, for the small sample, confidence in parliament and political parties. Although
we cannot control for unobserved country heterogeneity and possible indirect effects
such as government quality, these results suggest that our results are not specific to
a small set of countries.
As final robustness checks, we repeat the analyses of Table 2.2, where we either
replace our expenditure-based fiscal decentralization measure by one that is based on
revenues (Table B.7), or replace our measure of government quality by a measure of
corruption control (Table B.8).21 When we use the share of sub-national revenue in
general government revenues as our measure of fiscal decentralization its coefficient
always enter positively. However, it is not always significant in cases where we
do not control for the possible determinants at the aggregate level such as income
inequality. Control of corruption always enters with a positive coefficient but is only
20The average marginal effects of the three other measures of trust in government and the
marginal effects at the mean for all four measures are available upon request.
21Our measure of corruption control is taken from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators (2008) and has a similar structure to our measure of government quality. Hence, we
expect it to be positively related with trust in government.
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significant for confidence in civil services. In all cases, fiscal decentralization enters
with a positive and significant coefficient.22
Table 2.4 presents results where we control for the potential reverse causality of
fiscal decentralization. The even numbered columns of panel (a) regress the measures
of trust in government on the lag of fiscal decentralization, and the same set of vari-
ables as in Table 2.2 except income inequality. The odd numbered columns—which
employ the contemporaneous value of fiscal decentralization—serve as a comparison.
All estimations include country dummies and wave dummies. Across all measures
of trust in government, fiscal decentralization shows a positive and significant co-
efficient. Except for government size, the other effects are similar to those of the
benchmark analysis.
Panel (b) of Table 2.4 reports the results of the other approach. The even
numbered columns regress the respective measure of trust in government on the
lag of fiscal decentralization, the contemporaneous values of gender and age, and
country and wave dummies. Subsequently, the off numbered columns add the lag
of government size and the lag of the economic performance indicators. We exclude
government quality from the analysis, since data from the Worldwide Governance
Indicators are only available from 1996 onward. The results are similar to previous
findings. Fiscal decentralization increases trust in government once we control for
covariates at the aggregate level. Government size enters with a significant and
negative coefficient. We do not find a systematic relationship between economic
performance and trust in government.
22We also perform an ordered probit analysis of our benchmark analyses. The results are the
same in sign and significance as those of the ordered logit model and are therefore not reported.
To check for the robustness of our result to the choice of trust in government measures, we take the
average of the four measures of trust in government together as a new dependent variable. Although
the qualitative results in this case remain the same, we cannot say anything about the quantitative
effects. Averaging our trust in government measures increases the number of confidence categories
from four to 13. More precisely, the resulting average trust in government measure takes the values




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The chapter analyzes whether fiscal decentralization enhances trust in government.
To this end, we use survey data on several measures of trust in government (i.e.,
government, civil services, parliament, and political parties) for up to 13 coun-
tries over the period 1994–2007. In addition to fiscal decentralization, we include
macroeconomic determinants like government quality, government size, inequality,
macroeconomic performance indicators, and individual characteristics as determi-
nants of trust in government. We also control for unobserved country heterogeneity
and common shocks over time.
We find that fiscal decentralization increases trust in government above and
beyond interpersonal trust. More specifically, a one standard deviation increase in
the fiscal decentralization ratio causes roughly half a standard deviation increase
in trust in government. The beneficial effect of fiscal decentralization on trust in
government is neither limited to nor necessarily large for relatively decentralized
countries. Our findings are robust to different sample sizes, changes in the set of
control variables, and estimation techniques.
Our results are important from a policy point of view. Policy recommendations
on fiscal decentralization have typically been based on the perceived improvements
in allocative efficiency. Recognizing the improvements in trust in government would
help policy makers in forming a more complete assessment of the pros and cons
of fiscal decentralization. More important, trust in government contributes to the
credibility and success of government policy more generally.
Future research could usefully focus on providing a theoretical underpinning of
the transmission channels of fiscal decentralization on trust in government. Another
avenue for further research is a more thorough treatment of the potential endo-
geneity of fiscal decentralization. To this end, we need to aggregate the confidence
categories to just two and have to find valid instruments for fiscal decentralization.
Because we control for country fixed effects—and thus exploit the within dimen-
sion of variation—suitable instruments have to be time varying. In this way, we
can resort to a probit analysis with instrumental variables. Finally, an analysis of
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the relationship between fiscal decentralization and trust in government in a setting
where better measures for these concepts are available would further enhance our




Table A.1: Trimming Procedures
Procedure Observations Countries
Small Sample
World Values Survey dataseta 257,597 87
Conditioning on dependent variables 183,828 80
Conditioning on determinants at the individual level 132,983 74
Conditioning on fiscal decentralizationb 67108 36
Conditioning on remaining aggregate level determinants 28,837 17
Conditioning on non-singletons 22,794 10
Small sample 22,794 10
Large Sample
World Values Survey dataseta 257,597 87
Conditioning on dependent variables 183,828 80
Conditioning on individual unemployment 177,820 80
Conditioning on remaining individual level determinants 128,868 74
Conditioning on fiscal decentralizationb 63,566 35
Conditioning on remaining aggregate level determinants 43,043 22
Conditioning on non-singletons 35,259 13
Large sample 35,259 13
Conditioning on lags 30,842 12
Notes: The dependent variables are the following measures of government trust: confidence in gov-
ernment, confidence in civil services, confidence in parliament, and confidence in political parties.
Determinants at the individual level are interpersonal trust, age, education, social class, income
levels, and the importance of politics in life, except noted otherwise. Determinants at the aggregate
level are fiscal decentralization, government quality, government size, the level and volatility of the
growth rate, and, for the small sample, income inequality. aBased on the World Values Survey
2009 dataset. bTable B.3 in (Ligthart and Van Oudheusden, 2012b) provides coverage of the fiscal
decentralization measure.
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Benchmark Sample
Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max Source
Confidence in government 22,794 2.20 0.82 1 4 WVS
Confidence in civil services 22,794 2.23 0.77 1 4 WVS
Confidence in parliament 22,794 2.12 0.81 1 4 WVS
Confidence in political parties 22,794 1.90 0.73 1 4 WVS
Interpersonal trust 22,794 0.27 0.44 0 1 WVS
Male 22,794 0.49 0.50 0 1 WVS
Age 15-24 22,794 0.25 0.43 0 1 WVS
Age 25-34 22,794 0.40 0.49 0 1 WVS
Age 35-44 22,794 0.35 0.48 0 1 WVS
Education is lower 22,794 0.31 0.46 0 1 WVS
Education is middle 22,794 0.47 0.50 0 1 WVS
Education is upper 22,794 0.23 0.42 0 1 WVS
Income level 1 22,794 0.13 0.33 0 1 WVS
Income level 2 22,794 0.16 0.37 0 1 WVS
Income level 3 22,794 0.17 0.37 0 1 WVS
Income level 4 22,794 0.15 0.36 0 1 WVS
Income level 5 22,794 0.14 0.35 0 1 WVS
Income level 6 22,794 0.09 0.29 0 1 WVS
Income level 7 22,794 0.07 0.25 0 1 WVS
Income level 8 22,794 0.05 0.21 0 1 WVS
Income level 9 22,794 0.02 0.15 0 1 WVS
Income level 10 22,794 0.02 0.16 0 1 WVS
Social class is upper 22,794 0.01 0.11 0 1 WVS
Social class is upper middle 22,794 0.17 0.37 0 1 WVS
Social class is lower middle 22,794 0.39 0.49 0 1 WVS
Social class is working 22,794 0.34 0.47 0 1 WVS
Social class is lower 22,794 0.09 0.29 0 1 WVS
Politics is very important 22,794 0.10 0.30 0 1 WVS
Politics is rather important 22,794 0.27 0.45 0 1 WVS
Politics is not very important 22,794 0.39 0.49 0 1 WVS
Politics is not at all important 22,794 0.24 0.43 0 1 WVS
Fiscal decentralization 22,794 0.25 0.09 0.11 0.44 GFS
Government quality 22,794 0.58 1.08 -0.79 2.14 WGI
Government size 22,794 0.17 0.04 0.10 0.23 WDI
Income inequality 22,794 0.36 0.08 0.26 0.52 WIIDER
Level of growth rate 22,794 0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.11 WDI
Volatility of growth rate 22,794 2.85 3.62 0.10 15.84 WDI
Notes: Based on the small sample (which is our benchmark). Data sources are the World Values
Survey (WVS), the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), the World Bank’s Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI), the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), and Ver-
sion 2.0c of the World Income Inequality Database (WIIDER) of the World Institute for Develop-
ment Economics Research. Descriptive statistics of variables at the aggregate level are calculated
on a country-wave basis. The variable volatility of the growth rate is multiplied by a factor 100.
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The Fiscal Decentralization and
Economic Growth Nexus Revisited1
3.1. Introduction
Many developed and developing countries have devolved parts of their fiscal policy-
making authority to sub-national levels of government during the last decades. This
process of fiscal decentralization has led to a wide array of empirical analyses that
look at its possible consequences, where the relationship between fiscal decentraliza-
tion and economic growth has received the most attention. Despite this attention,
there is no consensus on this relationship, which may be explained by differences
in empirical specifications, country coverage and time period of the samples, or
econometric methods used. Only little attention has been paid to possible endo-
geneity problems that may plague the relationship between fiscal decentralization
and economic growth. This concern, however, is of relevance regardless of any char-
acteristics that sets these analyses apart. Moreover, disagreement on the accuracy
with which conventional government revenue and expenditure based measures of
fiscal decentralization reflect the autonomy of sub-national governments has led to
the use of alternative measures of fiscal decentralization. A consensus of what the
effect of doing so is compared to the use of conventional measures is absent though.
This chapter revisits the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth and addresses both of the above issues.
1This chapter is based on Ligthart and Van Oudheusden (2012a).
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The main argument in favor of fiscal decentralization can be derived from the
principle of subsidiarity as discussed by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1972, 1999).
They reason that the proximity of sub-national governments to households gives
them an information advantage over national governments about local preferences,
resulting in an improvement of allocative efficiency in the public sector. This effi-
ciency gain in turn translates in a higher growth rate. A higher growth rate, how-
ever, leads to a higher income which in turn may affect fiscal decentralization (cf.
Panizza, 1999).2 To deal with this problem of reverse causality, we construct new in-
strumental variables for fiscal decentralization based on common legal system origin,
common federal system, geographical distance, and relative country size. We argue
that countries similar in these aspects experience a similar process of fiscal decentral-
ization. Other papers that look at instrumental variables for fiscal decentralization
are Fisman and Gatti (2002), Iimi (2005), and Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007).
In contrast to their instrumental variables, ours vary over time, do not lead to a
reduction in the sample size, and can be tested for correlation with the error terms.
To our knowledge, we are the first to use these instrumental variables and compare
them with the conventional instruments in the literature.
Most of the literature uses fiscal decentralization measures based on government
expenditures and revenue data from the Government Finance Statistics of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) argue that these
measures may not capture all dimensions of fiscal decentralization such as the degree
of discretion that sub-national governments have over expenditures and taxes. We
use data on the tax autonomy of sub-national governments provided by the OECD
(1999, 2006, 2009) to capture this dimension. Papers that have a similar approach
are Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) and Thornton (2007).3 We contribute to the literature in
this aspect by addressing methodological issues, which enables us to clearly identify
whether results change with the use of alternative measures.
2See Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) and references therein for a detailed review of
the channels and issues concerning the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth. More formal models that describe the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth
are discussed later on.
3Bodman and Ford (2006) and Baskaran and Feld (2009) use alternative measures of fiscal




Using a sample of 56 countries over the period 1990–2007, we find that fiscal
decentralization is beneficial for economic growth. A one standard deviation in
fiscal decentralization leads to an increase in economic growth of on average a half
percentage point. Our proposed instruments outperform the conventional external
instruments in the literature, where instruments based on legal origin and relative
country size are our preferred instruments. Although internal instruments—i.e.,
the lag of the fiscal decentralization measure itself—can be used, they have the
disadvantage that the accompanied reduction in the sample leads to selection bias.
When controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity, we find an inverted u-shaped
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth.
The use of various measures of fiscal decentralization that differ in the degree
in which they reflect the discretion of sub-national governments may change the
results. These changes, however, are the result of the accompanied changes in the
samples rather than the use of the alternative measures themselves. Hence, conven-
tional measures are a good approximation for measures that better reflect the true
degree of fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments. Finally, the effect of fiscal
decentralization on economic growth holds both in the short and long run, is robust
to the use of alternative measures of fiscal decentralization based on revenue and
expenditure data, and seems more appropriate for OECD member countries than
other countries.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 discusses our econo-
metric specification, data, endogeneity issues, and various measures of fiscal decen-
tralization. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2. Literature
This section provides a short overview of the theoretical and empirical literature
on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Since
there are already good overviews of the more informal theoretical literature (i.e.,
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Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; Rodŕıquez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010), we focus
on the literature that uses formal, mathematical models to explain the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. When discussing the empiri-
cal literature, we limit attention to those analyses that look at the relationship in a
cross-country context.
3.2.1. Theoretical Literature
The literature that provides theoretical underpinnings for the effect of fiscal decen-
tralization on economic growth is almost absent. Moreover, the literature that does
provide a formal framework in which this relationship is analyzed focuses on other
mechanisms than the subsidiarity principle as discussed by Tiebout (1956) and Oates
(1972, 1999). The mechanism that is used most often for empirical analyses builds
on the framework of Barro (1990) and is provided by Davoodi and Zou (1998). In
their model, output is affected by government expenditures at both the national and
sub-national level. Under the additional assumption that government expenditures
at both levels are subject to diminishing returns to scale, it is optimal to devolve
part of total government expenditures to the sub-national level.4 The framework is
also used to analyze optimal taxation and intergovernmental transfers issues (Gong
and Zou, 2002).
Another approach is taken by Lejour and Verbon (1997), Hatfield (2006), and
Koethenbuerger and Lockwood (2010), who look at intergovernmental relations be-
tween sub-national governments themselves rather than between different levels of
government.5 Tax competition between sub-national governments leads to lower
taxes compared to a fully centralized government, which in turn stimulates eco-
nomic growth. This downward effect on taxes may be mitigated or even reversed
in the presence of mobility costs of capital (Lejour and Verbon, 1997) or stochastic
productivity shocks (Koethenbuerger and Lockwood, 2010). Fiscal decentralization
then leads to a reduction in economic growth.
4This result extends to multiple levels of government expenditures and is independent of their
degree of substitutability (Xie et al., 1999).
5More specifically, Lejour and Verbon (1997) look at coordination issues between countries but
their mechanism extends to sub-national governments as well. See Koethenbuerger and Lockwood
(2010) for an extensive overview of the related literature.
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The mechanism as described by Brueckner (1999, 2006) is more in line with the
subsidiarity principle. In a framework with overlapping generations he compares a
situation of full centralization, where the young and old receive the same level of
public goods, to a situation of full decentralization, where the provision of public
goods is tailored to their preferences. Depending on the production structure, a
switch from a fully centralized to a fully decentralized government either has tran-
sitory (Brueckner, 1999) or permanent (Brueckner, 2006) growth effects.6 Although
these analyses focus on intertemporal preference differences and abstract from a gov-
ernment that is partly decentralized, they capture the idea that preference matching
may foster economic growth.
3.2.2. Empirical Literature
Table 3.1 gives an overview of cross-country studies on the relationship between
fiscal decentralization and economic growth. Rather than discussing the individual
papers extensively, we sketch a broad overview of the findings in the literature;
see Rodŕıquez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010) and Buser (2011) for recent discussions and
critical assessments of individual papers. From Table 3.1 it becomes clear there is no
general consensus on the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth. There
are almost as many analyses that find a positive, a negative, or no relationship.
Moreover, these results cannot be explained by looking at differences in the number
or type of countries, the time period of the analysis, or estimation method used.
These findings suggest that differences in empirical specifications and data used are
a better explanation.
What is puzzling though is that only some analyses address the issue of possi-
ble endogeneity problems. This concern, however, is of relevance regardless of the
specification, data, country composition of the sample or time period considered.
Analyses that do deal with this issue have in common that they either have a rel-
ative large number of observations (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2006) or focus
solely on the cross-sectional variation in the data (Iimi, 2005; Enikolopov and Zhu-
ravskaya, 2007). They differ in the use of either internal or external instruments
6Actually, these results are driven by differentiation of taxes for the young and old, which work
in the opposite direction of the provision of public goods.
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Empirical Methodology and Data
though. In general, a thorough analysis of the endogeneity problems concerning
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth seems to be
missing.
In addition, little attention is being paid to the quantitative effect of fiscal de-
centralization on economic growth. Most analyses focus on the sign and significance
of the fiscal decentralization coefficient, a possible non-linear effect, or how the ef-
fect depends on the interaction with other explanatory variables. This focus makes
it hard to judge whether their findings are plausible or are of economic relevance.
There is, however, a common understanding that conventional fiscal decentralization
measures solely based on expenditure or revenue data may overestimate the degree of
true fiscal policy making authority of sub-national governments (Martinez-Vazquez
and McNab, 2003). Although some analyses use autonomy corrected fiscal decen-
tralization measures, there is no consensus of what the effect of doing so is compared
to the use of conventional measures of fiscal decentralization.
3.3. Empirical Methodology and Data
This section discusses the econometric specification, endogeneity issues, and several
measures of fiscal decentralization. We use data of 56 countries over the period 1990–
2007, where variables are three year averages unless indicated otherwise. Descriptive
statistics, the corresponding data sources, and sample composition are given in Ta-
bles A.1–A.3 in the Appendix.
3.3.1. Econometric Specification
We follow the literature on fiscal decentralization and economic growth, and use a
“Barro-style” growth regression:
git = φfit + β ln yi0 +ψ
′xit + γ
′zit + εit, (3.1)
where countries are denoted with i = 1, ..., N and time with t = 1, ..., T . The dependent
variable git denotes the growth rate of real GDP per capita of country i at time
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t. Our variable of interest—the degree of fiscal decentralization—is denoted by
fit, and ln yi0 is the logarithm of the initial value of real GDP per capita, where
β and φ are the corresponding parameters, respectively. The matrix xit contains
explanatory variables associated with the augmented Solow model as described by
Mankiw et al. (1992), and zit is a matrix of additional explanatory variables (see
below), where ψ and γ are the corresponding vectors of parameters, respectively.
We define εit ≡ µi+ηt+ εit, where µi is a country-specific fixed effect, ηt is a time fixed
effect, and εit is an independent and identically distributed error term. Depending
on the specification we consider, the country-specific and time fixed effects may be
set to zero or not.
In line with most of the fiscal federalism literature, we define our benchmark
measure of fiscal decentralization as the share of sub-national government expen-
ditures in general government expenditures. Sub-national expenditures are defined
as expenditures at both the state and local government level, where the state level
refers to the largest geopolitical entity within a country and the local level describes
the smaller governmental units below the state level; see the IMF’s GFS Manual
(2001).7 General government expenditures encompass public expenditures at the
central, state, and local government level together.
The set of augmented Solow variables xit consists of population growth, invest-
ment, and schooling. Population growth is measured as in Mankiw et al. (1992),
which is the logarithm of the the sum of the capital depreciation rate, the rate of
technological progress, and the population growth rate. Investment is measured by
the logarithm of the share of gross fixed capital information in output, and schooling
is defined as the logarithm of the product of gross secondary school enrollment and
the population share of secondary school age.
The matrix zit contains additional controls such as a the federal system, govern-
ment size, trade openness, and regional dummies. The federal system is represented
by a dummy that takes on the value one if a country is defined as federal and zero
otherwise. Government size is measured by the logarithm of the share of general
7Some countries (e.g., the United States and Spain) have more than one level of government
between the central level and the local level. In such cases, the GFS Manual (2001) groups the
intermediate levels of government together with the level they are most closely associated with.
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government final consumption expenditures in output, and trade openness is the
sum of exports and imports of goods and services expressed as a share of output.
We define five regions, namely East Asia & Pacific, Eastern Europe & Central Asia,
Latin America & Caribbean, Africa, and OECD member countries.
3.3.2. Endogeneity Issues
When estimating equation (3.1) by ordinary least squares, there is a potential prob-
lem of reverse causality; that is, a higher rate of economic growth may cause a change
in expenditure responsibilities of governments at the sub-national level. Another
problem is that fiscal decentralization may capture the effect of omitted variables.
To verify whether the reverse causality concern is valid, we need an instrumental
variable approach. Surprisingly, the fiscal federalism literature has hardly addressed
endogeneity issues. Exceptions are Fisman and Gatti (2002), who use the origin of
a country’s legal system, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007), who use the size of a
country as an instrumental variable for fiscal decentralization, and Iimi (2005) and
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2006), who use an internal instrument, namely the
lag of the fiscal decentralization measure itself.
The external instruments of Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Enikolopov and Zhu-
ravskaya (2007), who deal with the effect of fiscal federalism on corruption and
political institutions rather than economic growth, are time invariant. Their in-
struments may perform well in a cross-country analysis but are less suitable in a
panel data analysis where fiscal decentralization varies over time. Moreover, the
instruments cannot be used at all when country fixed effects are taken into account.
Internal instruments, as used by Iimi (2005), do not suffer from this drawback
but lead to a reduction in the number of observations; that is, one or more cross-
sections of data are lost, reflecting the time lags. The reduction in the number of
observations comes at a high cost in small samples. This disadvantage is especially
large given that most fiscal decentralization studies use samples that are unbalanced.
We propose new instrumental variables that can tackle the above mentioned
issues. Our approach in constructing instruments for fiscal decentralization is based
on the assumption that legal system origin and size of a country may not only
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be indicative for the degree of fiscal decentralization of a country but also for its
development over time. We argue that countries similar in these aspects experience
a similar process of fiscal decentralization.
The “similarity” between countries, however, does not have to be restricted to
their size and legal origin, but may also be captured by other proxies such as their
geographical distance or having the same federal system. Instrumental variables
for fiscal decentralization of a country i are then a weighted average of the fiscal
decentralization measure of “similar” countries. More specifically, we can define the








dij for i 6= j
0 for i = j
, (3.2)
where fjt denotes the degree of fiscal decentralization of country j at time t, ωij
denotes a weight, and dij measures the similarity of countries i and j. The weights
are normalized so that they lie in the closed interval [0, 1] and sum to unity.
Since the instrumental variables are based on a weighted average of countries
in the sample, missing observations may lead to an inconsistency in the number of
countries used in their construction. Therefore, we balance the sample by interpo-
lating the fiscal decentralization variable for the missing values so that the same
number of countries is used in every period.
We use several specifications to measure similarity. The first specification is
based on having a common legal system origin, which is a dummy taking on a value
of one if countries have the same legal system origin and zero otherwise. Based on
La Porta et al. (1999), we define the following main categories of legal origin: British,
French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist. (Fisman and Gatti, 2002) find that
“the proportion of public expenditures accounted for by state / local governments
is much lower in French origin countries than in British origin countries” (p. 337),
which, they argue, is in line with the affinity of a Civil legal code for government
centralization.
The second is based on having the same federal system, which is based on the
definition of whether a country is federal or not (e.g., Fan et al., 2009). Lijphart
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(1984, p. 176) argues that “federalism and decentralization tend to go together”.
As a third specification, we consider a measure based on geographical distance.
More specifically, we use the inverse of the squared distance between the main cities
of the countries i and j as a measure of similarity. This captures the idea that
governments set their rate of fiscal decentralization close to that of their neighboring
countries.




si + sj + ξ|si − sj |
,
where si and sj denote the size in squared kilometers of country i and country j, re-
spectively, and ξ ∈ [0,∞) is the weight of the absolute size difference. It can be argued
that the distance of the national government to its citizens increases with the size
of a country making it less likely that policies of the national government are in line
with the citizens’ preferences and strengthening the case for more decentralization;
see Panizza (1999, p. 104).
Table 3.2 gives an overview of the pairwise correlation coefficients of fiscal de-
centralization and the respective instrumental variables. The instruments based on
countries having the same federal system display the strongest correlation with fis-
cal decentralization. This instrument is followed by instruments based on relative
size of countries, where the correlation coefficient becomes larger when increasing
the weight of the absolute size difference. Instruments based on legal origin and
distance squared are less strongly correlated. Countries similar in federal system,
size, legal origin, and geographical position thus seem to have a similar process of
fiscal decentralization and therefore are likely to be valid instruments.8
When addressing the issue of reverse causality, we set µi to zero so that we do
not control for country fixed effects. Since we estimate equation (3.1) with a pooled
ordinary least squares estimator, this means we cannot completely correct for a
possible omitted variable bias even when controlling for regional fixed effects. We
8The instrumental variables are valid if they are correlated with the fiscal decentralization
measure but not with the error terms.
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Empirical Methodology and Data
acknowledge that including country fixed effects solves the omitted variable bias,
but this may come at a cost in the presence of measurement error. Hauk and
Wacziarg (2009) shows that a fixed effects estimator exacerbates the bias arising
from measurement error when the time persistence in the covariates is larger than
that of the errors in measurement. Unfortunately, the trade-off between the omitted
variable bias and measurement error bias cannot be resolved on theoretical grounds,
but it has to be evaluated with the use of simulations. In the fiscal decentralization
and economic growth nexus, even the latter approach may prove difficult given the
lack of a theoretical framework that can provide guidance on choosing values for the
parameters necessary for these simulations.
An alternative approach is to use a general method of moments estimator pro-
posed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The advantage of this estimator is that it deals
with the omitted variable bias, the measurement error bias, and biases arising from
reverse causality. Disadvantages are the loss of time periods—which could bias es-
timates when the number of time periods is small, as in our case—and the problem
of weak instruments. Even alternative instruments such as the general method of
moments estimators proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998), who address this last problem, are inadequate when the measurement error is
correlated with the proposed instruments. This situation occurs when measurement
errors are persistent over time. For growth regressions, Hauk and Wacziarg (2009)
use simulations to determine to which extent these and other estimators address the
different biases. Again, this approach may be applied to the fiscal decentralization
and economic growth nexus once a theoretical framework is established. However,
we leave this for future work.
3.3.3. Alternative Fiscal Decentralization Measures
Most studies measure the degree of fiscal decentralization by a country’s sub-national
government share in total government expenditures or revenues. Martinez-Vazquez
and McNab (2003) criticize these measures for not accurately representing the de-
gree to which these governments have policy autonomy. Thornton (2007) takes
up this point and constructs a measure that takes the policy making authority of
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sub-national governments into account. More specifically, he takes the share of sub-
national tax revenues in total tax revenues and multiplies this measure with an
indicator of tax autonomy. This indicator of local government’s tax autonomy is
based on data provided by the OECD (1999), which distinguishes several categories
of tax autonomy, ranging from full discretion on tax rates and reliefs (i.e., credits
and allowances) to no discretion on rates and reliefs at all; see Table A.4 in the
Appendix for an overview of all categories.
Whether a tax autonomy measure of fiscal decentralization affects the growth
and fiscal decentralization nexus remains an open question. Such an analysis re-
quires a counterfactual.9 Using data of the the OECD (1999; 2006; 2009), we con-
struct several autonomy-based measures of fiscal decentralization. More specifically,
we employ the share of sub-national tax revenues in total tax revenues, where we
only use those tax revenues on the sub-national level over which the corresponding
governments have policy making authority. Since there is no clear definition of or
consensus on the policy making authority of governments, we examine three different
cases in which we give the tax autonomy categories of the OECD different weights;
see Table A.4 in the Appendix.
Table 3.3 presents pairwise correlation coefficients of the different fiscal decen-
tralization measures. The conventional measures of fiscal decentralization based on
expenditures and tax revenues of the Government and Finance Statistics (2010) are
highly correlated. Moreover, this correlation remains strong after we adjust the tax
revenues measure with the tax autonomy data of the OECD. The conventional mea-
sures of fiscal decentralization thus seem a good approximation for measures that
better reflect the true degree of fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments.
3.4. Estimation Results
This section discusses the estimation results and performs robustness checks. In the
analyses, we deal with possible endogeneity problems and look at various measures
9Thornton (2007) only studies the effect of the constructed autonomy measure of fiscal decen-
tralization and not the conventional measure itself.
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of fiscal decentralization that differ in the degree in which they reflect the autonomy
of sub-national governments.
3.4.1. Endogeneity Issues
Table 3.4 presents our main estimation results and focuses on the possible endogene-
ity issues concerning the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth.
3.4.1.1. Instrumental Variables
The first column in panel (a) of Table 3.4 regresses the growth rate of real GDP per
capita on fiscal decentralization, initial real GDP per capita, population growth, in-
vestment, and schooling. We estimate the equation by ordinary least squares (OLS),
where standard errors are clustered at the country level since we could not reject
the error terms to be serially uncorrelated. The estimation results are as follows.
Initial real GDP per capita and population growth both enter with a negative and
significant coefficient, and investment and schooling have positive and significant
coefficients. These results are in line with most of the growth literature (Durlauf
et al., 2005). The coefficient of fiscal decentralization is not significant.
Fiscal decentralization, however, enters with a positive and significant coefficient
in the second column where we added federal system, government size, and trade
openness. The coefficient on population growth is no longer significant. Federal
system enters with a negative and significant coefficient. We find no evidence that
the size of the government is associated with growth in real GDP per capita although
being more open is positively associated with it.
We add regional dummies and time dummies in the third and fourth column,
respectively, where OECD countries and the period 2005–2007 are the bases. The
estimation results remain the same in sign and significance except for the coefficients
on schooling and federal system, which are not significant anymore. Countries be-
longing to East Asia & Pacific, Eastern Europe, & Central Asia, and Africa grow at
a lower rate than OECD countries. Compared to the period 2005–2007, growth in
real GDP per capita is lower over the period 1990–1992 and 1999–2004. Based on
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the estimation results of columns (2)–(4), a one standard deviation increase in fiscal
decentralization is associated with an increase of the growth in real GDP per capita
of a half percentage point.
We estimate the same four equations by two-stage least squares (2SLS) in
columns (5)–(8), where we use the constructed variables based on common legal
system origin and relative country size, with ξ = 50, as instruments for fiscal decen-
tralization. For the instrumental variables to be valid, they should be both correlated
with fiscal decentralization and uncorrelated with the model’s error term.
To see if they satisfy the first criteria, we follow the criteria of Staiger and
Stock (1997) and check whether the significance of the instruments in the first-stage
regression is large enough; as a rule of thumb the corresponding F -statistic should
be larger than 10. This is indeed the case. To test for the second criteria, we use the
robust score test of overidentifying restrictions of Wooldridge (1995). We also use
the regression-based test of Wooldridge (1995) to test for the endogeneity of fiscal
decentralization. We use these tests rather than the standard tests since we cluster
standard errors at the country level. The test statistics are never significant at
conventional levels, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis of fiscal decentralization
being exogenous, and the evidence suggests the fiscal instruments are valid.
The estimation results are similar in sign and significance for almost all variables.
Point estimates are higher for fiscal decentralization. In the specification where
we include both region and time dummies, however, the coefficient is no longer
significant at conventional levels.10
For comparison, we perform the same analyses with instrumental variables that
are commonly used in the literature on fiscal decentralization. These instruments
are either internal, such as the lags of the fiscal decentralization measure itself, or
external, such as country size and common legal system origin. Moreover, we look
at our constructed variables based on common federal system and distance. Finally,
the value of ξ is varied for the instruments used in columns (5)-(8) in Table 3.4 to
see how this affects the estimation results.
10In column (4), the p-value corresponding to the coefficient of fiscal decentralization is 0.063,
where in column (8) it is 0.129, so it is not significant at conventional levels.
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Table 3.4: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth
Panel (a): Preferred Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS
Fiscal decentralization 0.017 0.043** 0.043** 0.036* 0.022 0.054** 0.056** 0.037
(0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Initial real GDP per capita -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Population growth -0.035** -0.028 0.002 0.003 -0.034** -0.027 0.004 0.003
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Investment 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.035***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Schooling 0.016* 0.015* 0.017* 0.012 0.016* 0.015* 0.017** 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Federal system -0.010* -0.008 -0.007 -0.012** -0.010** -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Government size -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Trade openness 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.013** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
East Asia & Pacific -0.033** -0.026* -0.034** -0.026**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Eastern Europe & Central Asia -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Latin America & Caribbean -0.024** -0.025** -0.023** -0.025**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Africa -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Period 1990-1992 -0.028** -0.028**
(0.014) (0.013)
Period 1993-1995 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 1996-1998 -0.006 -0.006
(0.009) (0.008)
Period 1999-2001 -0.010** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 2002-2004 -0.006** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.152** 0.135 0.321*** 0.293*** 0.153*** 0.134* 0.321*** 0.293***
(0.059) (0.081) (0.102) (0.090) (0.058) (0.079) (0.100) (0.086)
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201
Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Adj. R2 0.316 0.345 0.375 0.415 0.316 0.344 0.373 0.415
First-stage F 25.253 12.782 14.040 10.307
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regression-based F 0.103 0.232 0.306 0.003
p-value 0.749 0.632 0.582 0.954
Robust Score 2.233 2.740 1.053 0.632
p-value 0.135 0.098 0.305 0.427
(Continued)
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. F statistics for the serial correlation test, as described
by Drukker (2003), for columns (1)–(4) are 11.02, 8.794, 8.794, and 8.235, respectively, which
means we reject the null-hypothesis of no serial correlation in all cases. The variables based on
common legal system origin and relative country size, with ξ = 50, are used as instruments for
fiscal decentralization in columns (5)–(8).
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Using the lags of fiscal decentralization as an instrumental variable leads to a
loss of observations, which can be quite large when the data sample is unbalanced,
as is the case in our sample. Panel (b) of Table 3.4 repeats the analyses of panel (a)
with the reduced sample, where the number of observations has been reduced from
201 to 126 and the number of countries from 56 to 37 (Table A.3). Although the
estimations results are similar for most variables, fiscal decentralization is no longer
significant when estimating the equations with ordinary least squares. However, it is
very likely it is not the reduction in observations but rather the selection of countries
that leads to this result since similar results are found when repeating the analyses
of columns (1)–(4) using the 37 countries of the reduced sample.
Columns (13)–(16) of panel (b) give the estimation results where we estimate
the equations by two-stage least squares using the lag of fiscal decentralization as its
instrument. Fiscal decentralization now enters with a significant coefficient, though
only at the 10 percent level. As with the external instrumental variables, point
estimates of the fiscal decentralization coefficients are higher, and we cannot re-
ject the null of fiscal decentralization being exogenous. However, we are unable to
test whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term since we only
have one instrumental variable. Having only one instrumental variable is a further
disadvantage of using the lag of fiscal decentralization as an instrumental variable.
Estimation results corresponding to conventional external instrumental variables
used in the literature are given in the first four columns of panel (c). The last
four columns of this panel present the estimations results corresponding to our con-
structed variables based on common federal system and distance. None of these
instrumental variables can be considered as valid according to the criteria of Staiger
and Stock (1997). A notable exception is presented in column (24), where the joint
significance of the instrumental variables is large enough to be considered as valid in-
struments. Moreover, in this case the instruments seems to outperform those based
on common legal system origin and relative country size.
To see how the value of ξ affects the results, we look at the distribution of relative
country size for different values; see Figure 3.1. The value of ξ captures the degree of
similarity of countries that differ in their size. A small value of ξ means absolute size
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Table 3.4: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth
Panel (b): Alternative Instruments
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
OLS 2SLS
Fiscal decentralization -0.005 0.040* 0.038 0.037 0.001 0.044* 0.043* 0.041*
(0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Initial real GDP per capita -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Population growth -0.043*** -0.034** -0.022 -0.025 -0.043*** -0.034*** -0.022 -0.024
(0.015) (0.013) (0.021) (0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)
Investment 0.048*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 0.037*** 0.035***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
Schooling 0.009 0.009 0.016* 0.017** 0.009 0.009 0.016** 0.017**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Federal system -0.016*** -0.013** -0.013** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Government size -0.002 -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.008 -0.007
(0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Trade openness 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
East Asia & Pacific -0.022** -0.021* -0.021** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Eastern Europe & Central Asia -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Latin America & Caribbean -0.020* -0.020* -0.020** -0.020**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Africa -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.014
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Period 1990-1992
Period 1993-1995 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 1996-1998 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.009)
Period 1999-2001 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 2002-2004 -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.097 0.093 0.189** 0.191** 0.098* 0.092 0.190*** 0.191***
(0.058) (0.066) (0.072) (0.078) (0.055) (0.063) (0.068) (0.072)
Observations 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
Countries 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37
Adj. R2 0.299 0.441 0.448 0.442 0.298 0.441 0.447 0.442
First-stage F 1034.786 587.063 416.806 387.178
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regression-based F 2.783 0.877 0.975 0.653
p-value 0.104 0.355 0.330 0.424
(Continued)
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 3.4: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth
Panel (c): Alternative Instruments
(17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Fiscal decentralization 0.032 0.094** 0.065*** 0.054** -0.013 -0.008 -0.040 0.053**
(0.023) (0.038) (0.025) (0.023) (0.031) (0.095) (0.101) (0.021)
Initial real GDP per capita -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Population growth -0.034** -0.023 0.005 0.005 -0.036** -0.034** -0.009 0.005
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015)
Investment 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.035** 0.037***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012)
Schooling 0.016* 0.013 0.016* 0.012 0.017* 0.017* 0.020* 0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Federal system -0.018*** -0.011** -0.009** -0.002 0.005 -0.009
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.016) (0.017) (0.006)
Government size -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.001 -0.000 -0.007
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010)
Trade openness 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.009 0.010 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.004)
East Asia & Pacific -0.034** -0.028** -0.027 -0.028**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.014)
Eastern Europe & Central Asia -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Latin America & Caribbean -0.023** -0.024** -0.026*** -0.024**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Africa -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040** -0.040***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
Period 1990-1992 -0.027** -0.027**
(0.013) (0.013)
Period 1993-1995 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 1996-1998 -0.005 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008)
Period 1999-2001 -0.010** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 2002-2004 -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.155*** 0.130 0.321*** 0.295*** 0.147** 0.140* 0.321*** 0.295***
(0.059) (0.088) (0.102) (0.089) (0.059) (0.081) (0.097) (0.089)
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201
Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Adj. R2 0.312 0.313 0.369 0.411 0.300 0.312 0.289 0.412
First-stage F 8.178 3.572 6.363 6.082 8.294 4.595 4.214 17.116
p-value 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.020 0.000
Regression-based F 0.718 4.111 0.860 0.617 1.268 0.287 0.650 1.375
p-value 0.400 0.047 0.358 0.435 0.265 0.594 0.424 0.246
Robust Score 10.501 5.958 7.545 6.937 1.867 1.488 0.733 0.167
p-value 0.062 0.310 0.183 0.225 0.172 0.222 0.392 0.683
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. All equations are estimated by two-stage least squares.
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differences are given a low weight, which means even countries considerably different
in size are considered as relatively similar. Absolute size differences are given a high
weight when the value of ξ is large so that countries of almost the same size are
considered as relatively dissimilar.11
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Relative Size with Different Weights
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Notes: All figures are based on the sample of 56 countries.
From Figure 3.1 it can be seen that increasing the weight of absolute size differ-
ences leads to a lower average relative country size. At the same time, the percentage
of relative country size with a value close to zero increases. As ξ becomes larger, only
countries very similar in size get a substantial weight in constructing the instrumen-
tal variables for fiscal decentralization, resulting in an increase in the correlation
coefficient between the constructed variable and fiscal decentralization; see Table
11For example, when ξ = 0, the relative size of two countries always equals one irrespective of
their actual size. When limξ→∞, the relative size of a country goes to zero even if the difference in
size is only a squared kilometer.
66
Estimation Results
3.2. The consequences of varying the value of ξ for the estimation results are given
in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Alternative Weights of the Absolute Size Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ξ = 5 ξ = 10
Fiscal decentralization 0.052* 0.110** 0.110** 0.068** 0.037 0.085*** 0.086*** 0.054*
(0.031) (0.043) (0.044) (0.032) (0.024) (0.032) (0.033) (0.028)
Initial real GDP per capita -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Population growth -0.033** -0.021 0.011 0.007 -0.034** -0.023 0.008 0.005
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
Investment 0.056*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.037***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Schooling 0.015* 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.015* 0.013 0.016* 0.012
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Federal system -0.021*** -0.018*** -0.011** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.009*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Government size -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Trade openness 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
East Asia & Pacific -0.037** -0.029** -0.036** -0.028**
(0.018) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
Eastern Europe & Central Asia -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Latin America & Caribbean -0.022** -0.023** -0.022** -0.024**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Africa -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.040***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Period 1990-1992 -0.026* -0.027**
(0.014) (0.013)
Period 1993-1995 -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 1996-1998 -0.005 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008)
Period 1999-2001 -0.009** -0.010**
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 2002-2004 -0.005** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.158** 0.128 0.322*** 0.297*** 0.155*** 0.130 0.322*** 0.295***
(0.063) (0.089) (0.114) (0.093) (0.060) (0.084) (0.107) (0.089)
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201
Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Adj. R2 0.295 0.290 0.320 0.403 0.309 0.323 0.353 0.411
First-stage F 16.459 9.248 10.702 6.231 22.620 10.775 12.379 7.485
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
Regression-based F 1.732 2.632 2.435 1.134 1.055 1.941 1.811 0.495
p-value 0.194 0.110 0.124 0.292 0.309 0.169 0.184 0.485
Robust Score 0.379 0.389 0.001 0.134 1.117 1.199 0.214 0.316
p-value 0.538 0.533 0.975 0.714 0.291 0.273 0.644 0.574
(Continued)
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Table 3.5: Alternative Weights of the Absolute Size Difference (Continued)
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
ξ = 25 ξ = 100
Fiscal decentralization 0.026 0.064** 0.065** 0.043* 0.018 0.046* 0.050** 0.033
(0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.019) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
Initial real GDP per capita -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.021*** -0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Population growth -0.034** -0.026 0.005 0.004 -0.034** -0.028 0.003 0.003
(0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Investment 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.035***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Schooling 0.016* 0.014* 0.016* 0.012 0.016* 0.015* 0.017** 0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Federal system -0.014*** -0.011** -0.008 -0.011** -0.009* -0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Government size -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Trade openness 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
East Asia & Pacific -0.034** -0.027** -0.033** -0.026**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Eastern Europe & Central Asia -0.008 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Latin America & Caribbean -0.023** -0.024** -0.024** -0.025**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Africa -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Period 1990-1992 -0.028** -0.028**
(0.013) (0.013)
Period 1993-1995 -0.004 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 1996-1998 -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008)
Period 1999-2001 -0.010** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.004)
Period 2002-2004 -0.006** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.154*** 0.133 0.321*** 0.294*** 0.152*** 0.134* 0.321*** 0.292***
(0.059) (0.081) (0.102) (0.087) (0.058) (0.079) (0.099) (0.085)
Observations 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201
Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Adj. R2 0.314 0.339 0.369 0.415 0.316 0.345 0.375 0.415
First-stage F 24.817 11.902 13.198 8.961 24.656 13.563 15.092 11.750
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regression-based F 0.372 0.801 0.820 0.084 0.009 0.022 0.072 0.014
p-value 0.545 0.375 0.369 0.773 0.923 0.883 0.789 0.906
Robust Score 1.888 2.219 0.729 0.519 2.452 3.094 1.295 0.726
p-value 0.169 0.136 0.393 0.471 0.117 0.079 0.255 0.394
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. All equations are estimated by two-stage least squares.
Table 3.5 repeats the two-stage least squares estimations of columns (5)–(8) of
Table 3.4. When absolute size differences are given a small weight, the constructed
instrumental variables are poor or even invalid instruments based on their joint
significance in the first stage regression. Moreover, point estimates of the fiscal
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decentralization coefficient are almost twice as large compared to the estimation
results by ordinary least squares. Increasing the value of ξ improves the strength
of the instruments and leads to lower point estimates of the fiscal decentralization
coefficients. For the cases where the instruments are valid, we cannot reject the null
of fiscal decentralization being exogenous, and the evidence suggest the instruments
are uncorrelated with the error term.
3.4.1.2. Fixed Effects and a Non-linear Relationship
A way to deal with the omitted variable bias is including country specific fixed effects
in the regression specification. When regressing the growth rate of GDP per capita
on fiscal decentralization, population growth, investment, schooling, government
size, trade openness, and country dummies, fiscal decentralization never enters with
a significant coefficient.
A possible explanation for why we do not find a relationship between fiscal de-
centralization and economic growth is given in Figure 3.2, which presents augmented
partial residual plots under different specifications. Figure 3.2 shows that the re-
lationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth may no longer be
linear once country dummies are included in the analysis. This finding is confirmed
in Table 3.6. In the first column, we regress the growth rate of real GDP per capita
on fiscal decentralization, fiscal decentralization squared, population growth, invest-
ment, schooling, government size, and trade openness. The evidence suggest there
is no relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. However,
when adding country dummies in the second column, we find that the relationship
is non-linear. More specifically, the marginal effect is zero at a fiscal decentraliza-
tion ratio of 23 percent. At the 25th and 75th percentile, a one standard deviation
increase in fiscal decentralization is associated with a change in the growth rate of
real GDP per capita of 0.63 and -0.53 percentage points, respectively.12
In column (3), we estimate the equation of column (2) by two-stage least squares,
where we use our the constructed variables based on common legal system origin and
relative country size as instruments for fiscal decentralization. The evidence suggests
12Fiscal decentralization ratios at the 25th and 75th percentile are around 13 and 36 percent,
respectively.
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Table 3.6: Fixed Effects and a Non-linear Relationship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Fiscal decentralization 0.046 0.484* 0.654 0.100 0.435** 0.452
(0.072) (0.243) (0.579) (0.073) (0.162) (0.282)
Fiscal decentralization squared -0.060 -1.053** -1.592 -0.180 -0.727** -0.588
(0.112) (0.504) (1.590) (0.113) (0.319) (0.373)
Population growth -0.039** -0.060 -0.054 -0.034** -0.093*** -0.095***
(0.020) (0.043) (0.053) (0.016) (0.034) (0.029)
Investment 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.035**
(0.013) (0.024) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017)
Schooling 0.005 -0.033 -0.030 0.001 -0.005 -0.008
(0.013) (0.021) (0.028) (0.014) (0.021) (0.020)
Government size -0.015 0.006 0.004 -0.012 -0.005 -0.006
(0.010) (0.051) (0.041) (0.008) (0.030) (0.025)
Trade openness 0.008 0.066** 0.068*** 0.010** 0.033*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.030) (0.021) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant -0.016 -0.161 -0.120 -0.047 -0.273*** -0.328***
(0.081) (0.207) (0.186) (0.060) (0.094) (0.123)
Country Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 201 201 201 126 126 126
Countries 56 56 56 37 37 37
Adj. R2 0.246 0.542 0.524 0.278 0.607 0.596
First-stage F 2.600 2.242
p-value 0.046 0.121




Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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our instruments or no longer valid once we control for fixed effects in the analysis.
To see whether internal instruments perform better under these circumstances, we
repeat the analyses using the reduced sample and use the lag of fiscal decentralization
as an instrumental variable. The estimation results are given in columns (4)–(6). We
still find evidence for a non-linear relationship when fixed effects are included. At
the same time, including fixed effects in the analysis causes the internal instruments
to be no longer valid. This means that neither conventional, nor our instrumental
variables can be used when country fixed effects are controlled for.
3.4.2. Alternative Fiscal Decentralization Measures
Table 3.7 studies whether the relationship between fiscal decentralization and eco-
nomic growth changes when alternative measures of fiscal decentralization are used.
We regress the growth rate of real GDP per capita on initial real GDP per capita,
population growth, investment, schooling, federal system, government size, trade
openness, and a measure of fiscal decentralization. In the first column, this measure
is defined as the share of sub-national tax revenues in general tax revenues. Tax
revenues at the sub-national level are adjusted for the degree of tax autonomy in
columns (2) and (3). We take all tax autonomy categories of the OECD into ac-
count in the second column, where lower weights are given to categories with low
degrees of autonomy.13 In the third column, we restrict sub-national taxes revenues
to those taxes for which sub-national governments have full discretion on both rates
and reliefs and those for which they have full discretion on rates only. Our standard
measure of fiscal decentralization based on expenditure data is used in the fourth
column as a counterfactual.
None of the estimation results suggest there is a relationship between fiscal decen-
tralization and economic growth. A possible explanation may be the small number of
observations as a result of using alternative fiscal decentralization measures. There-
fore, we repeat the analyses in columns (5)–(8) but use yearly data rather than three
year averages. The findings, however, remain the same.
Alternative measures of fiscal decentralization do matter when we only consider
13See Table A.4 for an overview of the different categories and corresponding weights.
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Table 3.7: Fiscal Decentralization Autonomy Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
3-year average yearly
Case I II I II
Tax revenues 0.006 0.003
(0.012) (0.013)
Tax revenues: Autonomy 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.011
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Expenditures 0.017 0.015
(0.018) (0.020)
Initial real GDP per capita -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Population growth -0.025 -0.026 -0.029 -0.024 -0.038** -0.038** -0.041** -0.037**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Investment 0.024* 0.025* 0.026** 0.025** 0.033** 0.034** 0.035*** 0.034***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Schooling 0.019* 0.020* 0.020* 0.018* 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.016
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Federal system -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Government size -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Trade openness 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.072 0.073 0.070 0.080 0.021 0.026 0.026 0.030
(0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.074) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075)
Observations 90 90 90 90 236 236 236 236
Countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Adj. R2 0.239 0.242 0.247 0.251 0.155 0.158 0.161 0.161
(Continued)
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Table 3.7: Fiscal Decentralization Autonomy Measures (Continued)
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Case I II III
Tax revenues 0.015
(0.014)




Constant 0.150* 0.154* 0.154* 0.120 0.175**
(0.082) (0.082) (0.079) (0.071) (0.074)
Initial real GDP per capita 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Population growth 0.004 -0.000 -0.005 -0.011 -0.003
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Investment 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.037*** 0.036***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Schooling 0.024** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.029**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Federal system -0.007* -0.007** -0.006* -0.007* -0.014**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Government size 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Trade openness 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.012***








Constant 0.150* 0.154* 0.154* 0.120 0.175**
(0.082) (0.082) (0.079) (0.071) (0.074)
Observations 50 50 50 50 50
Countries 15 15 15 15 15
Adj. R2 0.309 0.327 0.346 0.357 0.389
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. All equations are estimated by ordinary least squares.
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those tax revenues for which sub-national governments have full discretion on both
rates and reliefs; case III in Table A.4 in the Appendix. This restriction, however,
leads to a reduction in the number of countries to 15. For the reduced sample,
we find that the fiscal decentralization measure based on tax revenue data does
not enter with a significant coefficient; see column (9). Once we control for the
autonomy of sub-national governments in columns (10)–(12), the coefficient of fiscal
decentralization does enter with a significant coefficient. The same holds for our
conventional measure of fiscal decentralization based on expenditure data. This
implies that it is not so much the use of alternative measures of fiscal decentralization
that may change its relationship with economic growth but rather the accompanied
change in the sample of countries.
3.4.3. Robustness Analyses
Table 3.8 presents estimation results of a wide variety of robustness analyses. In
all cases, we regress the growth rate of real GDP per capita on initial real GDP
per capita, population growth, investment, schooling, federal system, government
size, trade openness, and fiscal decentralization. These estimation results can be
compared to column (2) of Table 3.4. To conserve on space, we only present the
coefficient of fiscal decentralization, where we use our standard measure of fiscal
decentralization unless indicated otherwise. We vary the fiscal decentralization mea-
sures, the frequency—i.e., yearly, 3-year average, 6-year average, 9-year average, and
18-year average—of the data used, the time period, and finally we control for out-
liers. In some of these cases, we look at the effects for OECD member countries and
other countries, separately.
Point estimates are lower, but still significant, when using alternative fiscal de-
centralization measures based on revenue and expenditure data of the Government
Finance Statistics (2010). Based on the alternative measures, a one standard de-
viation increase in fiscal decentralization implies an increase in economic growth of
around a third of a percentage point. Estimation results are similar though when
varying the frequency of the data used, implying that the relationship between fiscal
decentralization and economic growth holds for both the short and long run. An
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Table 3.8: Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth: Robustness Analyses
Measure Data Period Coefficient Observations Number of Type of
Countries Countries
Revenues 3-year average 1990–2007 0.036** 179 56 All
(0.016)
Revenues, taxes 3-year average 1990–2007 0.025* 179 56 All
(0.014)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1990–2007 0.044*** 179 56 All
(0.016)
Expenditures, subset Ia 3-year average 1990–2007 0.021* 179 56 All
(0.011)
Expenditures, subset IIb 3-year average 1990–2007 0.026** 179 56 All
(0.012)
Expenditures, all yearly 1990–2007 0.057** 414 38 All
(0.027)
Expenditures, all yearly 1990–2007 0.035** 261 21 OECD
(0.013)
Expenditures, all yearly 1990–2007 0.127** 153 17 non OECD
(0.044)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1990–2007 0.051* 165 38 All
(0.028)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1990–2007 0.043*** 99 21 OECD
(0.012)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1990–2007 0.103 66 17 non OECD
(0.070)
Expenditures, all 6-year average 1990–2007 0.045** 100 38 All
(0.022)
Expenditures, all 6-year average 1990–2007 0.039** 58 21 OECD
(0.014)
Expenditures, all 6-year average 1990–2007 0.088 42 17 non OECD
(0.057)
Expenditures, all 9-year average 1990–2007 0.052** 65 38 All
(0.023)
Expenditures, all 9-year average 1990–2007 0.030** 39 21 OECD
(0.011)
Expenditures, all 9-year average 1990–2007 0.117* 26 17 non OECD
(0.058)
Expenditures, all 18-year average 1990–2007 0.012 38 38 All
(0.014)
Expenditures, all 18-year average 1990–2007 0.031* 21 21 OECD
(0.018)
Expenditures, all 18-year average 1990–2007 0.004 17 17 non OECD
(0.055)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1990–2007 0.043** 201 56 All
(0.020)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1990–2007 0.033** 101 22 OECD
(0.014)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1990–2007 0.042 100 34 non OECD
(0.043)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1993–2007 0.046*** 182 56 All
(0.016)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1993–2007 0.039** 87 22 OECD
(0.018)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1993–2007 0.048 95 34 non OECD
(0.030)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1996–2007 0.048*** 159 56 All
(0.018)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1996–2007 0.024 70 22 OECD
(0.023)
Expenditures, all 3-year average 1996–2007 0.060* 89 34 non OECD
(0.033)
Expenditures, allc 3-year average 1990–2007 0.045** 201 56 All
(0.020)
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the country level. ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. The subset of expenditures indicated with a contains
compensation of employees, use of goods and services, and subsidies. The subset indicated with b
contains compensation of employees, use of goods and services, and social benefits. Expenditures
indicated with c are based on a dataset in which outliers are excluded, where outliers are defined
as observations that lie outside the range of three times the standard deviation from the mean.
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exception is the case where we average the data over the whole period and look at
a pure cross-sectional analysis. In this case, the coefficient of fiscal decentralization
is no longer significant. Shortening the time period to 1993–2007 and 1996–2007,
respectively, and controlling for outliers does not affect the main results.
Some of these analyses are also performed for subsets of the sample, where we
make a distinction between OECD member countries and other countries. In general,
the coefficient of fiscal decentralization enters with a positive and significant, though
a slightly lower point estimate, in the sample with OECD member countries only.
Although fiscal decentralization sometimes enters with a significant coefficient in the
sample with non OECD member countries, most of the time it is not significant.
The evidence, thus, suggest that the relationship between fiscal decentralization and
economic growth is more pronounced in OECD member countries.
3.5. Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the relationship between economic growth and fiscal decentral-
ization. Using a sample of 56 countries over the period 1990–2007, we find that there
is a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization economic growth. When ex-
cluding fiscal policy and trade related explanatory variables from the analyses, such
as the size of the government and the openness of a country, we find no evidence of
a relationship between economic growth and fiscal decentralization. The relation-
ship holds both in the short run and long run, and seems to be more pronounced in
OECD member countries. The use of alternative measures for fiscal decentralization
may change these outcomes, which is the result of the accompanied changes in the
samples rather than the use of the alternative measures themselves though.
To control for endogeneity problems, we introduced instrumental variables based
on common legal system origin, common federal system, relative country size, and
geographical distance. In contrast to the conventional instrumental variables in the
literature, such as country size and legal system origin, our instrumental variables
are time-variant, so they can be used in analyses where fiscal decentralization varies
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over time. Although the same holds for the use of lags of fiscal decentralization as
instrumental variables, our instruments have the advantage that they do not reduce
the sample size and that it is possible to test for correlation with the error terms.
Our choice of instrumental variables is based on the notion that countries similar
in aspects such as the origin of their legal system or country size have a similar
process of fiscal decentralization. This idea implies that our approach may not work
well for samples with a relatively small number of countries that are different in these
aspects. One possible solution to this problem and direction for future research is the
construction of a broader dataset of fiscal decentralization, covering a larger number
of countries over a longer time period, that can be used to derive a general set of
instrumental variables. Another direction for further research is to look at alternative
aspects of countries that may be related to the process of fiscal decentralization such
as the number of government tiers, number of local governments, or measures of
autonomy.
Policy recommendations on fiscal decentralization may benefit from taking the
outcomes of fiscal decentralization into account. The approach and instrumental
variables suggested in this chapter help improve the evaluations of these outcomes by




Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Growth rate real GDP per capita overall 201 0.032 0.031 -0.124 0.126
between 0.028 -0.006 0.122
within 0.021 -0.121 0.088
Fiscal decentralization overall 201 0.238 0.133 0.006 0.646
between 0.144 0.015 0.634
within 0.029 0.120 0.355
Initial real GDP per capita overall 201 9.362 0.942 6.424 10.773
between 1.026 6.424 10.773
within 0 9.362 9.362
Population growth overall 201 -2.880 0.161 -3.445 -2.397
between 0.167 -3.379 -2.501
within 0.048 -3.032 -2.690
Investment overall 201 -1.538 0.200 -2.023 -0.871
between 0.186 -1.878 -0.909
within 0.106 -1.867 -1.189
Schooling overall 201 -2.430 0.252 -3.973 -1.981
between 0.265 -3.724 -2.014
within 0.079 -2.910 -2.192
Federal system overall 201 0.214 0.411 0 1
between 0.401 0 1
within 0 0.214 0.214
Government size overall 201 -1.769 0.277 -2.736 -1.227
between 0.259 -2.369 -1.293
within 0.076 -2.252 -1.465
Trade openness overall 201 0.886 0.478 0.180 3.020
between 0.436 0.229 2.415
within 0.133 0.346 1.491
OECD member countries overall 201 0.502 0.501 0 1
between 0.493 0 1
within 0 0.502 0.502
East Asia & Pacific overall 201 0.045 0.207 0 1
between 0.227 0 1
within 0 0.045 0.045
Eastern Europe & Central Asia overall 201 0.264 0.442 0 1
between 0.471 0 1
within 0 0.264 0.264
Latin America & Caribbean overall 201 0.114 0.319 0.000 1.000
between 0.334 0.000 1.000
within 0 0.114 0.114
Africa overall 201 0.075 0.263 0 1
between 0.312 0 1
within 0 0.075 0.075
Notes: Based on the sample of 56 countries over the period 1990–2007. Data are 3 year averages,
except for initial real GDP per capita and dummy variables. The exact definitions of the variables
can be found in Section 3.3.1 and are too elaborate to describe here.
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Table A.3: Country Overview Samples
Endogeneity Sample Autonomy Sample
Argentinaa Finlanda Morocco Australiab Germanyb Norwayb
Armenia Francea Netherlandsa Austriab Greece Poland
Australiaa Georgia New Zealanda Belgiumb Hungary Portugal
Austriaa Germanya Norwaya Canadab Icelandb Spainb
Belarus Greecea Perua Czech Republicb Italyb Swedenb
Belgiuma Hungarya Polanda Denmark Luxembourgb Switzerlandb
Boliviaa Icelanda Portugala Finland Mexicob United Kingdom
Bulgaria Irelanda Romaniaa Franceb Netherlands
Canadaa Israela Russian Federation
Chilea Italya Slovak Republica
China Kazakhstana Sloveniaa
Colombia Latvia South Africaa
Congo, Rep. Lesotho Spaina
Costa Rica Lithuaniaa Switzerland
Croatia Luxembourga Ugandaa
Czech Republica Malaysiaa Ukraine
Denmarka Mauritius United Kingdoma
El Salvador Moldova United Statesa
Estoniaa Mongolia
Notes: The endogeneity sample is used in Tables 3.4 and 3.6. Countries with the superscript a
are also included in the corresponding reduced sample. The autonomy sample is used in Table 3.7.
Countries with the superscript b are also included in the corresponding reduced sample.
Table A.4: Categories of Tax Autonomy
Label Description I II III
a Discretion on rates and bases/reliefs 1.0 1.0 1.0
b1 Discretion on rates unrestricted 0.9 1.0 0
b2 Discretion on rates restricted 0.8 1.0 0
c Discretion on bases/reliefs 0.7 0 0
d1 Tax sharing arrangement: Revenue split set by sub-national governments 0.6 0 0
d2 Tax sharing arrangement: Revenue split with consent of sub-national governments 0.5 0 0
d3 Tax sharing arrangement: Revenue split set by national government pluriannual 0.4 0 0
d4 Tax sharing arrangement: Revenue split set by national government biannual 0.3 0 0
e Rates and bases/reliefs set by national government 0.2 0 0
f Other 0.1 0 0





Fiscal Policy Reforms and Dynamic
Laffer Effects1
4.1. Introduction
The notion that the direct negative effect of a lower tax rate on government revenues
is fully or partly offset by its stimulating effect on the economy has been around for
quite some time and is best illustrated by the Laffer curve (Laffer, 1979). Recently,
renewed attention has been paid to the impact of lower tax rates on government
revenues in particular and to the impact of fiscal policy reforms on the government
budget balance more generally. Feedback effects of changes in tax rates or public
expenditures on the economy are now analyzed using dynamic rather than the tra-
ditional static frameworks.2 In this chapter, we analyze the effects of several fiscal
policy reforms on the long-run government budget balance using a dynamic general
equilibrium framework. More specifically, we analyze the effect of changes in the
capital income tax rate, the labor income tax rate, the consumption tax rate, and
the public expenditures-to-output ratio on the long-run government budget balance
in an endogenous growth framework. Moreover, we are interested in the conditions
under which these fiscal policy reforms lead to a dynamic Laffer effect, which is
defined as an improvement in the long-run government budget balance.
Our analysis is closely related to the work of Ireland (1994), Bruce and Turnovsky
1This chapter is based on Van Oudheusden (2009)
2For example, Fullerton (1982) analyzes the Laffer curve using a static framework.
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(1999), Agell and Persson (2001), and Fernández et al. (2010) who all use a one-
sector endogenous growth model to analyze the impact of changes in fiscal policy
instruments on the long-run government budget balance in a closed economy.3 These
studies differ from each other in the assumptions made on the structure of govern-
ment expenditures and public debt, leading to seemingly conflicting results and,
therefore, a lack of consensus on the conditions under which a dynamic Laffer effect
occurs.4 Other related literature to our analysis is the work of Novales and Ruiz
(2002) and Frederiksson (2007), who employ a two-sector rather than a one-sector
endogenous growth model with elastic labor supply to analyze the effects of fiscal
policy reforms on the economy. However, this choice for a two-sector model either
restricts or makes an analytical analysis of the effects of fiscal policy reforms on the
long-run government budget balance impossible.
We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, we can resolve the different
results in the literature by decomposing the overall effect of fiscal policy reforms on
the long-run government budget balance in three basic effects, namely the direct
budget effect, the growth rate effect, and the discount rate effect.5 In addition, we
take different specifications with respect to the structure of government expenditures
and public debt into account. Second, by assuming labor supply to be endogenous
instead of exogenous, we include a labor-leisure trade-off which allows us to study
a wider variety of fiscal policy reforms. That is, changes in the labor income tax
rate and the consumption tax rate now have real effects instead of acting as lump-
sum taxes. Third, we calibrate the model for some of the euro area economies and
analyze a wide array of fiscal policy reforms to see whether a dynamic Laffer effect
occurs. Rather than restricting attention to marginal changes in fiscal instruments
available to the government, we look at discrete changes. Moreover, we separately
3Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) analyze the effects of fiscal
policy reforms on the long-run government budget balance in a framework in which the growth
rate of the economy is exogenously given and cannot be permanently affected by changes in fiscal
instruments. Therefore, their approach is quite different from ours.
4The different conditions under which a dynamic Laffer effect occurs in the literature will be
discussed in Section 4.3.3.
5The direct budget effect covers the direct impact of fiscal policy reforms on government rev-
enues and expenditures, the growth rate effect, covers the impact on government revenues and
expenditures over time, and the discount rate effect aligns the changes in current and future gov-
ernment revenues and expenditures.
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analyze the effects of allowing for changes in labor supply and different assumptions
on government debt so that we can quantify their impact on the analysis of dynamic
Laffer effects.
Our results are as follows. We analytically explain and reconcile the seemingly
different results found in the literature on dynamic Laffer effects. In addition to
the current explanation, which is an assumption about the structure of government
expenditures provided by Agell and Persson (2001), an assumption about public
debt is needed to explain these different results. Hence, we find that the current
explanation has to be altered. Moreover, the decomposition of the overall effect
enables us to identify the necessary conditions under which a dynamic Laffer effect
can occur. However, numerical analyses are required to see whether such an effect
actually occurs.
Using numerical illustrations, we show that for an economy representative of
the euro area a dynamic Laffer effect is always obtained for lower tax rates on
capital income. An improvement in the long-run government budget balance may
be possible for a lower tax rate on labor income or a higher public expenditures-
to-output ratio though this requires substantial and unrealistic changes in these
fiscal instruments. These findings, however, depend on the economy considered and
the assumptions made. For example, when looking at Spain, a lower tax rate on
capital income does not lead to a dynamic Laffer effect when allowing for changes
in labor supply and taking into account the initial stock of public debt. Relaxing
some of these assumptions change the analysis so that a dynamic Laffer effect may
be possible for Spain. We find that neglecting the stock of initial debt or changes in
labor supply lead to an overestimation and underestimation of the dynamic Laffer
effect, respectively.
The assumption of a fixed path of lump-sum transfers is crucial for any of these
dynamic Laffer effects to occur. When relaxing this assumption, we show that
financing lower tax rates on factor income by a higher tax rate on consumption
gives combinations of tax rates that lead to an improvement in both the long-run
government budget balance and welfare. When the tax rate on capital income is
lowered, these combinations of tax rates lead to a decrease in labor supply and
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negative immediate welfare effects. However, when the tax rate on labor income
is lowered, these combinations of tax rates lead to an increase in labor supply and
positive immediate welfare effects. In both cases, feasible combinations are not found
for marginal changes in tax rates but are found for discrete changes only.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the
analytical framework. Section 3 discusses the analytical results, consisting of com-
parative static effects of changes in fiscal policy instruments, the effects on the
long-run government budget balance, and an explanation of the different results in
the literature. Section 4 discusses the calibration and presents numerical results.
Section 5 concludes.
4.2. Analytical Framework
The closed economy is characterized by three economic actors, namely firms, house-
holds, and the government, which are discussed in turn.
4.2.1. Firms
The production side of the economy is characterized by a continuum of identical
firms operating under perfect competition. For convenience, the total number of
firms is normalized to unity. Following Benhabib and Farmer (1994), the production
technology for firm i is given by
Yi(t) = Ki(t)
aLi(t)
bX(t), a+ b = 1,
X(t) = K̄(t)α−aL̄(t)β−b, a < α ≤ 1, b < β < 1, α+ β > 1,
where Yi(t) is output of firm i, and the production factors Ki(t) and Li(t) represent
the private capital stock and the amount of labor used by firm i, respectively. From
the perspective of the representative firm, the Cobb-Douglas production technology
exhibits constant returns to scale, that is a+ b = 1. The term X(t) represents positive
external returns that are increasing in the economy-wide average levels of the capital
stock K̄(t) and amount of labor L̄(t). Output is taken as the numeraire, and the
corresponding price is normalized to unity.
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[Yi(t)− w(t)Li(t)− Ii(t)] e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsdt,
where r(t) is the rate of return to capital, w(t) is the wage rate, and Ii(t) is gross
investment, all denoted in real terms. Firms maximize their stock market value
subject to the capital accumulation constraint K̇i(t) = Ii(t) − δKi(t), where δ is the
depreciation rate. In equilibrium it holds that Ki(t) = K̄(t) = K(t), Li(t) = L̄(t) = L(t),
and Yi(t) = Ȳ (t) = Y (t). We assume that capital externalities are large enough for the
aggregate production technology to be linear in capital so that
Y (t) = K(t)L(t)β. (4.1)
Competitive factor payments, resulting from the maximization problem of the firm,
are given by
r(t) = aL(t)β − δ, (4.2)
w(t) = bK(t)L(t)β−1. (4.3)
On the production side of the economy, we abstract from human capital as a
factor of production. Taking it into account comes with serious problems for the
purpose of our analysis. First, including it according to Novales and Ruiz (2002)
makes the model analytically intractable. This means we cannot use our model to
reconcile the different results in the literature. Frederiksson (2007) partly solves this
problem by putting restrictions on the accumulation functions of physical and hu-
man capital. Under these restrictions, he shows there are both static and dynamic
inefficiencies that have to be taken into account when analyzing the effect of fiscal
policy reforms on the budget balance of the government. However, the specification
of Frederiksson (2007) limits the calibration of the model, especially when endoge-
nous labor supply is taken into account. Since we want to explain the different result
in the literature, want to include endogenous labor supply to prevent non-distorting
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taxation, and want as few limitations as possible for the calibration of our model, we
do not include human capital as a production factor in our production technology.
Basically, this analytical framework is the simplest one possible that can be used to
explore the mechanisms behind the dynamic Laffer effect while still being able to
replicate basic stylized facts observed in the data.
4.2.2. Households
Infinitely lived representative households have identical and time separable prefer-




U(t)e−ρtdt, ρ > 0, (4.4)
where ρ is the pure rate of time preference and U(t) represents the felicity function:6
U(t) ≡ [C(t)
φ(1− L(t))ηG(t)θ]1−σ − 1
1− σ
if σ 6= 1,
where C(t) is private goods consumption, and G(t) is public goods consumption.
Leisure is represented by 1− L(t), where the amount of time available to the house-
holds has been normalized to unity. The parameter σ > 0 represents the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Preferences for private goods consump-
tion, leisure, and public goods consumption are non-separable, and their respective
weights are given by φ > 0, η > 0, and θ ≥ 0. Moreover, the felicity function is assumed
to be jointly concave in private goods consumption, public goods consumption, and
leisure, resulting in the following constraints on the preferences’ weights:
1− (1− σ)φ > 0, 1− (1− σ)(φ+ η) > 0, and 1− (1− σ)(φ+ θ) > 0. (4.5)
If θ = 0, then public goods consumption is modeled as waste, and θ > 0 means
the provision of public goods by the government is utility enhancing. Since we
assume preferences for private and public goods to be non-separable, the utility
weight of public goods consumption enters the inverse of the effective intertemporal
6U(t) ≡ φ logC(t) + η log[1− L(t)] + θ logG(t) if σ = 1.
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elasticity of substitution, 1− (1− σ)(φ+ θ), and therefore affects the dynamics of the
model quantitatively; see also Section 4.2.4. Alternatively, preferences for private
and public goods can be assumed to be additively separable by assuming that θ = 0.
The main results of the chapter are not affected by these choices though; see also
Agell and Persson (2001).
Households receive income from labor and claims on both physical capital and
government bonds. Following Turnovsky (2000b), government bonds are assumed
to be perpetuities that every period pay out a coupon equal to one unit of output.
The nominal value of the stock of bonds held by the households is denoted by B(t),
which is defined as the number of bonds multiplied by their price p(t), where this
price is defined in terms of the numeraire.7 Households receive lump-sum transfers
from the government, which we denote by T (t) > 0. The budget constraint of the
household is then given by
K̇(t)+Ḃ(t) = (1−τA)r(t)K(t)+(1−τA)q(t)B(t)+(1−τL)w(t)L(t)−(1+τC)C(t)+T (t), (4.6)
where q(t) is the rate of return on government bonds and is defined as q(t) = 1+ṗ(t)
p(t)
.
Income of households is taxed, where τA and τL denote the tax rates on capital income
and labor income, respectively. Moreover, private goods consumption is taxed where
τC is the corresponding ad valorem tax rate. Note that these tax rates are assumed
to be time invariant in equilibrium. Households choose private goods consumption,
labor, capital, and government bonds to maximize utility (4.4) subject to the budget
constraint (4.6). The first-order conditions for this problem are
[C(t)φ(1− L(t))ηG(t)θ]1−σφC(t)−1 =λ(t)(1 + τC), (4.7a)







7This specification allows for immediate adjustment of the price of bonds such that constant
portfolio shares of physical capital and government bonds in equilibrium are guaranteed. Hence,
the specification abstracts from transitional dynamics in portfolio shares associated with fixed-price
bonds, see Turnovsky (2000b, p. 438).
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where λ(t) is the shadow price of assets. The transversality conditions are given by
lim
t→∞
λ(t)K(t)e−ρt = 0, and lim
t→∞
λ(t)B(t)e−ρt = 0. (4.8)
Combining equations (4.7c) and (4.7d) gives the no-arbitrage equation r(t) = q(t),
which implies that the return on physical capital should equal the return on govern-
ment bonds.
4.2.3. Government
To link the provision of public goods to the size of the economy, the government
uses a constant fraction ωG of output for the provision of unproductive public goods:
G(t) = ωGY (t), 0 < ωG < 1. (4.9)
Besides the provision of public goods for consumption, government expenditures
are interest payments on outstanding bonds and lump-sum transfers to households.
Revenues of the government consist of taxes on capital income, labor income, and
private goods consumption. Any fiscal deficit has to be financed by issuing bonds.
Taking into account the no-arbitrage condition r(t) = q(t), the budget constraint of
the government becomes
Ḃ(t) = ωGY (t) + T (t) + (1− τA)r(t)B(t)− τAr(t)K(t)− τLw(t)L(t)− τCC(t). (4.10)
4.2.4. The Balanced Growth Path
The equilibrium of the decentralized equilibrium is characterized by a first-order
differential equation in labor supply, which is obtained by a number of steps.8 We
make use of the intratemporal optimality condition between leisure and private goods









8In the derivations we omit time indices for convenience of notation.
90
Analytical Framework
which implies that at each point in time the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and private goods consumption should equal its relative price. We also make
use of the aggregate resource constraint that follows from combining the budget
constraint of the household (4.6) and the budget constraint of the government (4.10):
K̇ = rK + wL− C −G = (1− ωG)Y − δK − C, (4.12)
where we have used (4.1)–(4.3), (4.9), and a + b = 1 in deriving (4.12). The set of
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Lβ − δ, (4.13c)
λ̇
λ
= ρ− (1− τA)(aLβ − δ). (4.13d)
By substituting equations (4.13b), (4.13c), and (4.13d) into equation (4.13a), we




















(1− σ)(φ+ θ)− 1
]
+ (1− τA)(aLβ − δ)− ρ, (4.15a)
ΘD(L) ≡ −
[













9Substituting (4.1) and (4.9) into (4.7a) and subsequently taking the logarithm and time
derivate of the resulting expression gives equation (4.13a). Substituting (4.3) into (4.11) and
subsequently taking the logarithm and time derivate of the resulting expression gives equation
(4.13b). Equation (4.13c) is obtained by dividing both sides of (4.12) by K and making use of the
expression of the consumption-capital ratio. The latter can be obtained by substituting (4.3) into
(4.11) and rearranging terms. Finally, substituting (4.2) into (4.7d) and rearranging terms gives
equation (4.13d).
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We define the balanced growth path as a situation in which private goods con-







. However, along the balanced growth path, labor supply is constant:
L̇ = 0. Equation (4.14) then implies that ΘN(L) = 0 must hold. This is the case if
(1− τA)(aLβ − δ)− ρ











Lβ − δ. (4.16)
We follow Turnovsky (2000a) and represent the balanced growth path by two loci
describing the relationship between the growth rate and labor supply. The left-hand
side of (4.16) is associated with portfolio balance equilibrium and the right-hand
side of (4.16) with product market equilibrium. These are given by
γP (L) ≡
(1− τA)(aLβ − δ)− ρ












Lβ − δ. (4.17b)
The effect of assuming preferences for private and public goods consumption to
be non-separable can be seen in the denominator of equation (4.17a), which is the
standard Euler equation. Assuming θ > 0 only affects the value of the effective
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, given by 1
1−(1−σ)(φ+θ) , but does not affect the
main results of the chapter since it is always larger than zero regardless of the value
of θ; see equation (4.5).
It can be shown that an equilibrium exists if
σ > 1− 1− ωG − (a− δ)(1− τA) + ρ
(1− ωG)(φ+ θ)
, (4.18a)
and that this equilibrium is unique. Moreover, the equilibrium is determinate, or
locally unstable, if
ΘD(L̃) < 0, (4.18b)
where L̃ is the level of labor supply for which (4.16) holds. See Appendix 4.A.1 and
4.A.2 for a derivation of both these results. We assume that the conditions in (4.18)
92
Analytical Results
are always satisfied so that both a unique equilibrium exists and the economy always
lies on its balanced growth path. Since the production technology is similar to that
of Benhabib and Farmer (1994), an equilibrium may exist that is indeterminate, or
locally stable. However, both equation (4.18a) and equation (4.18b) hold when per-
forming the numerical analyses in Section 4.4. The same holds for the transversality
conditions (4.8) which are satisfied if ρ > (1 − σ)(φ + θ)γ. We therefore focus on the
determinate equilibrium only but do indicate how results may change in the case
the equilibrium is indeterminate.
4.3. Analytical Results
We first discuss comparative static effects that we use to decompose the dynamic
Laffer effect in three basic effects. These basic effects are used to identify the nec-
essary conditions for a dynamic Laffer effect to occur and to reconcile the different
results in the literature.
4.3.1. Comparative Static Effects
Fiscal policy reforms are defined as changes in the fiscal policy instruments τA,
τL, τC, or ωG. Their effects on labor supply are obtained by fully differentiating
(4.16). To keep the government budget balanced, we assume changes in government
expenditures or revenues as a result of fiscal policy reforms to be offset in a non-






















Effects of fiscal policy reforms on the growth rate of the economy are obtained by






















If the equilibrium is indeterminate, which is not supported by the calibration in
Section 4.4, these results are reversed; see also Itaya (2008). See Appendix 4.A.3
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for a derivation of these results. From (4.19a) and (4.19b) it is clear that both
labor supply and the growth rate of the economy decrease with higher tax rates and
increase with a higher public expenditures-to-output ratio. We proceed by discussing
the effects of changes in fiscal policy instruments on the growth rate separately.
The effect of a higher capital income tax rate on economic growth is given in
panel (a) of Figure 4.1 and is represented by a rotation of the line associated with
portfolio balance equilibrium from P to P ′. Holding labor supply fixed, a higher tax
rate on capital income lowers the after-tax return on capital so that it falls below
the return on consumption.10 This difference, in terms of the growth rate, is given
by the vertical distance between A and B. Consequently, households respond by
increasing private goods consumption. At the same time, households increase leisure
to ensure the intratemporal optimality condition between leisure and private goods
consumption remains satisfied. The resulting fall in labor supply has a negative
effect on the growth rate. The overall effect is given by the shift from A to C along
the line Q.
The effect of a higher labor income tax rate or consumption tax rate on economic
growth is given in panel (b) of Figure 4.1 and is represented by a rotation of the line
associated with product market equilibrium from Q to Q′. Both a higher labor in-
come tax rate and a higher consumption tax rate make private goods consumption
relatively expensive compared to leisure. Holding labor supply fixed, households
respond by lowering private goods consumption to retain the intratemporal opti-
mality condition between leisure and private goods consumption. This decrease in
consumption for a given amount of labor supply leads to a rise in the return to
consumption above the return to investment. In terms of the growth rate, this dif-
ference is given by the vertical distance between A and B.11 Households respond by
both increasing private goods consumption and leisure. The resulting fall in labor
supply has a negative effect on the growth rate. The overall effect is given by the
shift from A to C along the line P .
10The return on private goods consumption is given by the left-hand side of (4.7c) and (4.7d);
see Turnovsky (2000b, p. 233) for an explanation of the return on consumption.
11Holding labor supply fixed, there is too little investment given the the return to investment
when the public expenditures-to-output ratio increases since the intratemporal optimality condition
between leisure and private goods consumption is not affected. The effect is thus the opposite of
a higher labor income tax rate or consumption tax rate.
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4.3.2. Three Basic Effects on the Long-run Government Budget Balance
The comparative static effects are used to analyze changes in the long-run govern-
ment budget balance. The long-run government budget balance is given by the
intertemporal budget constraint of the government, which can be obtained by inte-
grating (4.10) and making use of the customary No-Ponzi Game condition given by
limt→∞B(t)e
−(1−τA)(aL
β−δ)t = 0. The intertemporal budget constraint of the government
is given by
∆ ≡ τA(aL̃
β − δ)K(0) + τLbK(0)L̃β + τCC(0)
(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃︸ ︷︷ ︸
present value of revenues
− ωGK(0)L̃
β + T (0)
(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃︸ ︷︷ ︸
present value of expenditures
−B(0) = 0, (4.20)
where initially it is balanced: ∆ = 0.12 When deriving the intertemporal budget
constraint of the government, we assume lump-sum transfers to grow at the same
rate as the economy. Choosing lump-sum transfers to grow at a different growth
rate than the economy implies that in the long run the size of transfers will become
12γ̃ is the growth rate valued at L̃.
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either very small or very large compared to output.
To explore the mechanisms behind the dynamic Laffer effect, we distinguish three
basic effects when analyzing the overall effect of fiscal policy reforms on the long-run
government budget balance: (i) the direct budget effect, covering the direct impact of
fiscal policy reforms on government revenues and expenditures; (ii) the growth rate
effect, covering the impact on government revenues and expenditures over time; and
(iii) the discount rate effect, aligning the changes in current and future government
revenues and expenditures. The basic effects are obtained by fully differentiating
(4.20) with respect to the policy instrument of choice:
d∆
di
= ∆i = ξi + ξ
l
i + υi + υ
l
i + πi + π
l
i − ζi − ζ li , (4.21)
where ξi, υi, and πi, for i ∈ {τA, τL, τC , ωG}, represent the direct budget effect, the dis-
count rate effect, and the growth rate effect, respectively. The growth rate effect for
lump-sum government transfers in particular is represented by ζi for i ∈ {τA, τL, τC , ωG}.
Although the effect of ζ is implicitly captured by π, we include it in our analysis to
emphasize the main assumption responsible for the dynamic Laffer effects found in
the literature. This assumption will be discussed in Section 4.3.2.2. The superscript
l represents the part of the basic effects that is caused by changes in labor supply
only. The basic effects are discussed in turn.13
4.3.2.1. The Direct Budget Effect





















(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃
[1 + τC ] < 0. (4.22d)
13Hereby we make use of the expression for initial private consumption C̃(0) = [(1−ωG)L̃β−(γ̃+
δ)]K(0), which follows from the relationship between the growth rate and labor supply associated
with product market equilibrium; see (4.17b).
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The bracketed terms in equations (4.22a) and (4.22d) indicate that changes in fiscal
policy instruments not only affect their own tax base but also other tax bases.
For example, a lower tax rate on capital income increases the firm’s incentives to
invest, which come at the cost of lower private goods consumption. A higher public
expenditures-to-output ratio crowds out private goods consumption directly. Both
effects lead to a decrease in the consumption tax base, which in turn leads to a
deterioration of the long-run government budget balance. The additional effect




1− ωG − (1−τA)a1−(1−σ)(φ+θ)
]
− ωG





for i ∈ {τA, τL, τC , ωG}. A change in labor supply resulting from a fiscal policy re-
form not only affects government revenues via changes in tax bases but also affects
government expenditures since the latter are linked to the size of the economy; see
(4.9). The net effect is given by the numerator of equation (4.23), which has to be
determined numerically. The direct budget effect is thus ambiguous.
4.3.2.2. The Growth Rate Effect




[(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃]
1
[1− (1− σ)(φ+ θ)]
, (4.24a)




[(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃]
1




for i ∈ {τA, τL, τC , ωG}. When labor supply does not change, the effect is absent for τL,
τC, and ωG so that endogenous labor supply is necessary for the growth rate effect
to extend to these instruments. More importantly, the sign of the growth rate effect
depends on the initial stock of public debt: B(0). The intuition for this relationship
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is as follows. When the initial stock of public debt is positive B(0) > 0, the present
value of revenues is larger than the present value of expenditures so that, given the
discount rate, there is a stream of positive cash flows. Now, consider a fiscal policy
reform that leads to a higher growth rate. The stream of positive cash flows then
grows at a higher rate than before the fiscal policy reform, which corresponds to an
improvement in the long-run government budget balance.
The growth rate effect corresponding to lump-sum government transfers is given
by
ζτA ≡
T (0)(aL̃β − δ)
[1− (1− σ)(φ+ θ)][(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃]2
, (4.25a)
and ζτL ≡ ζτC ≡ ζωG ≡ 0 when labor supply does not change. The additional effect
caused by changes in labor supply is given by
ζ li ≡ −
T (0)(1− τA)aβL̃β−1




for i ∈ {τA, τL, τC , ωG}. Again, consider a fiscal policy reform that leads to a higher
growth rate. Lump-sum transfers, from the perspective of the government seen as
a stream of negative cash flows, then grow at a higher rate than before the fiscal
policy reform, which corresponds to a deterioration in the long-run government
budget balance.
We pay special attention to the growth rate effect corresponding to lump-sum
government transfers since it is directly connected to the main assumption made
in the literature. This assumption is that the path of lump-sum transfers is prede-
termined, and it is made by Ireland (1994), Agell and Persson (2001), Novales and
Ruiz (2002), Frederiksson (2007), and Fernández et al. (2010). It means that after
a fiscal policy reform lump-sum transfers remain to grow at the rate corresponding
to the old equilibrium so that the growth rate effect corresponding to lump-sum
government transfers is left out of the analysis. Since this effect is negative for a
growth promoting fiscal policy reform, it is more likely to obtain a dynamic Laffer
effect when this assumption is made.
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4.3.2.3. The Discount Rate Effect




(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃
, (4.26a)
and υτL ≡ υτC ≡ υωG ≡ 0 when labor supply does not change. The additional effect
caused by changes in labor supply is given by
υli ≡ −B(0)
(1− τA)aβL̃β−1




for i ∈ {τA, τL, τC , ωG}. As for the growth rate effect, the sign of the discount rate
effect depends on the initial stock of public debt. However, the intuition for this
relationship is different than that of the growth rate effect. Recall that a positive
initial stock of public debt corresponds to a stream of positive cash flows. A fiscal
policy reform that leads to an increase in labor supply implies a higher discount rate.
The stream of positive cash flows is now discounted at a higher rate, which leads to
a lower present value and thus to a deterioration in the long-run government budget
balance. Again, endogenous labor supply is necessary for the discount rate effect to
extend to all fiscal policy instruments.
4.3.2.4. The Overall Effect
We now look at the overall effect where, for analytical tractability, we take the
discount rate effect and the growth rate effect together. More specifically, we replace
υi + υ
l
i + πi + π
l
i in equation (4.21) by the equations in (4.24) and (4.26) so that the
overall effect is given by
∆i = ξi + ξ
l
i − ζi − ζ li
+B(0)
(aL̃β − δ)
(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃
[
1− 1




(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃
[
1− 1
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for i = τA, and
∆i = ξi + ξ
l
i − ζi − ζ li
−B(0) (1− τA)aβL̃
β−1
(1− τA)(aL̃β − δ)− γ̃
[
1− 1





for i ∈ {τL, τC , ωG}. In equations (4.27) and (4.28), the first term between brackets
corresponds to the discount rate effect, and the second term between brackets corre-
sponds to the growth rate effect. The discount rate effect dominates the growth rate
effect if the bracketed term is positive. The reverse holds if it is negative, and both
effects cancel out when it is zero. The sign of the bracketed term is determined by
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution: 1/σ. When it is relatively high so that
σ < 1, households are more willing to shift consumption between time periods, and
the growth rate effect dominates. When it is relatively low so that σ > 1, households
are less willing to shift consumption between time periods, and the discount rate
effect dominates. Table 4.1 gives an overview of all of the above discussed effects for
a number of fiscal policy reforms in a convenient manner.
4.3.3. Explaining the Literature
The first row of Table 4.1, (dτA < 0), is used to reconcile the conflicting results in
the literature. These conflicting results are as follows. Ireland (1994) shows that
a dynamic Laffer effect is obtained for both σ > 1 and σ < 1, while Bruce and
Turnovsky (1999) show that this is only possible for σ < 1. Agell and Persson (2001)
show that a dynamic Laffer effect does not exist at all for any σ and argue that all
these differences are explained by the assumption made on the path of government
expenditures. We think this explanation has to be altered.
The analysis of Ireland (1994) is replicated by setting B(0) = 0 and noting that
the path of lump-sum transfers is assumed to be predetermined. Since labor supply
is exogenous, the overall effect of his analysis is given by the sign of ξ − ζ, which
is ambiguous. Possibly there exists a range of non-trivial conditions for which this
is positive so that a dynamic Laffer effect exists. Agell and Persson (2001) show
that under the conditions of Ireland (1994) a dynamic Laffer effect is more likely
to occur when the initial lump-sum transfer-to-output ratio T (0)/Y (0) is relatively
100
Analytical Results
Table 4.1: Effects of Fiscal Policy Reforms on the Long-Run Government Budget
Balance
effects when labor supply is fixed
ξi ζi νi + πi νi + πi νi + πi
B(0) > 0 B(0) = 0 B(0) < 0
σ < 1 σ = 1 σ > 1 σ < 1 σ = 1 σ > 1 σ < 1 σ = 1 σ > 1
d τA < 0 - - + 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 +
d τL < 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
d τC < 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
d ωG > 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
















B(0) > 0 B(0) = 0 B(0) < 0
σ < 1 σ = 1 σ > 1 σ < 1 σ = 1 σ > 1 σ < 1 σ = 1 σ > 1
d τA < 0 +/- - + 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 +
d τL < 0 +/- - + 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 +
d τC < 0 +/- - + 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 +
d ωG > 0 +/- - + 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 +
Notes: ξ denotes the direct budget effect, ζ is part of the growth effect corresponding to the case
where the path of lump-sum transfers is predetermined, υ denotes the discount rate effect, and π
denotes the growth rate effect. The parameter σ denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution and B(0) denotes the initial stock of debt, where B(0) > 0 denotes the situation
where initial debt is positive and B(0) < 0 denotes the situation where the government acts as a
creditor to the private sector.
high. From equations (4.22) and (4.25) it is straightforward to see that this means
that, in absolute sense, ζ is relatively large compared to ξ so that ξ− ζ is more likely
to be positive.
The analysis of Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) is replicated by setting B(0) > 0 and
noting that the path of lump-sum transfers is not assumed to be predetermined.14
Also, in their analysis labor supply is exogenous so that their overall effect is given
by the sign of ξ + ν + π. A dynamic Laffer effect is now only possible for σ < 1; see
Table 4.1. Hence, not only the assumption on the path of government expenditures
but also the assumption on the initial stock of public debt is needed to explain the
different results of Ireland (1994) and Bruce and Turnovsky (1999).
Agell and Persson (2001) show that a dynamic Laffer effect does not exist at all
for any σ. Their analysis can be replicated by noting that the path of lump-sum
transfers is not assumed to be predetermined and that in addition to the decrease
in the tax rate on capital income the government expenditures-to-output ratio is
increased. Again labor supply is exogenous so that their overall effect is given by
14Although the analysis of Bruce and Turnovsky (1999) differs from ours, the mechanism is
basically the same.
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the sign of 2ξ, one for dτA < 0 and one for dωG > 0, which is always negative for any
σ.
Although Table 4.1 can be used to identify the necessary conditions for a dynamic
Laffer effect to exist, numerical analyses are needed to see when a dynamic Laffer
effect actually occurs. This is done in the next section.
4.4. Numerical Results
We perform numerical analyses to see whether there are fiscal policy reforms that
lead to an improvement in the long-run government budget balance. To this end,
we calibrate the model for several European countries to see whether our model is
able to replicate the main fiscal stylized facts.15 When defining the initial balanced
growth path of the economies, we use parameters and variables representative of
these countries over the period 1995–2006, and the calibration is done on an annual
basis.16
4.4.1. Calibration and Fiscal Stylized Facts
Although in practice fiscal systems are complex, consisting of a variety of statutory
taxes and corresponding tax bases, we can use the implicit tax rates published by the
European Commission (2008) to pin down our initial tax rates. These implicit tax
rates are fairly constant over time.17 For the public expenditures-to-output ratio and
debt-to-output ratio, we use data on final government consumption and general gov-
ernment consolidated gross debt as a percentage of Gross Domestic Output (GDP)
from the AMECO database published by the European Commission (2007). The
production elasticities of capital and labor are based on the labor share of income,
also taken from the AMECO database. Moreover, we set b = β so that we abstract
15See Table 4.2 for a list of the countries we consider.
16All data used for the calibration can be found in Table 1 of the Web Appendix to the chapter;
see Van Oudheusden (2012).
17The method for calculating the implicit tax rates is based on Mendoza et al. (1994). We use
the implicit tax rate related to the taxation of income and profits of firms for the implicit tax




from the externalities associated with the use of labor in production. Hours per year
worked are taken from the Total Economy Database provided by (The Conference
Board, 2009). These data are summarized in Table 4.2 for several countries.
Table 4.2: Fiscal and Structural Parameters
τA τL τC ωG B/Y 1− α Hours
EA (15) 0.2520 0.3905 0.1941 0.2013 0.7038 0.6523 1700
France 0.2829 0.4173 0.2097 0.2348 0.5984 0.6648 1597
Germany 0.1979 0.3998 0.1844 0.1912 0.6513 0.6514 1473
Italy 0.2223 0.4275 0.1728 0.1898 1.1108 0.6245 1613
Spain 0.3551 0.2952 0.1543 0.1758 0.5536 0.6248 1793
United Kingdom 0.1991 0.2494 0.1953 0.1948 0.4345 0.7246 1643
Notes: The EA (15) represents 15 members of the euro area. The countries are Austria, Belgium,
Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Por-
tugal, Slovenia, and Spain. We do not assume these countries to actually represent one economy
but rather think that the calibration of the benchmark economy falls within the plausible range of
economies for these countries.
For the structural parameters of the model, we follow the literature when data
are unavailable. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to a half so that
σ = 2, somewhere half way the range of values found by Attanasio and Weber (1993).
They find that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ranges from 0.3 (when
using aggregate data drawn from national accounts) to 0.8 (when using cohort data
drawn from a household survey) so that our choice can be justified empirically.
Similar values are used by Turnovsky (2000a), Mendoza and Tesar (2005), and Itaya
(2008). The depreciation rate is obtained by averaging the values used by Mendoza
and Tesar (2005) and Itaya (2008), leading to δ = 0.08. We set φ to a half and
follow Turnovsky (2000a) by setting θ/φ to 1/3. The initial physical capital stock is
normalized to one.
The utility weight of leisure η and the natural rate of time preference ρ are varied
to get an exact match of both the ratio of labor supply to total time and the growth
rate of the economy with the data.18 We compare the resulting values of η and ρ
with those used in the literature. The model should also be able to replicate fiscal
18The ratio of labor supply to total time is calculated by dividing the total hours work per year
by 7300. The resulting ratios are close to the ones aimed for in the literature; see Mendoza and
Tesar (2005, p. 190). Data on the growth rates are taken from the AMECO database.
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stylized facts of these countries, which are the output shares of consumption, lump-
sum transfers, and tax revenues for the consumption tax, labor income tax, and
capital income tax, respectively.19 Table 4.3 gives a comparison of these stylized
facts and the outcomes of the calibration of our model.
Table 4.3: Comparing Stylized Facts
EA (15) France Germany Italy Spain United Kingdom
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
L̃ 0.2329 0.2329 0.2188 0.2188 0.2017 0.2017 0.2010 0.2010 0.2382 0.2382 0.2251 0.2251
γ 0.0121 0.0121 0.0127 0.0127 0.0195 0.0195 0.0068 0.0068 0.0047 0.0047 0.0176 0.0176
Output shares:
C 0.5736 0.5604 0.5621 0.5655 0.5867 0.5832 0.5896 0.5738 0.5886 0.6166 0.5621 0.6355
T 0.1661 0.1776 0.1763 0.1904 0.1882 0.2067 0.1669 0.1689 0.1223 0.1439 0.1327 0.1293
revenues: τC 0.1088 0.1088 0.1167 0.1186 0.1028 0.1223 0.1034 0.0991 0.0954 0.0951 0.1187 0.1230
revenues: τL 0.2129 0.2547 0.2307 0.2774 0.2367 0.2604 0.1999 0.2670 0.1619 0.1844 0.1327 0.1807
revenues: τA 0.0281 0.0355 0.0249 0.0482 0.0238 0.0353 0.0316 0.0350 0.0343 0.0636 0.0342 0.0314
Implied:
η/φ 1.9569 2.0218 2.1933 2.1120 1.9784 2.4685
ρ 0.0205 0.0233 0.0179 0.0337 0.0393 0.0135
Notes: For all economies, the depreciation rate δ is set to 0.08, the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is set to 2, and the utility weight of consumption φ is set to 0.5.
The ratio of labor supply to total time that follows from the model exactly cor-
responds with its real-word counterpart by adjusting η. The corresponding relative
weight of leisure to consumption η/φ is given in Table 4.3 and is close to 2 for almost
all economies considered. This ratio is close to the one used by Novales and Ruiz
(2002), Mendoza and Tesar (2005), and Leeper and Yang (2008), which is 2 to 3.
The parameter ρ is adjusted to match the growth rate of the economy with the data.
Most of the resulting values lie between 0.02 and 0.04, the range of values used in
the literature (e.g., Agell and Persson, 2001; Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2006; Leeper
and Yang, 2008). The natural rate of time preference seems too low for Germany
and the United Kingdom, which have a relatively high growth rate compared to the
other economies. This finding may be the result of assuming the depreciation rate
and intertemporal elasticity of substitution to be the same for all economies, which
may actually differ for Germany and the United Kingdom.
Our model performs surprisingly well in replicating the private consumption-to-
output ratio and the lump-sum transfer-to-output ratio. However, it is not possible
19Data on the private consumption-to-output ratio and the lump sum transfer-to-output ratio
are taken from the AMECO database, where we use social transfers defined as social transfers
other than in kind, mainly consisting of social benefits in the form of cash. Data on tax revenues
are taken from the European Commission (2008).
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to get exact matches for these ratios because our model considers a closed economy so
that we have no counterpart for net imports. Moreover, we do not take into account
all expenditures and revenues of the government such as capital expenditures and
taxes on capital stocks and transfers. The average deviation from the data is slightly
more than 1.5 percentage points, which we believe is fair given the simplicity of our
model. In matching the output share of tax revenues, the model also performs well
for the tax rate on consumption. The output shares for labor tax revenues are higher
than those observed in the data. However, this particular deviation is not specific to
our model but seems to be present in other calibrated dynamic general equilibrium
models as well; see Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Deviations for capital income tax
revenues as a share of output are modest.
Table 4.4: Comparing Stylized Facts: Robustness Checks
European Area (15)
θ 0.1667 0.0000* 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667
η/φ 1.9569 1.9569 2.0000* 1.9597 1.5408 2.0518 1.9569
ρ 0.0205 0.0225 0.0205 0.0200* 0.0737 0.0111 0.0286
1− α 0.6523 0.6523 0.6523 0.6523 0.5452* 0.6744* 0.6523
σ 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 2.0000 1.0000*
Data Model
L̃ 0.2329 0.2329 0.2329 0.2293 0.2329 0.2329 0.2329 0.2329
γ 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121 0.0115 0.0124 0.0121 0.0121 0.0121
Output shares:
C 0.5736 0.5604 0.5604 0.5596 0.5596 0.5949 0.5526 0.5604
T 0.1661 0.1776 0.1776 0.1771 0.1776 0.1395 0.1840 0.1776
revenues: τC 0.1088 0.1088 0.1088 0.1086 0.1086 0.1155 0.1073 0.1088
revenues: τL 0.2129 0.2547 0.2547 0.2547 0.2547 0.2129 0.2634 0.2547
revenues: τA 0.0281 0.0355 0.0355 0.0349 0.0355 0.0700 0.0281 0.0355
Notes: The second column gives the stylized facts as observed in the data, and the third column
gives the calibration as described in Table 4.3. In the remaining columns, we vary one parameter,
indicated with an asterisk, at the time.
Table 4.4 show various alternative calibrations for the euro area to check the
robustness of the results. The parameters that are varied are indicated with an
asterisk. First, we set θ to zero so that government spending is modeled as waste.
Since this increases the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ρ has to
increase for the growth rate to match the data but its value is still in the range used
in the literature. Compared to the benchmark scenario, leisure is valued more than
consumption when η/φ is set to 2. As a result, households supply less labor, leading
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to a lower growth rate. However, deviations are very small. Making households more
patient by setting ρ to 0.0200 leads to a slightly higher growth rate. The income
share of labor, 1 − α, can be adjusted for the model to replicate the output shares
of the tax rates on labor and capital income. In the case of the tax rate on labor
income, this adjustment seems implausible since it implies that the labor income
share is almost as low as fifty percent. Finally, setting the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution to one does not change much compared to the benchmark scenario.
It can be argued that any of the choices for the labor income share we made imply
too high social returns to capital to be justified on empirical grounds. However,
the mechanisms behind the dynamic Laffer effect discussed in Section 4.3.2 extend
directly to models where endogenous growth is not the result of externalities but of
intentional research and development by firms.20 We have chosen for this analytical
framework in particular since it provides the simplest model possible to explore these
mechanisms while still being able to replicate the basic stylized facts observed in the
data. Although we recognize that the calibration of more elaborate endogenous
growth models deserves more attention, this is beyond the scope of the chapter, and
we leave this to future research.
For all values of the parameters of the model we considered, equations (4.18a)
and equation (4.18b) are both satisfied, which means that an equilibrium exists and
that the economy is always in its equilibrium. Thus, we do not have to worry about
the possible indeterminacy of the model. For the remaining numerical analyses, we
use the calibration of the EA (15) economy unless indicated otherwise.
4.4.2. Basic Fiscal Policy Reforms
Given our choice of parameters, we analyze whether the fiscal policy reforms lead to
a dynamic Laffer effect. Instead of restricting the analysis to marginal changes in
the tax rates on the long-run government budget balance, we analyze a wide range of
discrete changes in the tax rates. More specifically, we analyze a series of lower tax
rates whereby the difference between the initial tax rate and the tax rate after the
fiscal policy reform is repeatedly increased up to the point where the difference is 15
20For an example of these models see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999) and Acemoglu (2009).
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percentage points. We calculate the balanced growth path corresponding to the new
tax rate for every change and check both the existence (4.18a) and stability (4.18b)
conditions. The same procedure is followed for the public expenditures-to-output
ratio, which is repeatedly increased up to the point where the ratio is 15 percentage
points higher than the initial ratio. In all cases, we follow the main assumption in
the literature and assume that the path of lump-sum transfers is predetermined.
The solid lines in panels (a)–(d) of Figure 4.2 represent the overall effect of the
fiscal policy reforms on the long-run government budget balance.21 The magnitude
of the overall effect is given on the vertical axis to the right. All fiscal policy reforms
result in an equilibrium that is unique. Moreover, all equilibria are determinate,
so there are no transitional dynamics, and the economy jumps right to the new
equilibrium. Figure 4.2 shows that an improvement in the long-run government
budget balance is always obtained for a lower tax rate on capital income. A lower
tax rate on labor income or a higher public expenditures-to-output ratio may only
lead to a dynamic Laffer effect for very substantial changes. Lowering the tax rate
on consumption never leads to a dynamic Laffer effect.
One possible explanation for the contrast in these outcomes is differences in
the size of the distorting effect of the fiscal instruments. The new growth rates
corresponding to a fiscal policy reform of a 15 percentage points change in a fiscal
instrument are 1.64 percent for the tax rate on capital income, 2.04 percent for the
tax rate on labor income, 1.56 percent for the tax rate on consumption, and 1.80
percent for the public expenditures-to-output ratio. That is, based on the size of the
distorting effects, it should be more likely to obtain a dynamic Laffer effect for an
increase in public expenditures than for a decrease in the tax rate on capital income.
Since we do not observe this, we need a different explanation.
Another explanation for the observed differences in Figure 4.2 is differences in the
size of the initial tax base of the fiscal instruments. The sizes of the initial tax bases
are around 14, 65, and 55 percent of GDP for the tax rate on capital income, la-
bor income, and consumption, respectively.22 For the public expenditures-to-output
21The results are for the EA (15) economy. Result for the other economies can be found in the
Web Appendix to the chapter.
22We divide tax revenues as a percentage of GDP by the corresponding tax rate to obtain the
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ratio, the size of the initial ‘tax base’ is 100 percent of GDP since government expen-
ditures are linked to the size of the economy; see (4.9). Hence, the relatively small
initial tax base of the tax rate on capital income compared to that of the other fiscal
instruments is a better explanation for why it is more likely to obtain a dynamic
Laffer effect for this fiscal instrument.
However, a comparison of the size of both the distorting effect and initial tax base
only gives an indication whether a dynamic Laffer effect can be obtained. It does
not gives us insight in the exact conditions under which such an effect is obtained.
Therefore, we look at the relative contributions of the basic effects to the change
in the long-run government budget balance. These relative contributions are given
by the stacked bars in Figure 4.2, where we make a distinction between the direct
budget effect ξ + ξl (dark gray bars), the combined discount rate effect and growth
rate effect π + πl + ν + νl (white bars), and the growth rate effect corresponding to
lump-sum transfers ζ + ζ l (light gray bars).23
This last effect is included to analyze the implications of the assumption that
lump-sum transfers are predetermined for obtaining a dynamic Laffer effect. Recall
from Section 4.3.2.2 that the growth rate effect corresponding to lump-sum transfers
is negative and is implicitly captured by the combined discount rate effect and
growth rate effect. Moreover, under the assumption that lump-sum transfers are
predetermined, the growth rate effect corresponding to lump-sum transfers has to
be removed from the analysis. The removal of this effect leads to an improvement in
the long-run government budget balance, and the relative magnitude of this effect
is given by ζ + ζ l. The magnitudes of the relative contributions are given on the left
vertical axis and sum up to one. The stacked bars that are dashed represent the
relative contribution of the basic effects caused by changes in labor supply.
Panels (a)–(d) of Figure 4.2 show that the relative contribution of the combined
discount rate effect and growth rate effect is negligible compared to the other basic
effects. The total contribution of the direct budget effect is always negative although
initial tax base as a percentage of GDP; see Table 4.3.
23Note that the above described effects are not the marginal effects as discussed in Section 4.3.2,
but the effects are only related since we analyze discrete changes here. Notes on the specific method
can be found in the Web Appendix to the chapter.
109
Chapter 4: Fiscal Policy Reforms and Dynamic Laffer Effects
the part that is caused by changes in labor supply is positive.24 The total contribu-
tion of the growth rate effect corresponding to lump-sum transfers is always positive
since this represents the removal of a negative effect. In the case of the tax rate on
capital income, panel (a) of Figure 4.2, it can be seen that the relative contribution
of the direct budget effect is always smaller than the relative contribution of the
growth rate effect corresponding to lump-sum transfers. The opposite can be seen
in the case of the tax rate on labor income, the tax rate on consumption, and the
public expenditures-to-output ratio; see panels (b)–(d) of Figure 4.2. Hence, the
relative magnitude of the growth effect corresponding to lump-sum transfers and
the direct budget explains why we do obtain a dynamic Laffer effect for a lower tax
rate on capital income and do not obtain it for the other fiscal instruments.
We now calculate the quantitative effects of the different assumptions we make,
such as taking into account the initial stock of public debt and allowing for changes
in labor supply. The effects of these assumptions can be seen in Figure 4.3, where we
look at the effects of lower tax rates on capital income for Spain. Panel (a) gives the
scenario where both the initial stock of public debt and changes in labor supply are
taken into account. In this case, no dynamic Laffer effect is obtained, which means
it is not always the case that a lower tax rate on capital leads to an improvement
in the long-run budget balance of the government. If the initial stock of public debt
is neglected, as in panel (b), a dynamic Laffer effect is always obtained. Hence,
neglecting the stock of initial debt leads to an overestimation of the dynamic Laffer
effect. If instead changes in labor supply are not taken into account, it becomes
harder to obtain a dynamic Laffer effect; compare panel (a) and (c), and panel (b)
and (d). Assumptions on the initial stock of public debt and labor supply thus affect
the size of the tax rate reduction needed to obtain a dynamic Laffer effect, where
the size is decreasing and increasing when neglecting the initial stock of public debt
and changes in labor supply, respectively.
All of the obtained dynamic Laffer effects so far are the result of the assumption
that the path of lump-sum transfers is predetermined. However, this assumption
24Note that the direct budget effect of a change in a fiscal instrument does not correspond
one-to-one with the initial size of the corresponding tax base since the tax base of other fiscal





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 4: Fiscal Policy Reforms and Dynamic Laffer Effects
implies that the transfers-to-output ratio goes to zero over time after the fiscal
policy reforms we consider, which seems a rather strong assumption. By looking
at combinations of fiscal policy reforms, we analyze whether an improvement in the
long-run government budget is also possible when lump-sum transfers always grow at
the same rate as the economy so that the transfers-to-output ratio remains constant
over time.
4.4.3. Composite Fiscal Policy Reforms
We define a composite fiscal policy reform as a combination of changes in the tax
rates on capital income, labor income, and consumption, while letting transfers
grow at the same rate as the economy. More specifically, we analyze composite
fiscal policy reforms, consisting of a range of lower tax rates on capital income or
labor income in combination with a range of higher tax rates on consumption, to see
under which conditions an improvement in the long-run government budget balance
occurs. Hereby, we start at the initial tax rates of the benchmark economy and
impose the additional condition that the new combinations of tax rates should lead
to an improvement in lifetime welfare. We define the change in lifetime welfare as
the percentage change in private goods consumption before the fiscal policy reform
necessary to obtain the same present discounted value of utility as after the fiscal
policy reform. Moreover, we make a distinction between immediate and long-run
welfare effects.25 The area in panel (a) of Figure 4.4 represents the combinations of
capital income tax rates and consumption tax rates that lead to an improvement in
both the long-run government budget balance and lifetime welfare. The area in panel
(b) represents the combinations of the labor income tax rates and the consumption
tax rates for which these conditions hold. From now on, these combinations are
called “feasible combinations.”26
For all feasible combinations in panel (a) of Figure 4.4, labor supply is decreas-
ing resulting in a lower after-tax return on capital. However, the lower tax rates on
25Again, notes on the method used are available in the Web Appendix to the chapter see Van
Oudheusden (2012).
26For all combinations of the tax rates, the conditions for existence (4.18a) and stability (4.18b)
are examined. All composite fiscal policy reforms result in an equilibrium that is unique. Moreover,
all equilibria are determinate, so the economy jumps right to the new equilibrium.
112
Numerical Results
Figure 4.4: Composite Fiscal Policy Reforms
(a) Capital Income and Consumption Tax











(b) Labor Income and Consumption Tax











Notes: The areas represent combinations of after-reform tax rates for which there is an improvement
in both the long-run government budget balance and overall welfare. Initial tax rates are τA =
0.2520, τL = 0.3905, and τC = 0.1941 for the tax rate on capital income, labor income, and
consumption, respectively.
capital income lead to a higher after-tax return on capital. The latter effect domi-
nates the former so that the growth rate of the economy is increasing for all feasible
combinations. This finding is in contrast with the fiscal policy reforms analyzed in
Section 4.4.2, where both the supply of labor and the growth rate of the economy
always increase. For all feasible combinations the lifetime welfare effect is positive
by definition. However, the immediate welfare effect is always negative, and this
raises the question whether the reforms will be implemented in the first place. All
feasible combinations in panel (b) of Figure 4.4 lead to an increase in labor supply
and thus to an increase in the growth rate of the economy since the growth rate
in this case is only affected by changes in labor supply. In contrast to panel (a)
of Figure 4.4, both the immediate and long-run welfare effects are positive. This
means that these fiscal policy reforms may be more likely to be implemented. In
both cases, feasible combinations are not found for marginal changes in tax rates
but for discrete changes only.
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4.5. Conclusions
Using a one-sector model of endogenous growth with endogenous labor supply and
allowing for different structures of government spending and public debt, we analyt-
ically explain and reconcile the seemingly different results found in the literature on
the dynamic Laffer effect. Moreover, we numerically show that lowering the tax rate
on capital income is the best candidate for obtaining a dynamic Laffer effect for the
euro area. However, this result hinges on the assumption that the path of lump-sum
transfers is predetermined. When this assumption is relaxed, an improvement in
the long-run government budget balance is still possible if lower tax rates on factor
income, here capital income and labor income, are financed by a higher tax rate on
consumption. The combinations of tax rates for which this improvement is possi-
ble differ in their implications for the changes in both labor supply and immediate
welfare though.
A direction for future research is the inclusion of political economy elements that
allow a more thorough analysis of issues concerning the political feasibility of the
fiscal policy reforms discussed in our analysis. A first step would be an adjustment
of the framework such that an explicit distinction between current and future gener-
ations is possible. Another avenue for future research is an extensive analysis of the
effect of fiscal policy reforms on the debt-to-output ratio over time. It then can be
examined whether after a fiscal policy reform the debt-to-output ratio exceeds legal
thresholds imposed by the Growth and Stability Pact, thereby providing additional
criteria for the implementation of the reforms. More importantly, potential large
debt-to-output ratios resulting from a fiscal policy reform are likely to give rise to a
risk-premium on bonds. Together with uncertainty, the risk-premium would make
the return on bonds endogenous and may alter the current analysis. Finally, dy-
namic Laffer effects may be studied in a more elaborate framework where growth is
the result of intentional innovation by firms rather than of social returns to capital.
In this case, the equilibrium should be analytically tractable to facilitate a thorough




4.A.1 Existence of the Equilibrium
Both (4.17a) and (4.17b) are defined for L ∈ (0, 1]. Over this interval it holds that
γP (L) =
(1− τA)(aLβ − δ)− ρ










= − (1− τA)aβ(1− β)L
β−2






















































































(a− δ)(1− τA)− ρ
1− (1− σ)(φ+ θ)
, γQ(1) = 1− ωG − δ.
Now, a unique equilibrium exists if γP (1) < γQ(1). This is the case if
σ > 1− 1− ωG − (a− δ)(1− τA) + ρ
(1− ωG)(φ+ θ)
.
4.A.2 Stability of the Equilibrium
We define ΩP (L) ≡ ∂γP (L)/∂L and ΩQ(L) ≡ ∂γQ(L)/∂L. The sign of the derivative of
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If (A.1) is positive, then small deviations in labor supply lead to a permanent de-
viation from L̃ so that the equilibrium is locally unstable and said to be locally
determinate. If (A.1) is negative, then small deviations of the supply of labor will
force labor supply back to L̃ so that the equilibrium is locally stable and said to be
locally indeterminate. Since ΩQ(L̃) > ΩP (L̃) when a unique equilibrium exists, and
1− (1−σ)(φ+θ) > 0 by the concavity of the felicity function, the equilibrium is locally
unstable if ΘD(L̃) < 0.
4.A.3 Comparative Static Effects
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where ΩP (L̃) > ΩQ(L̃) in the equilibrium that is determinate. In an indeterminate






























Dynamic Scoring in a model with
Creative Destruction1
5.1. Introduction
Governments face the challenge to set fiscal policies such that they result in sufficient
revenues to deal with long-run budget challenges and promote economic growth
at the same time. This challenge is especially relevant for governments currently
proposing fiscal reforms to reduce their fiscal deficits and bring down their debt.
Scoring exercises, which are analyses of the impact of fiscal policies on the long-run
budget balance of the government and the economy, are useful tools to see whether
these two goals can be satisfied simultaneously. These scoring exercises increasingly
take place in dynamic general equilibrium frameworks and are referred to as dynamic
scoring exercises.
Most dynamic scoring exercises use models where economic activity is solely de-
termined by traditional factors of production such as physical capital and labor.2
So far, less attention is being paid to the use of models where economic activity is
the result of intentional investment in research and development (R&D) by firms.
However, scoring exercises are especially interesting in these models since they fea-
ture monopolistic distortions and usually some form of externalities (e.g., research
spillovers). Therefore, they lend themselves to studying active government involve-
1This chapter is based on Van Oudheusden (2011)
2See Ireland (1994), Agell and Persson (2001), Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006), Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011), Van Oudheusden (2009), and Strulik and Trimborn (2012).
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ment. More important, the question whether the government is able to deal with
these distortions and externalities remains largely unanswered when either only a
part of government activities is taken into account or when it is assumed that the
government can raise funds at no cost to economy activity. Such an analysis requires
a calibrated framework in which the government plays a prominent role. This chap-
ter addresses these issues and performs dynamic scoring exercises in an economic
model with intentional innovation by firms. We do this by examining the dynamic
feedback effects of fiscal policies on the government budget in a calibrated general
equilibrium framework featuring endogenous growth through creative destruction.
The production side of the closed economy takes standard “Schumpeterian”
growth models (cf. Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Acemoglu, 2009) as a basis. Expendi-
tures of the government consist of interest payments on debt, public consumption,
and lump-sum transfers to households. The government finances these expendi-
tures by issuing debt and collecting taxes on capital income, labor income, and
consumption. Moreover, the government provides tax incentives with respect to
research effort to affect the economy (e.g., investment tax credits and depreciation
allowances for research and development expenditures). To prevent the government
from raising revenues in a non-distorting way, we assume labor supply is elastic.
Finally, we calibrate the model to resemble the economies of the United Kingdom
and three major European continental countries, which are France, Germany, and
Italy.
We use this calibrated framework to perform dynamic scoring analyses for more
generous tax incentives with respect to research effort, lower tax rates on capital
income, labor income and consumption, and a higher share of government expendi-
tures in output. From these dynamic scoring analyses it follows that more generous
tax incentives with respect to research effort is the least costly way, in terms of
the impact on the government budget, to stimulate economic activity. This policy
is almost three times as cost effective as lowering the tax rate on capital income,
which is the next best policy. We never obtain a dynamic Laffer effect, which is
an improvement in the long-run government budget balance, for the fiscal policies
considered. This last finding can be explained by the relatively large deterioration
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of the government budget balance in the short run compared to the resulting effi-
ciency gains of these policies in the long run. Finally, when non-distorting financing
options are unavailable, more generous tax incentives with respect to research effort
can best be financed by cutting government expenditures and raising the tax rate
on consumption.
The framework we develop in this chapter has characteristics that makes it suit-
able to also address other issues than dynamic scoring analyses. The model has
closed form solutions in equilibrium, features tractable transitional dynamics, and
comes with a graphical apparatus that provides a clear insight in the mechanisms
that are at work after a change in a fiscal instrument. Moreover, the inclusion of
a wide array of fiscal instruments available to the government makes it possible
to include almost all government expenditures and revenues that are found in the
national accounts of countries. Because of these characteristics, the framework is
useful to study, for example, optimal taxation questions. Although these questions
are interesting on their own, we do not address them here and leave them for future
research.
Our analysis is closely related to Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) who perform dy-
namic scoring analyses for the United States and several European countries in a
neoclassical growth model. We mainly differ from this study by looking at a frame-
work where economic activity results from intentional innovation by firms and by
analyzing a wider variety of financing schemes.3 Other related papers in the dynamic
scoring literature are Ireland (1994), Bruce and Turnovsky (1999), Agell and Pers-
son (2001), and Van Oudheusden (2009), who look at the conditions under which
a dynamic Laffer effect can be obtained. Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) and Strulik
and Trimborn (2012) perform dynamic scoring analyses in a standard neoclassical
growth model and focus on the degree of self-financing of fiscal policy reforms. None
of these papers considers economic activity to be the result of intentional research
by firms, and all papers limit the number of financing schemes. Our paper is also
related to Jones (1995), Jones and Williams (2000), Zeng and Zhang (2007), and
3We consider three financing schemes: i) a non-distorting financing scheme, ii) a non-distorting
scheme where debt is allowed to adjust, and iii) a distorting financing scheme.
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Grossmann et al. (2010), who calibrate R&D-based models of economic growth but
differ substantially in their treatment of the elasticity of labor supply and coverage
of fiscal instruments available to the government.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 sets out the an-
alytical framework. Section 5.3 presents the analytical results. Section 5.4 discusses
the numerical results. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2. Analytical Framework
The building block of the model is a “Schumpeterian growth model” similar to
those discussed by Aghion and Howitt (1998), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999), and
Acemoglu (2009).4 We consider a closed economy where the production side consists
of a final goods sector, an intermediate goods sector, and a research sector. Other
economic actors are households and the government.
5.2.1. The Final Goods Sector
The final goods sector operates under perfect competition and produces a homo-
geneous output good Y (t) using a continuum of intermediate goods, normalized to
unity, and aggregate labor:










where 0 < α < 1, θ > 0, εβ > 1, xi(t|Qi(t)) is the quantity of intermediate good i at
time t with quality Qi(t), θ measures how this quality affects the productivity of the
intermediate good, and εβ is the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated
intermediate goods. Aggregate labor is given by H(t) and its production elasticity
is 1− α.
We take output as the numeraire and normalize its price to unity. Profits of the




4More specifically, the model contains elements of but is not identical to the models described by




τX is the tax rate on capital income, wt is the wage rate, and pi(t|Qi(t)) is the price of
intermediate good i at time t with quality Qi(t).5 Profit maximization gives demand
































5.2.2. The Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate good i with quality Qi(t) is produced by a representative firm that
owns a potentially infinitely lived patent for the use of that good. This patent can








This equation can be written in a more convenient way by taking the time derivative
and rearranging terms:6
r(t)Vi(t|Qi(t)) = πi(t|Qi(t)) + V̇i(t|Qi(t))− zi(t|Qi(t))Vi(t|Qi(t)). (5.4)
Equation (5.4) says that the per period expected income of owning a patent
r(t)Vi(t|Qi(t)) equals the profit in that period πi(t|Qi(t)), plus the change in the
value of the patent V̇i(t|Qi(t)), and minus the expected loss of losing the patent
zi(t|Qi(t))Vi(t|Qi(t)) by being replaced; see Section 5.2.3 for the last effect. In this
equation, r(t) is the market interest rate, and zi(t|Qi(t)) is the Poisson arrival rate
of innovations, also called the flow rate of innovations, on intermediate good i with
quality Qi(t).
Per period profits are given by πi(t|Qi(t)) = pi(t|Qi(t))xi(t|Qi(t)) − ψQi(t)θxi(t|Qi(t)),
where the marginal costs ψQi(t)θ, with ψ > 0, are increasing in the quality of the
5Hence, the intermediate goods can be seen as capital; see Acemoglu (2009).
6The result is the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman representation of the value of the patent; see
Acemoglu (2009, p. 244).
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intermediate good, which captures the idea that it is more expensive to produce
intermediate goods of higher quality. Firms in the intermediate sector act like mo-
nopolists when maximizing their profits. Assuming firms are small and charge the



























5.2.3. The Research Sector
Each intermediate good sector has it own research sector where firms compete to
discover the next quality improvement of that good. The quality of intermediate




where v > 1, Qi(0) > 0, and Si is the total number of innovations on intermediate
good i between time 0 and time t. The total number of innovations depends on the
flow rate of innovations; Ṡi(t) = zi(t). Since zi(t|Qi(t)) is the Poisson arrival rate of
innovations, quality improvements of a particular intermediate good are stochastic.
For an incumbent, zi(t|Qi(t)) is the probability of being replaced by an entrant.
Firms in the research sector spend Zi(t|Qi(t)) units of the final good on research
effort, where a successful innovation gives the firm a patent with value Vi(t|Qi(t)).
The relation between the flow rate of innovations zi(t|Qi(t)) and research effort is
given by
zi(t|Qi(t)) = ηΦ(Qi(t))Zi(t|Qi(t)),
7Equation (5.5) is obtained by substituting equation (5.2) into the expression for per period
profits and maximizing with respect to pi(t|Qi(t)), where the effect of pi(t|Qi(t)) on P (t) is neglected
since the size of firms is small. Equation (5.6) is obtained by substituting equation (5.5) into P (t),




where η > 0 is the productivity of research effort, and Φ(·) with ∂Φ(·)/∂Qi(t) < 0
captures the idea that it becomes harder to obtain a successful innovation when the
quality of the intermediate good is higher.
Expected profits of research are given by zi(t|Qi(t))Vi(t|Qi(t)) − (1 − sZ)Zi(t|Qi(t)),
where we assume the government provides tax incentives, denoted by sZ, to stimulate
research effort. The parameter sZ captures the generosity of the tax incentives with
respect to research effort, which may capture exemptions, allowances, credits, tax
deferrals and rate reliefs. Since these tax incentives can be seen as an implicit
subsidy to research effort, we model them accordingly. Free entry in the research








if Zi(t|Qi(t)) = 0,
where the first equation is the free entry condition when research effort takes place
and implies that V̇i(t|Qi(t)) = 0 since Qi(t) is constant over time until there is a new





which is affected by the quality of the intermediate good in two opposite ways. The
first effect is captured by πi(t|Qi(t)) and says that the return on research effort in-
creases with Qi(t) since profits depends positively on the quality of the intermediate
good; see equation (5.6). The second effect is captured by Φ(Qi(t)) and says it be-
comes harder to obtain a successful innovation when the quality of the intermediate
good is higher, which means the return on research effort decreases with Qi(t).
If the first effect dominates the second, then the return on research effort increases
with quality, and research effort will focus on the intermediate goods with the highest
quality. Conversely, research effort shifts to the intermediate goods with the lowest
quality if the second effect dominates. In both cases, research effort depends on
8This result is obtained by substituting Vi(t|Qi(t)) = 1−sZηΦ(Qi(t)) into (5.4), taking into account
that V̇i(t|Qi(t)) = 0, and rearranging terms.
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the quality of the intermediate goods. Since quality improvements are stochastic,
the model becomes analytically intractable. The only situation in which we can say
something about the growth process is when research effort is independent of the
quality of intermediate goods, which is the case when the two effects exactly offset
each other.
Because we do not want to limit our attention to this particular case, we need to
adjust the model in such a way that research effort is the same for all intermediate
goods regardless of which effect dominates. We do this by following Aghion and
Howitt (1992, 1998). Suppose now that after a successful innovation at time t, the
quality of an intermediate good does not follow the quality ladder given above but
instead jumps to the leading-edge quality in the whole economy at that time, which
is denoted by Q(t). Any innovation then leads to a discontinuous jump of the quality
that is currently being used in the production of that good to this leading-edge
quality. More specifically, a new firm now produces the intermediate good using the
leading-edge quality and replaces the old firm that uses the old quality. Moreover,
suppose now that the flow rate of innovation is given by
zi(t|Q(t)) = ηΦ(Q(t))Zi(t|Q(t)) = ηQ(t)−φZi(t|Q(t)),
where we defined Φ(Q(t)) ≡ Q(t)−φ, and φ > 0 indicates that the effectiveness of






which again says that the return on research effort on intermediate good i is still
affected in two opposite ways, though not by the quality of the intermediate good
itself but by the leading-edge quality in the economy. Moreover, equation (5.7)
implies that research effort will be the same for all intermediate goods.
We follow Aghion and Howitt (1998) and assume that the evolution of the













zi(t)di. A graphical representation of this process of quality improve-
ments of the intermediate goods is given in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 shows that both the distribution of qualities and the leading-edge
quality change over time. However, it can be shown that the distribution of rel-
ative qualities qi ≡ Qi/Q is independent of the leading-edge quality and thus time
independent: J(q) = qv−1. This property implies that intermediate goods can be
classified according to their relative qualities so that the sum of qualities used in the






v − 1 + θ
Q(t)θ. (5.9)
5.2.4. Households
The economy consists of a set of infinitely lived identical households, where for
convenience the number of households is normalized to unity. The size of the rep-
resentative household is given by N(t), which evolves according to N(t) = N(0)ent,
where N(0) = 1, and n ≥ 0 is the growth rate. Each household has the same felicity








[c(t)εC (1− L(t))εL ]1−σ − 1
1− σ
e−ρtdt, (5.10)
where ρ > 0 is the pure rate of time preference, u(t) represents the felicity function,
and c(t) is per capita consumption of the final good. We normalize the total amount
of time to unity so that 1 − L(t) reflects leisure. The parameter σ > 0 represents
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Preference weights for
consumption and leisure are given by εC > 0 and εL > 0, respectively. The felicity
function is assumed to be jointly concave in per capita consumption and leisure.
9For more detail see Aghion and Howitt (1998, p. 88). The derivation of equation (5.8) is given
in Appendix 5.A.
10This result is given in Appendix 5.A.
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The representative household receives income from labor and claims on assets
A(t) and government bonds B(t).11 Since we have a closed economy, assets equal the
sum of patent values A(t) ≡
∫ 1
0
Vi(t|Qi(t))di. Moreover, households receive lump-sum
transfers T (t) > 0 from the government. The budget constraint of the household is
then given by
Ȧ(t) + Ḃ(t) = r(t)A(t) + rB(t)B(t) + (1− τL)w(t)H(t)− (1 + τC)C(t) + T (t), (5.11a)
where rB(t) is the rate of return on government bonds, C(t) ≡ c(t)N(t) is aggregate
consumption, and H(t) ≡ L(t)N(t) is aggregate labor. Labor income is taxed at rate
τL and consumption at rate τC. The per capita budget constraint of the household
is given by
ȧ(t)+ ḃ(t) = (r(t)−n)a(t)+(rB(t)−n)b(t)+(1−τL)w(t)L(t)−(1+τC)c(t)+T (t)/N(t), (5.11b)
where a(t) ≡ A(t)/N(t) and b(t) ≡ B(t)/N(t), are assets per capita and government
bonds per capita, respectively. Households choose consumption, labor, assets, and
government bonds to maximize utility (5.10) subject to the per capita budget con-
straint (5.11b). The first-order conditions for this problem are
εCc(t)
−1 (c(t)εC (1− L(t))εL)1−σ = λ(t)(1 + τC), (5.12a)
εL(1− L(t))−1 (c(t)εC (1− L(t))εL)1−σ = λ(t)(1− τL)w(t), (5.12b)
λ(t)(r(t)− n) = λ(t)(ρ− n)− λ̇(t), (5.12c)
λ(t)(rB(t)− n) = λ(t)(ρ− n)− λ̇(t), (5.12d)
where λ(t) is the shadow price of assets and government bonds. The transversality
conditions are given by
lim
t→∞
λ(t)A(t)e−ρt = 0, and lim
t→∞
λ(t)B(t)e−ρt = 0. (5.13)
11Government bonds are assumed to be perpetuities that every period pay out a coupon equal
to one unit of output. The nominal value of the stock of bonds B(t) is defined as the number
of bonds multiplied by their price pB(t) defined in terms of the numeraire. The return on bonds
is given by rB(t) ≡ (1 + ṗB(t))/pB(t). We choose this specification to abstract from transitional
dynamics in portfolio shares associated with fixed-price bonds; see Turnovsky (2000b, p. 438).
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Combining equations (5.12c) and (5.12d) gives the no-arbitrage condition rB(t) = r(t),
which says the return on assets should equal the return on government bonds.
5.2.5. Government
Government expenditures are interest payments on outstanding bonds rB(t)B(t),
lump-sum transfers to households T (t), and other expenditures defined by G(t) ≡
ωGY (t), which says that G(t) is a constant fraction of output (0 < ωG < 1). Rev-
enues of the government consist of taxes on consumption τCC(t), capital income
τX(Y (t) − w(t)H(t)), and labor income τLw(t)H(t). Moreover, sZZ(t) measures the
amount of foregone revenues by research effort stimulating tax incentives. Any fiscal
deficit has to be financed by issuing bonds. Taking into account the no-arbitrage
condition rB(t) = r(t), the periodic budget constraint of the government becomes
Ḃ(t) = r(t)B(t)+T (t)+ωGY (t)−τLw(t)H(t)−τCC(t)−τX(Y (t)−w(t)H(t))+sZZ(t). (5.14)
5.2.6. Balanced Growth Equilibrium
We define the balanced growth equilibrium as a situation where aggregate consump-
tion, research expenditures, intermediate goods expenditures, and output all grow













, and L̇(t) = 0,
where g is the constant growth rate of the economy in the balanced growth equi-




θxi(t|Qi(t))di. The evolution of labor supply over time is
given by12
L̇(t) =
(v − 1)(α− 1)(1− εβ) + θα(1− (1− σ)εC)
(α− 1)(1− εβ)(1− (1− σ)(εC + εL))
(L(t)− 1)(γP − γQ) (5.15)





















































From equation (5.15) it can be seen that L̇(t) = 0 when γP = γQ. Using equations




























rate of output in the balanced growth equilibrium is g = θα
(α−1)(1−εβ)
γQ + n, which is
only constant as long as QN(t) is constant; see equations (5.16a) and (5.16b). The










which implies that there are two cases in which Q̇N(t) = 0.
In the first case, φ > θα
(α−1)(1−εβ)






must hold. The growth rate of the economy in the balanced





. In this case, g does
not depend on fiscal instruments of the government, for example, the tax incen-
tives related to research effort sZ, so that government policies cannot influence the
growth rate of the economy in the balanced growth equilibrium. Let L̃ and Q̃N be
the equilibrium values for which γP = γQ. Equations (5.16a) and (5.16b) show that
these values are affected by fiscal instruments of the government, which means the
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government can affect the level of output, so government policies have temporary
effects on the growth rate of the economy during the transition toward the balanced
growth equilibrium; this will be discussed in Section 5.2.7.
In the second case, φ = θα
(α−1)(1−εβ)
and n = 0 so that Q̃N = 1, and the growth





γQ(L̃). The equilibrium value of labor supply L̃ follows from equating (5.16a)
and (5.16b). In this case, g depends on L̃, which can be influenced by the govern-
ment so that government policies have permanent effects on the growth rate of the
economy.
The balanced growth equilibrium in which government policies have temporary
effects on growth (TEG) and the one in which they have permanent effects on growth

































γP = γQ ⇒ L̃,

for PEG. (5.19b)
Figure 5.2 gives a graphical representation of the equilibrium described by
(5.19a). The dashed lines in the graphs, indicated by ΓP , correspond to γP and
are associated with portfolio balance equilibrium. Along these lines the return on
consumption always equals the return on investment. The solid lines, indicated
by ΓQ, correspond to γQ and are associated with good market equilibrium. Along
these lines, the aggregate resource constraint Y (t) = C(t) + G(t) + X(t) + Z(t) and
the intratemporal optimality condition between consumption and leisure are always
satisfied.14
The top panel of the figure shows the two loci describing the relationship between
γi and L conditional on QN , for i ∈ {P,Q}. When the two loci intersect, labor
13Basically, the TEG and PEG equilibria correspond to an endogenous growth model without
and with scale effects, respectively.
14The intratemporal optimality condition between consumption and leisure says that the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals its relative price.
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Figure 5.2: TEG Equilibrium: φ > θα
(α−1)(1−εβ)

























Notes: The dashed lines in the graphs correspond to ΓP and are associated with portfolio balance
equilibrium. The solid lines correspond to ΓQ and are associated with good market equilibrium.
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supply is constant over time. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b only differ in the way these
loci intersect, which determines the stability of the equilibrium. The bottom panel






, both for γP and γQ. The top and bottom panel together
determine the equilibrium values Q̃N and L̃.
Figure 5.3 shows the graphical representation of the equilibrium described by
(5.19b). Since Q̃N = 1 by the choice of parameter values, the equilibrium is solely
represented by the two loci describing the relationship between γi and L, for i ∈ {P,Q}.
The growth rate of the economy and corresponding equilibrium value of labor supply
L̃ are determined by the intersection of these loci.
Figure 5.3: PEG Equilibrium: φ = θα
(α−1)(1−εβ)















Notes: The dashed lines in the graphs correspond to ΓP and are associated with portfolio balance
equilibrium. The solid lines correspond to ΓQ and are associated with good market equilibrium.
5.2.7. Transitional Dynamics










where ∆ is the Jacobian matrix with typical element δij:
δ11 ≡
(v − 1)(α− 1)(1− εβ) + θα(1− (1− σ)εC)














(v − 1)(α− 1)(1− εβ) + θα(1− (1− σ)εC)

























δ22 ≡ −n < 0.
Since δ12, δ21, and δ22 are all negative, the TEG equilibrium is saddle path stable if
the following condition holds:15
(v − 1)(α− 1)(1− εβ) + θα(1− (1− σ)εC)












−n > 0. (5.21)
The condition in equation (5.21) also determines the stability of the PEG equilibrium
where φ = θα
(α−1)(1−εβ)
and n = 0. In this case, the elements δ12, δ21, and δ22 are all zero so
that the dynamics of the balanced growth equilibrium are given by L̇(t) = δ11(L(t)−L̃).
If δ11 > 0, then a positive deviation of labor supply from its steady-state value leads
to a permanent deviation from this value. The balanced growth equilibrium is then
locally unstable and, thus, locally determinate. Moreover, the economy is then
always in its balanced growth equilibrium and there are no transitional dynamics.
If δ11 < 0, then a positive deviation will force labor supply back to its initial steady-
state value so that the balanced growth equilibrium is locally stable and, thus,
locally indeterminate. Figures 5.3a and 5.3b give the situations in which the PEG
equilibrium is locally determinate and indeterminate, respectively.
5.3. Analytical Results
In this section, we discuss the effects of changes in the fiscal instruments on the
economy and the long-run government budget balance of the government, respec-
15When δ11 − n > 0, the determinant and trace of ∆ are negative and positive, respectively,
which means the equilibrium is saddle path stable.
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tively.
5.3.1. Effects of Fiscal Policy on the Economy
We define fiscal policies as changes in tax rates τC, τL, and τX, changes in government
expenditures ωG, and changes in the generosity of the tax incentives with respect to
research effort sZ. From the definitions in (5.19), it follows that L and QN in the
respective balanced growth equilibria are given by
L̃ = l̃TEG(α, εβ, εC , εL, ρ, σ, v, τC , τL, τX , sZ , ωG, θ, φ, n, )
Q̃N = q̃TEG(α, εβ, εC , εL, ρ, σ, v, τC , τL, τX , sZ , ωG, θ, φ, n, η, ψ, L̃)
 for TEG,
L̃ = l̃PEG(α, εβ, εC , εL, ρ, σ, v, τC , τL, τX , sZ , ωG, θ, η, ψ)
Q̃N = 1
 for PEG.
The steady-state, or long-run, effects of fiscal policies are obtained by fully differ-
entiating the functions l̃TEG(·), q̃TEG(·), and l̃PEG(·).16 For now, we assume changes in
government revenues or expenditures that follow from these fiscal policies are offset
in a non-distorting way by adjusting lump-sum transfers to keep the budget balance












< 0 for i ∈ {ωG, sZ},
which says that increases in tax rates lead to a decrease in labor supply and a decrease
in the relative quality used in production.17 On the other hand, an increase in
government expenditures and more generous tax incentives with respect to research
effort lead to an increase in both labor supply and the relative quality of intermediate
goods used in production.
The effects for the PEG equilibrium are less straightforward. In gen-
16From (5.19) it follows that L̃ and Q̃N are described by two equations with two unknowns in
the TEG equilibrium and by one equation with one unknown in the PEG equilibrium. Although
we can solve explicitly for L̃ and Q̃N in both equilibria, the resulting expressions are too large to
show them here.

























for i ∈ {τC , τL, τX , ωG, sZ}; see equation (5.19b). If
the condition in equation (5.21) is satisfied, then the effects of fiscal policies for the












> 0 for i ∈ {ωG, sZ}.
In this case, increases in tax rates lead to a decrease in labor supply and, in contrast
to the TEG equilibrium, a permanent lower growth rate of the economy. An increase
in government expenditures or more generous tax incentives with respect to research
effort lead to an increase in both labor supply and the growth rate of the economy.
The effects are the opposite if equation (5.21) is not satisfied.
For the calibrated model and numerical illustrations in Section 5.3, equation
(5.21) is always satisfied.18 Henceforth, we assume that this equation is satisfied. In
this case, there are no transitional dynamics in the PEG equilibrium, and transitional
dynamics in the TEG equilibrium are given by solving (5.20):
L(t) = (1− eµt) L̃(∞) + eµtL(0),
QN(t) = (1− eµt) Q̃N(∞) + eµtQN(0),
where µ is the stable characteristic root of matrix ∆, and L̃(∞) and Q̃N(∞) are
long-run equilibrium values. Moreover, L(0) = L(∞) + (QN(0) − Q̃N(∞)) δ12µ−δ11 so that
the short-run response of labor supply is larger in absolute terms than its long-run
response. We proceed by discussing the effects in more detail.
For the TEG equilibrium, the short-run and long-run qualitative effects of more
generous tax incentives with respect to research effort are given in Figures 5.4a and
5.4b, respectively. In the short run, an increase in sZ leads to an increase in the return
on research effort for the given leading-edge quality, which results in an upward
18Itaya (2008), however, shows that in an endogenous growth model with elastic labor sup-
ply and environmental externalities that are more than proportionally increasing with output an
indeterminate balanced growth equilibrium may occur.
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rotation of ΓP in the upper panel of Figure 5.4a. The higher return on research
effort leads to a shift of resources from consumption to research effort, and labor
supply increases accordingly to ensure that both the aggregate resource constraint
and the intratemporal optimality condition between consumption and leisure are
satisfied.19 The increase in labor supply leads to an increase in the growth rate in
the short run. From the bottom panel of Figure 5.4a, it can be seen that both the
short-run leading-edge quality and labor supply are incompatible with a balanced
growth equilibrium under the more generous tax incentives.
19The intratemporal optimality condition between consumption and leisure is obtained by divid-
ing equations (5.12a) by (5.12b). In general, there is a inverse relationship between consumption
and labor supply, which depends among others on the relative utility weights of consumption and
leisure, the relative taxation of consumption and wage income, and the production elasticity of
labor. This relationship is captured by the slope of ΓQ in the upper panel of Figure 5.4a. The




Figure 5.4: TEG Equilibrium: Short-run and Long-run Effects of Fiscal Policies
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Figure 5.4: TEG Equilibrium: Short-run and Long-run Effects of Fiscal Policies
(continued)
































Notes: The dashed lines in the graphs correspond to ΓP and are associated with portfolio balance
equilibrium. The solid lines correspond to ΓQ and are associated with good market equilibrium.





. Figures 5.4c and 5.4d also capture
the effects of a lower tax rate on consumption.
The short-run increase in research effort leads to a higher growth of the leading-
edge quality and, since population growth does not change, a decrease in QN . The
return on research effort, however, decreases with the leading-edge quality since
φ > θα
(α−1)(1−εβ)
, which is reflected by the downward rotation of ΓP in the upper panel
of Figure 5.4d. This decrease in the return on research effort also means that more
labor is needed to produce the same amount of research effort, which results in a
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clockwise rotation of ΓQ in the upper panel of Figure 5.4b. Both effects imply a shift
of resources from research effort to consumption and a corresponding reduction in
labor supply so that research effort and the decline in QN decrease over time until
the new equilibrium is reached; see the bottom panel of Figure 5.4b. In the new
equilibrium, the growth rate of the economy returns to its balanced growth level.
The qualitative effects of a lower tax rate on labor income, or equivalently a
lower tax rate on consumption, are as follows. A decrease in τL makes consumption
relatively cheap compared to leisure so that, for the current amount of labor sup-
ply, consumption has to increase to satisfy the aggregate resource constraint and
the intratemporal optimality condition between consumption and leisure, which is
represented by a downward rotation of ΓQ in the upper panel of Figure 5.4c. As a
consequence of the rise in consumption for the given amount of labor supply, the
return on consumption falls below the return on research effort, which leads to a
shift of resources from consumption to research effort and a corresponding increase
in labor supply and the growth rate of the economy in the short run. The short-
run leading-edge quality and labor supply are again incompatible with a balanced
growth equilibrium under the lower tax rate on labor income; see the lower panel of
Figure 5.4c.
The transition toward the long-run equilibrium is the same as described above
and is presented in Figure 5.4d. Recall that the mechanism behind the transitional
dynamics follows from the negative relationship between the return on research
effort and the leading-edge quality; see the discussion in Section 5.2.3. In the PEG
equilibrium, this is not the case since φ = θα
(α−1)(1−εβ)
, which implies that the return
on research effort is independent of the leading-edge quality. This independency
implies that the effects of fiscal policies in the PEG equilibrium are the same as the
short-run effects in the TEG equilibrium; see Figures 5.5a and 5.5b. For a higher
government expenditures-to-output ratio and a lower tax rate on capital income, we
therefore limit the analysis of the qualitative effects to the PEG equilibrium.
A higher government expenditures-to-output ratio increases the claim of the gov-
ernment on resources from the private sector. Given labor supply, and consumption
following from the intratemporal optimality condition between consumption and
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Figure 5.5: PEG Equilibrium: Short-run and Long-run Effects of Fiscal Policies




































Notes: The dashed lines in the graphs correspond to γP and are associated with portfolio balance
equilibrium. The solid lines correspond to γQ and are associated with good market equilibrium.
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leisure, this results in too little research effort given its return. This situation is
represented by a downward rotation of ΓQ in Figure 5.5c. As a result, resources flow
from consumption to research effort and labor supply increases accordingly, leading
to an increase in the growth rate of the economy.
The qualitative effects of a decrease in the capital income tax rate are given in
Figure 5.5d. A decrease in τX leads to a higher return on research effort, which
is shown by the upward rotation of ΓP . Moreover, it increases the demand for
intermediate goods, which results in too little research effort given labor supply.
This situation is represented by the downward and counterclockwise rotation of ΓQ.
Both effects lead to a shift of resources from consumption toward research effort,
which implies an increase in labor supply and the growth rate of the economy.
5.3.2. Effects of Fiscal Policy on the Government Budget Balance
The fiscal policies, and resulting changes in consumption, research effort, and labor
supply also, effect the budget balance of the government. Studies that look at the
feedback effects of fiscal policies using calibrated general equilibrium frameworks
differ in the way they include the budget balance of the government. They assume
either a periodically balanced government budget or an intertemporal government
budget constraint that has to be satisfied, where the former has the disadvantage
that it rules out financing schemes involving changes in the debt of the government.20
We follow the latter approach since we want to analyze the consequences of the fiscal
policies on the sustainability of the government budget in the long run. The long-
run government budget balance is given by the intertemporal budget constraint of
the government:
D ≡ τCC(0) + τLw(0)H(0) + τX(Y (0)− w(0)H(0))− sZZ(0)− ωGY (0)− T (0)
r̃ − g̃
−B(0),
20For example, studies that assume a periodically balanced government budget are Mankiw
and Weinzierl (2006), Zeng and Zhang (2007), and Itaya (2008), and analyses that look at the
intertemporal budget balance of the government are Ireland (1994), Bruce and Turnovsky (1999),
and Novales and Ruiz (2002).
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0.21 If D < 0, then the net present value of government revenues minus the net present
value of government expenditures is insufficient to pay off the initial public debt,
and vice versa. The intertemporal budget constraint of the government is balanced
if D = 0.
There are different approaches in the dynamic scoring literature to measure the
feedback effects of fiscal policies on the government budget. Mankiw and Weinzierl
(2006), Trabandt and Uhlig (2009), Strulik and Trimborn (2012), and Scrimgeour
(2010) analyze the degree of self-financing of tax cuts and focus on the dynamic
feedback effects on government revenues. In these analyses, government budgets
are balanced by letting lump-sum transfers adjust, where lower transfers imply a
replacement of distortionary taxes with lump-sum taxes. Bruce and Turnovsky
(1999) take a different approach and measure the feedback effects as the change in
the present discounted value of lump-sum taxes needed for the intertemporal budget
to be balanced. This approach shifts the attention from the effects on government
revenues toward the effects on the government budget in general, including the effects
on government expenditures and the growth rate of the economy.
One way we measure the feedback effects is by κ, which is defined as the percent-
age change in the transfer-to-output ratio T/Y needed for the intertemporal budget
to be balanced. More specifically,






− 1 such that ∂D
∂i
= 0 for i ∈ {τC , τL, τX , ωG, sZ},
where we assume that initially D = 0 and that the debt-to-output ratio cannot
change. Since this approach takes into account the effects on both government
revenues and expenditures, the return on assets, and the growth rate of the economy,
it is in line with the approach of Bruce and Turnovsky (1999).
The above measure gives a good indication of the dynamic feedback effects of fis-
cal policies on the government budget. However, it is restrictive since the financing
scheme is limited to the adjustment of transfers. Ireland (1994) proposes an alter-
21Variables with tildes, like r̃ and g̃, are equilibrium values.
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native financing scheme where the path of transfers is predetermined but requires
the assumption of a fixed debt-to-output ratio to be relaxed. If the path of transfers
is predetermined, growth enhancing fiscal policies, such as lower distortionary tax
rates, lead to a decline in the transfer-to-output ratio over time. This process frees
up resources in the future that can be used to cover the initial loss in revenues caused
by the lower tax rates. Since these resources come available over time, government
debt is used to finance short-term fiscal deficits. If the present discounted value of
these resources equals or is larger than the deterioration of the government bud-
get and additional interest payments, the intertemporal budget of the government
remains balanced or may even improve. In the latter situation, the fiscal policies
lead to a dynamic Laffer effect. This financing scheme seems to be used only in
frameworks where fiscal policies have permanent effects on growth, though the idea
naturally extends to frameworks where they have only temporary effects.
Although it has the advantage that government expenditures do not have to de-
crease, the alternative finance scheme described above does not always lead to an
improvement in the long-run government budget and may even lead to a situation
where the intertemporal budget constraint is not satisfied.22 Leeper and Yang (2008)
introduce financing schemes where the intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied
without having to rely on adjustments of transfers. More specifically, changes in the
government budget as a result of fiscal policies are offset with a range of possible
responses, such as changes in government expenditures or other distorting taxes.
These offsetting policies may dampen or reverse the stimulating effects on the econ-
omy that the initial fiscal policies have brought forth.
We analyze the dynamic feedback effects of fiscal policies on the government
budget under these three financing schemes. The first is the non-distorting financing
scheme, where we adjust the transfer-to-output ratio to ensure the intertemporal
budget constraint of the government is satisfied. In this case, we assume the debt-
to-output ratio cannot be changed. Under the second financing scheme, the path
of transfers is predetermined so that transfers cannot be lowered to improve the
22See Van Oudheusden (2009) for an overview of the mechanisms behind the dynamic Laffer
effect and the conditions under which it may occur.
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budget balance of the government. Temporary changes in the debt-to-output ratio,
however, are allowed. We call this the non-distorting finance scheme with debt.
Finally, we consider the distorting finance scheme, where we finance changes in the
government budget by adjusting government expenditures or other distorting taxes.
Changes in welfare as a result of a fiscal policy are calculated as the percentage
change in consumption, corresponding to the initial balanced growth equilibrium,
necessary to obtain the same present discounted value of utility that follows from













where the subscript A corresponds to values of the new balanced growth equilibrium.
If υ is positive, then fiscal policies lead to a gain in welfare. A negative value of υ
implies a deterioration in welfare as a result of fiscal policies.
5.4. Numerical Results
To quantify the dynamic feedback effects of fiscal policies on the government bud-
get, we perform several numerical analyses for different economies. We want these
economies to differ in the way they set tax rates since this allows us to verify whether
our model is able to replicate fiscal stylized facts and, thus, can be used for quan-
titative analyses. Mendoza and Tesar (2005) use similar arguments for the choice
of their economies, we therefore choose the same economies. More specifically, we
calibrate our model for both the United Kingdom and an average of three major con-
tinental European economies, namely France, Germany, and Italy; hereafter defined
as Continental Europe. These two economies differ in how they tax factor income.
Our choice of parameters and variables, representative for these countries, is based
on data over the period 1995–2006. We take averages over this period to control for
business-cycle effects, and we calibrate the model at an annual frequency.
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5.4.1. Calibration and Stylized Facts
All fiscal parameters and variables are taken from the data, while for the structural
parameters of the model we refer to literature when data are unavailable.23
To pin down the initial tax rates for the economies, we use data on implicit tax
rates, which are based on the method of Mendoza et al. (1994). The benefits of
these tax rates are that they take into account various features of the tax system,
such as the combined effects of tax credits, tax deductions, and statutory rates.24
The tax rate on consumption is the same for both economies and is 18.90 percent.
The economies, however, differ in their tax rates on factor income. In Continen-
tal Europe, labor income and capital income are taxed at 41.16 and 20.01 percent,
respectively, and for the United Kingdom these rates are 25.04 and 23.81 percent,
respectively.
We measure the generosity of the tax incentives with respect to research effort
by making use of data on the B-index, which captures the elements of these tax
incentives such as exemptions, allowances, credits, tax deferrals and rate reliefs.
The index reflects before-tax income required to break even on one unit of research
expenditures. We take one minus this index as the value for the parameter sZ, which
is 4.10 percent for Continental Europe and 7.85 percent for the United Kingdom; see
Warda (2001) for details on the construction of the B-index.
The remaining fiscal parameters are the public expenditures-to-output ratio and
the debt-to-output ratio. When restricted to consumption expenditures only, the
public expenditures-to-output ratio is 20.51 percent for Continental Europe and 19.53
percent for the United Kingdom. Including investment expenditures of the govern-
ment increases these ratios to 22.85 and 20.98 percent, respectively, which are used
for the calibration. The debt-to-output ratio is 77.63 percent for Continental Europe,
but it is only 43.73 percent for the United Kingdom. This difference can be explained
by Italy, which has a debt-to-output ratio of over one hundred percent. However,
23The data are given in Table A.1, and the corresponding definitions and data sources are given
in Table A.2. The data and their sources are in line with the calibration as performed by Trabandt
and Uhlig (2011).
24See European Commission (2011, pp. 392–422) for a detailed overview of the exact definitions
of the implicit tax rates and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) for arguments for the use of these tax
rates rather than marginal tax rates.
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the debt-to-output ratio of both France and Germany exceeds that of the United
Kingdom, so the inclusion of Italy does not change their relative position.
For Continental Europe, the population growth rate and the production elastic-
ity of aggregate labor are 0.80 percent and 0.6467, respectively, and for the United
Kingdom these values are 1.08 percent and 0.7083, respectively. Here, we use that
the value of the production elasticity of aggregate labor equals the income share of
labor since there is perfect competition in the final goods sector. Krueger (1999),
however, argues that there is a lot of variation in the income share of labor depend-
ing on which definition of labor income is used. Therefore, we do not always restrict
the value of the production elasticity of aggregate labor to be equal to the observed
income shares of labor, but let it vary to match other variables with the data; see
also Grossmann et al. (2010).
We set the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ to 2, which
falls well within the range of estimates found by Attanasio and Weber (1993) and is
a common value used in the literature.25 The choice for the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods εβ is less straightforward. A number of studies relates
this elasticity directly to the production elasticity of capital α, resulting in either
unrealistic high markups or implausible income shares of production factors when
calibrating the model; see Romer (1990), Jones (1995), Zeng and Zhang (2007), and
Long and Pelloni (2011). We follow the literature that calibrates the parameters εβ
and α separately (i.e., Jones and Williams, 2000; Grossmann et al., 2010). These
studies choose a value for εβ such that the implied markup lies between 1.05 and
1.40. We set εβ to 20 and aim at the lower bound of this range since Basu (1996)
argues that estimates of mark-ups may be too large when failing to take into account
variable utilization rates of production factors.
The parameters εC, εL, φ, ρ, η, ψ, and v have no real-world observable counter-
parts. We set εC to 1 and let εL adjust so that the share of the time endowment
allocated to labor resulting from the model matches with the share observed in the
25For example, Turnovsky (2000a), Mendoza and Tesar (2005), Itaya (2008) and Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011) use the same value for σ. In contrast, Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006) and Leeper and
Yang (2008) set σ equal to unity, which falls outside the range of Attanasio and Weber (1993). Our
model, however, is also compatible with this value for the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
146
Numerical Results
data.26 In general, the relative weight of leisure to consumption εL/εC is used to
obtain a value of L̃ of around 20 percent (Mendoza and Tesar, 2005, p. 190). Dif-
ferences in the values of α, or the tax rate on consumption and labor, then lead to
differences in the value of εL/εC. For example, Novales and Ruiz (2002), Mendoza
and Tesar (2005), and Leeper and Yang (2008), who all have in common that α is
0.36, set εL/εC between 2 and 3. In contrast, Turnovsky (2000a) sets εL/εC to 0.3 and
works with a value of α of 0.92.
We set ρ so that the interest payments of the government match with the data.
The parameters η and ψ are chosen such to ensure that, at least initially, the share of
the time endowment allocated to labor in the TEG and PEG equilibrium coincides;
see l̃TEG(·) and l̃PEG(·). Finally, we use φ, v, and θ to match the output share of
research expenditures and the growth rate of output per capita with the data. The
parameter v, which is inversely related to the size of quality improvements on the
quality ladder of an intermediate good, has to be large enough for monopoly pricing
to exist, so we set v equal to 2.27
Table 5.1 summarizes the choices of parameters. The table compares the out-
comes of our model with stylized facts observed in the data for different scenarios.
These scenarios differ as follows. In the first scenario (I) , 1− α is chosen under the
assumption that the value of the production elasticity of labor equals the income
share of labor, whereas in the second scenario (II), 1− α adjusts so that the output
share of consumption matches the data. In the third (III) and fourth (IV ) scenario,
we vary 1 − α to match output shares of the capital income tax revenues and labor
income tax revenues, respectively.
By adjusting εL, the share of time endowment allocated to labor resulting from
the model always matches with the one observed in the data. The resulting values
of εL/εC lie between 2 and 3, which are common values in the literature. Moreover,
the implied values of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply vary between 1.41 and 1.58.
26The share of time endowment allocated to labor L is calculated as the amount of hours per
capita worked divided by the time endowment, which is set to 7200 (=20×360). Other calculations
are possible, though the current share is similar to those aimed for in the literature; see Turnovsky
(2000a), Mendoza and Tesar (2005), Leeper and Yang (2008), and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).











1. See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999, p. 244) and Acemoglu (2009, p. 461).
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Table 5.1: Comparing Stylized Facts (continued)
Continental Europe United Kingdom
Actual I II III IV Actual V VI VII VIII
L 0.2275 0.2275 0.2275 0.2275 0.2275 0.2275 0.2275 0.2275 0.2275 0.2275
g − n 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105 0.0105
Output shares:
C 0.5794 0.4640 0.5794 0.5075 0.3842 0.6497 0.5359 0.6479 0.5581 0.4153
X + Z 0.1721 0.3075 0.1921 0.2640 0.3873 0.1544 0.2543 0.1423 0.2321 0.3749
Z 0.0391 0.0391 0.0391 0.0391 0.0391 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432 0.0432
T 0.1769 0.1584 0.2123 0.1787 0.1211 0.1327 0.1162 0.1392 0.1207 0.0913
rBB 0.0442 0.0442 0.0442 0.0442 0.0442 0.0268 0.0268 0.0268 0.0268 0.0268
T + rBB +G 0.4262 0.4311 0.4850 0.4515 0.3938 0.3548 0.3528 0.3758 0.3573 0.3279
revenues: τC 0.1076 0.0877 0.1095 0.0959 0.0726 0.1167 0.1013 0.1224 0.1055 0.0785
revenues: τL 0.2230 0.2662 0.3287 0.2898 0.2230 0.1357 0.1774 0.2161 0.1851 0.1357
revenues: τX 0.0592 0.0707 0.0403 0.0592 0.0917 0.0621 0.0695 0.0326 0.0621 0.1091
revenues: total 0.3898 0.4246 0.4785 0.4449 0.3873 0.3145 0.3481 0.3712 0.3527 0.3233
Notes: Continental Europe is the average of France, Germany, and Italy. The data used for the
calibration are based on the average over the period 1995–2006; see Table A.1. The term EPL
denotes expected patent life. The parameters εC , εL, φ and ρ do not have observable equivalents
in the data. We use the parameter φ to match the growth rate of our model, and the parameter ρ
to match interest payments of the government. The parameters η and ψ are used to ensure L is
the same in the TEG and PEG equilibrium. The values of εC , εL, σ, and L are used to determine










scenario (I), (II), (III), and (IV ), 1 − α varies to match respectively the income share of labor,
the output share of consumption, the output share of capital income tax revenues, and the output
share of labor income tax revenues with the data.
These values are close to one, which is the value used by House and Shapiro (2006),
Strulik and Trimborn (2012), and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). In contrast to these
analyses, however, our value for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply follows endoge-
nously from the model and cannot be picked.28 Although the values implied by the
model are higher than estimates based on micro data, we think they are plausible
given the “major discrepancies between the micro evidence and the assumptions on
which the stylized dynamic models are based” (Browning et al., 1999, p. 545) and
the downward bias in the micro estimates (Domeij and Flodén, 2006).
To match the growth rate of output per capita to the data, we adjust φ, v, and
θ in such a way that the output share of research expenditures also matches with
the data.29 Given that these parameters have no real-world counterparts, we look
28More precisely, House and Shapiro (2006) have separable preference and Strulik and Trimborn
(2012) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) use constant Frisch elasticity preferences. Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011) also consider the case where the Frisch elasticity of labor supply does depend on the
share of time endowment allocated to labor and has value of 3 in line with Prescott (1996). We
can replicate this case in our model by setting σ = 1.
29Basically, we fix one of the parameters, v, and let the other vary. Changing the value of v
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at the corresponding expected lifetime of a patent, which ranges from six years to
15.5 years. These values are well in the range of values found by Mansfield et al.
(1981) and Caballero and Jaffe (1993); see also Jones and Williams (2000). An
alternative strategy would be to fix the expected lifetime of a patent and compare
the corresponding output share of research expenditures with the data. However, we
do not pursue this approach since Jones and Williams (2000) and Grossmann et al.
(2010) argue that statistics on research expenditures do not completely capture the
true amount of research expenditures.
By construction, we cannot replicate the share of consumption and investment
in output exactly since our model assumes a closed economy. More specifically, the
observed sum of consumption, government expenditures, and investment in Conti-
nental Europe falls short of output when not taking into account net exports. This
means the sum of output shares of consumption and investment resulting from the
model will always differ from the observed sum in the data. For Continental Europe,
this difference amounts to 2.00 percentage points, and for the United Kingdom this
is −1.39 percentage points.
In general, we find that our model underpredicts the output share of consump-
tion. Since the output share of government expenditures is determined by the data,
we overpredict the investment share of output. This outcome may be explained
by the inclusion of durable consumption goods in the data on consumption, which
could be seen as investment; see Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). The best fit in terms of
the consumption and investment shares in output is obtained in the scenarios where
we choose 1 − α such that the output share of consumption exactly matches. The
implied income share of labor in this case is on average 79.86 percent for Continental
Europe and on average 86.30 percent for the United Kingdom.
To measure the fit of our model in terms of the fiscal side of the economy, we
calculate the transfer-to-output ratio necessary for the long-run government budget
to be balanced and compare this ratio with its real-world counterpart. In addition,
we look at the implied revenue shares in output for the various taxes and see whether




they are in line with the shares as observed in the data. Note that by construction, we
cannot replicate exact shares of all the fiscal parameters since we capture on average
95 percent of all expenditures but only 90 percent of all revenues.30 This situation is
incompatible with a positive stock of initial debt and a long-run government budget
that is balanced. Given this problem, however, the model has a relatively good fit
when comparing the implied and actual transfer-to-output ratio.
For the interest payments of the government to match the data, we adjust ρ. This
leads to a value of 0.0360 for Continental Europe and 0.0245 for the United Kingdom.
Both values are in the range of 0.02 (Agell and Persson, 2001; Mendoza and Tesar,
2005) and 0.04 (Turnovsky, 2000a; Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2006; Leeper and Yang,
2008) used in the literature. Since our model underpredicts the output share of
consumption, it underpredicts the output share of consumption tax revenues as well.
In general, the model overpredicts the output share of labor income tax revenues.
We can remove this bias by adjusting 1−α, but the implied income share of labor is
54.18 percent, which seems rather low.31 The overprediction of the output share of
labor income tax revenues, however, is not a bias specific to our model, but it seems
to be shared by a wider class of calibrated dynamic general equilibrium models;
see Van Oudheusden (2009) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). There is no general
pattern in the prediction of the output share of capital income tax revenues. To be
certain that the tax bases following from our model correspond to the actual tax
bases, we look at different scenarios when analyzing the dynamic feedback effects of
fiscal policies on the government budget.
5.4.2. Feedback Effects of Fiscal Policies
Given our choice of parameters and variables for the different scenarios, we ana-
lyze the dynamic feedback effects of fiscal policies on the government budget. More
30For example, the sum of interest payments, transfers, consumptive government expenditures,
and investment expenditures of the government are 94.19 percent of all government expenditures
in the United Kingdom. At the same time, revenues from consumption taxes and taxes on labor
income and capital income only make up 88.45 percent of all revenues. See Table A.1 for the data
used in these calculations.
31The overprediction of the output share of labor income tax revenues is not too problem-
atic since it mitigates the problem of the discrepancy between the government expenditures and
revenues as described above.
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specifically, we look at the effects of an unexpected and permanent one percentage
point change in each of the fiscal instrument available to the government separately.
Hereby, we look at a decrease in the various tax rates and an increase in the gov-
ernment expenditures-to-output share and generosity of tax incentives with respect
to research effort.32 When analyzing these fiscal policies, we make a distinction be-
tween a non-distorting financing scheme, a non-distorting financing scheme where
we allow for debt-to-output ratio changes over time, and a distorting finance scheme
where changes in the budget balance of the government are financed by adjusting
expenditures or other distorting taxes.
5.4.2.1. Non-distorting Financing Scheme
Table 5.2 gives an overview of the effects on the economy of the fiscal policies in
the case of the non-distorting financing scheme. For the TEG equilibrium, the ta-
ble gives both the short-run and long-run effects on the growth rate per capita, a
measure of the leading-edge quality used in production QN , the share of time endow-
ment allocated to labor, and both the output shares of consumption and research
expenditures. Since transitional dynamics are absent in the PEG equilibrium, these
effects represent changes in balanced growth equilibrium values. For each fiscal pol-
icy, the model predicts the short-run effects in the TEG equilibrium to be the same
as the effects in the PEG equilibrium. Any deviations between the two are caused
by linearization of the dynamics around the balanced growth equilibrium. Table
5.2 shows that the magnitude of these deviations are around one-hundredths of a
percent, so we are confident we capture the dynamics well.
Lowering the tax rate on capital income gives the largest increase in economic
activity measured by the impact on the growth rate, either temporary or permanent,
or the use of a relatively higher leading-edge quality in the new balanced growth
equilibrium. This fiscal policy is followed by an increase in government expenditures,
a lower tax rate on labor income, and more generous tax incentives with respect to
research effort. A lower tax rate on consumption is the least effective way to boost
the economy.
32Changes in the government expenditures-to-output ratio are henceforth referred to as changes


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Changes in labor supply are the largest for an increase in government expendi-
tures, followed by lower taxes on labor income, capital income, and consumption.
More generous tax incentives with respect to research effort lead to the smallest
changes in the share of time endowment allocated to labor. In the TEG equilib-
rium, the long-run effects are smaller than the short-run effects, which is in line
with the theoretical predictions of the model, although the differences are rather
small.
The impact on the government budget is measured by κ, where in its calcula-
tion we use the actual transfer-to-output ratio rather than the ones implied by the
model since the latter differ across the scenarios and may bias the results. Making
tax incentives with respect to research effort more generous leads to the smallest
impact on the long-run government budget balance, in terms of a lower transfer-to-
output ratio. This fiscal policy is followed by the lower tax rates on capital income,
consumption, and labor income. The largest impact on the budget balance of the
government is caused by the increase in government expenditures.
Welfare effects are measured by υ. The largest welfare gain is obtained by lower-
ing the tax rate on labor income, followed by a lower tax rate on capital income and
consumption. More generous tax incentives for research effort lead to the smallest
welfare gain. Increasing government expenditures lead to a loss in welfare, which
can be explained by government expenditures being modeled as pure waste. A larger
claim of the government on the private sector then means a larger part of private
activity is crowded out.
For comparison, we normalize the effect such that all fiscal policies lead to an
increase in the growth rate per capita of one percent for the PEG equilibrium and
to a decrease in QN of one percent for the TEG equilibrium. The results are given
in Table 5.3 and suggest that the least costly way, in terms of the impact on the
government budget, to promote economic growth is by making tax incentives with
respect to research effort more generous. This fiscal policy is followed by lower tax
rates on capital income and labor income. Higher government expenditures and a
lower tax rate on consumption are the most expensive policies to boost economic
activity. The corresponding changes in labor supply follow a similar pattern.
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Table 5.3: Effects of Fiscal Policies: Normalized
Continental Europe United Kingdom
Instrument TEG PEG TEG PEG
κ L κ L κ L κ L
τC -4.4907 1.0065 -3.6047 0.8075 -7.0452 1.0066 -6.4732 0.9188
τL -3.1486 1.0131 -2.5297 0.8075 -5.9444 1.0103 -5.4546 0.9188
τX -1.0031 0.2395 -0.8341 0.1973 -1.2936 0.2058 -1.2281 0.1882
sZ -0.2742 0.0606 -0.2768 0.0599 -0.4268 0.0607 -0.4641 0.0600
ωG -4.4907 1.0166 -3.5686 0.8075 -7.0452 1.0150 -6.4199 0.9188
Notes: Continental Europe is the average of France, Germany, and Italy. The effects are percent
changes and are the result of a change in fiscal instruments such that QN decreases with one
percent in the TEG equilibrium and g−n increases with one percent in the PEG equilibrium. The
numbers are the average of all scenarios.
The above results hold for both economies and are robust across the different
scenarios. To stimulate economic activity, more generous tax incentives with respect
to research effort are almost three times as effective as lowering the tax rate on
capital, which in turn is at least three times as effective as lowering the tax rate on
labor income. An explanation of this result may be the relative size of the initial tax
bases of the instruments. For example, the tax base of tax incentives with respect to
research effort, which is the output share of research expenditures, is relatively small
compared to the bases of the other instruments. A relatively small initial tax base
causes smaller losses in revenues when tax rates are lowered. Of course, this effect
has to be compared with the resulting efficiency gains of changes in the fiscal policy
instruments, which may be independent of their corresponding initial tax bases.
5.4.2.2. Non-distorting Financing Scheme with Debt
Under the previous financing scheme, the transfers to households are adjusted to
ensure the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is satisfied. At the
same time, the debt-to-output ratio is assumed to be constant. As an alternative
finance scheme, we assume the path of transfers to households to be predetermined
so that transfers cannot be lowered to improve the budget balance of the government.
We do, however, allow for temporary changes in the debt-to-output ratio now. Figure
5.6 gives the impulse response functions of more generous tax incentives with respect
to research effort for both economies under the second scenario. We choose this
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scenario because it has the highest κ, and the possibility of obtaining a dynamic
Laffer effect is the largest of all scenarios.
Figure 5.6: Impulse Response Functions of Fiscal Policies
(a) Continental Europe II: ∆sZ = 0.01
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(b) United Kingdom II: ∆sZ = 0.01
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Notes: Impulse responses of an unexpected and permanent shock at time 0 for both the TEG
equilibrium (solid line) and PEG equilibrium (dashed line). The vertical axes show ratios, and the
horizontal axes show time in years. Based on scenario II.
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For Continental Europe, the debt-to-output ratio increases over time (see Figure
5.6a), which means the resources that come available in the future, as a result of
the predetermined path of transfers, are insufficient to cover the initial deterioration
of the budget balance of the government and the temporary increase in government
debt. The same result is obtained for the United Kingdom. None of the fiscal
policies lead to a dynamic Laffer effect, which can be explained by the relatively
large deterioration of the government budget balance in the short run compared to
the resulting efficiency gains of these policies; see Van Oudheusden (2009).
5.4.2.3. Distorting Financing Scheme
As a final financing scheme, we consider the case where changes in the budget balance
of the government, as a result of fiscal policies, are offset by adjusting expenditures
or other distorting taxes. In addition, we assume constant output shares of lump-
sum transfers and debt. The previous results already suggest what to expect. We
know that adjusting government expenditures or the consumption tax are the most
expensive way, in terms of their impact on the budget balance of the government, to
promote economic activity; see Table 5.3. Thus, they should be the least expensive
way, in terms of their impact on economic activity, to offset changes in the budget
balance of the government. This expectation is confirmed in Table 5.4.
For tax incentives with respect to research effort, offsetting changes in the gov-
ernment budget balance with the consumption tax leads to an increase in the growth
rate per capita that is on average 94 percent of the increase under the non-distorting
finance scheme. Adjusting the tax rate on labor income or capital income are less
efficient with percentages of around 92 and 65, respectively. When financing a lower
tax rate on capital income by adjusting the consumption tax rate, the increase in
the growth rate per capita is only 82 percent of the increase under the non-distorting
finance scheme. In all cases, changes in the share of time endowment allocated to
labor are relatively small. Adjustments of the consumption tax rate also lead to the
largest gain in welfare.33
33Financing with government expenditures does lead to a higher gain in welfare, but this is the
results of government expenditures being modeled as waste. Lower expenditures then imply that















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 5: Dynamic Scoring in a model with Creative Destruction
In general, making tax incentives with respect to research effort more generous
is the least costly way to boost economic activity. If non-distorting finance options
are excluded, then adjusting government expenditures and the consumption tax to
finance this policy lead to the smallest loss in efficiency. The last result may be
changed when giving government expenditures a more prominent role in the frame-
work. In our framework, government expenditures are modeled as waste. Including
them in the utility function in a separable way may be useful for welfare analysis, but
it does not change the results; see Agell and Persson (2001) and Trabandt and Uh-
lig (2011). When included in a non-separable way, government expenditures affect
the effective intertemporal elasticity of substitution (Agell and Persson, 2001; Van
Oudheusden, 2009) and possibly transitional dynamics (Van Oudheusden, 2009).34
The general findings, however, should remain valid.
5.5. Conclusions
Using a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium framework featuring endogenous
growth through creative destruction, we analyze dynamic feedback effects of fiscal
policies on the government budget balance for several European countries. Mak-
ing tax incentives with respect to research effort more generous is the least costly
way, in terms of the impact on the government budget, to boost economic activity.
Moreover, this policy is almost three times as cost effective as the next best policy,
which is a lower tax rate on capital income. A dynamic Laffer effect is never possi-
ble for any of the fiscal policies. If financing with non-distorting means is excluded,
adjusting government expenditures and the consumption tax rate are the preferred
policies to keep the long-run government budget balanced. Governments that face
the challenge to set fiscal policies such that they result in sufficient revenues to deal
with long-run budget challenges and promote economic growth at the same time
could possibly benefit by taking into account the above findings.
34Transitional dynamics are influenced in the case where the PEG equilibrium is locally stable,
which is not the case in our analysis. See Leeper and Yang (2008) for an additional discussion on
including government expenditures in dynamic scoring analyses.
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Conclusions
Future research could usefully focus on extending the framework with additional
growth engines; for example, the inclusion of human capital accumulation or a more
elaborate process of the investment and depreciation of physical capital. However,
explicitly modeling intermediate good specific capital stocks may change research
effort incentives by introducing an additional element of competition. Firms then
not only compete on basis of their relative quality but also have to take into ac-
count the stock of machines of competitors. This may create an additional role for
government policies in the form of directed R&D subsidies or sector specific depre-
ciation allowances. Including public R&D expenditures in addition to private R&D
expenditures may be another avenue for future research.
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Appendix 5.A
This appendix describes the derivations of equations (5.8), (5.9), and (5.15). More-
over, it provides the data, and corresponding sources, we use in the calibration of
the model.
5.A.1 Derivation of Equations
Derivation of (5.8)
The derivation of equation (5.8) is as follows. Assume that the leading-edge quality
























where v > 1, Q(0) > 0, S(t) is the total number of innovations between time 0 and
time t, and Ṡ(t) = z(t) is the aggregate flow of innovations.
Derivation of (5.9)
In deriving equation (5.9), we follow Aghion and Howitt (1998, p.115). We define
Θ(t) ≡ F (Q̄, t) as the mass of intermediate goods that are produced with quality lower
than Q̄ > 0, where F (·, t) is the cumulative distribution function of absolute qualities
at time t, and Q̄ is the leading-edge quality at time t0 ≥ 0. This means that Q(t0) = Q̄
and Θ(t0) = 1. As a result of innovations, intermediate goods that are being produced
with qualities lower than Q̄ jump to the leading-edge quality so that Θ(t) decreases
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over time. More specifically, this process is given by Θ̇(t) = −Θ(t)z(t) ∀ t ≥ t0, which
says that the decline in Θ(t) equals the number of intermediate goods with quality
lower than Q̄ times the aggregate flow rate of new innovations z(t). From equation
(5.8), we know that in general the leading-edge quality evolves over time according























with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and q ≡ Q̄/Q(t). Since Θ(t) is the mass of intermediate goods that
are produced with quality lower than qQ(t) at time t, the distribution function of
quality Qi(t) with relative quality q can be given by J(q) ≡ qv−1. This means that the
distribution function of any quality Qi(t) is independent of the leading-edge quality.
Moreover, intermediate goods can be classified according to their relative qualities












v − 1 + θ
Q(t)θ.
Derivation of (5.15)
The derivation of equation (5.15) is standard though quite tedious. Basically, we
combine the intratemporal optimality condition between consumption and leisure,
the intertemporal optimality condition that says the return on consumption should
equal the return on investment, and the aggregate resource constraint.
The intratemporal optimality condition between leisure and per capita consump-
tion is obtained by dividing equation (5.12b) by equation (5.12a) and says that at
each point in time the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and per capita
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(5.2), (5.3), (5.5), and (5.8). Taking the logarithm and subsequently the time deriva-











The return on consumption is given by
ρ− λ̇(t)
λ(t)







where the expression for λ̇(t)/λ(t) is obtained by taking the logarithm and subse-

























where we use equations (5.6)–(5.9), and zi(t) = z(t) since the return on research effort
is the same for all intermediate goods and the total number of intermediate goods













which says that the return on consumption should equal the return on investment.
The derivation of the condition corresponding to the aggregate resource con-
straint is as follows. First, we multiply the per capita budget constraint (5.11b)




Vi(t|Qi(t))di since we have a closed economy. We further use that per-
fect competition in the research sector implies zi(t|Qi(t))Vi(t|Qi(t) = (1− sZ)Zi(t|Qi(t)),
perfect competition in the final good sector implies
∫ 1
0





θxi(t|Qi(t)) = Y (t)−X(t), and G(t) = ωGY (t) so that the aggregate resource






































































φ εβ − 1
εβ
L(t),
Z(t) = (v − 1) Q̇(t)
Q(t)
η−1Q(t)φ,





1−εβ , Z(t) = z(t)η−1Q(t)φ, and equa-
tions (5.1), (5.2), (5.3), (5.8), (5.9), (5.12a), and (5.12b). The aggregate resource

































. Combining equation (5.15a)–(5.15f)
and rearranging terms gives equation (5.15).
5.A.2 Data
The data are on the next pages.
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